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Georg Lauenstein

@gsec
Trusted contributorCompletionist
11 followers468 downloads740 copies45 likes15,785 views

211 detections

Detects a camera management software binary (e.g. iVMS-4200,
SmartPSS, NVR/DVR viewers, vendor CMS/VMS clients) spawning cmd.exe,
powershell.exe or pwsh.exe. In this campaign the compromised vendor update
channel abused the trusted, signed vendor executable to proxy execution of
follow-on payloads and shell commands, inheriting the vendor signature to
evade application allowlisting and static detection.
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Georg Lauenstein@gsec
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SecOps Signals
12 days ago
3013
Detects Windows web/PHP worker processes (php.exe, php-cgi.exe,
apache.exe, httpd.exe, lsphp.exe, nginx.exe) spawning unexpected command shells
or download utilities. Exploitation of CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619 in core
PHP grants unauthenticated RCE; the child process is the observable artifact since
the memory corruption leaves no trace in the PHP logs. mod_php deployments are
the highest-risk configuration.
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Georg Lauenstein@gsec
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SecOps Signals
21 days ago
402114
Detects exploitation of the PHP2Shell RCE vulnerabilities in core PHP
(CVE-2026-109618 out-of-memory corruption and CVE-2026-109619 stale global state),
which allow unauthenticated remote code execution delivered through malicious
multipart uploads. Successful exploitation causes the PHP-FPM/Apache/httpd/lsphp
worker, typically running as www-data, to spawn a system shell (sh, bash, cmd,
powershell) or a download utility (curl, wget) to retrieve a second-stage payload.
A web server process spawning an interactive shell is a high-fidelity indicator of
web application compromise and should be investigated immediately.
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Georg Lauenstein@gsec
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SecOps Signals
21 days ago
34091
Detects a Run/RunOnce registry value whose data points to an
executable or script in a user-writable location (AppData, Temp, ProgramData,
Users\\Public). Amatera establishes persistence by adding Run key entries that
relaunch the stealer on user logon.
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Georg Lauenstein@gsec
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SecOps Signals
12 days ago
207
Detects process injection targeting a web browser process.
Amatera and comparable infostealers inject into trusted browser processes
such as Chrome, Edge, Brave and Firefox to evade detection and access
credential and cookie data in memory.
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Georg Lauenstein@gsec
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SecOps Signals
12 days ago
207
Detects process command lines referencing browser credential
store filenames such as Chromium "Login Data"/Cookies and Firefox
logins.json/key4.db/cookies.sqlite. Amatera and similar infostealers copy
or read these files to harvest saved passwords and session cookies for
account takeover.
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Georg Lauenstein@gsec
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SecOps Signals
12 days ago
106
Detects creation of a DLL inside a camera management software
installation directory under Program Files. The campaign dropped malicious DLLs
alongside the trusted vendor binary so that the signed camera client side-loads
them at startup, proxying execution through a legitimate vendor process
(T1574.002 / T1036.005).
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Georg Lauenstein@gsec
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SecOps Signals
12 days ago
105
Detects script-driven (curl, wget, python) outbound connections to
AI/LLM API endpoints. The campaign uses legitimate AI platform APIs as covert
command, control, and exfiltration channels, blending malicious traffic with
approved web services to evade network-based detection.
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Georg Lauenstein@gsec
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SecOps Signals
21 days ago
6020
Detects password spraying: a single source IP generating failed
logins against many distinct accounts in a short window. AI-assisted planning
can produce low-rate credential attacks designed to stay under per-account
lockout thresholds; the distinguishing signal is breadth across users rather
than volume per user.
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Georg Lauenstein@gsec
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SecOps Signals
21 days ago
5117
Detects cmd.exe launched from the Windows Run dialog (explorer.exe
parent) downloading a payload with a living-off-the-land transfer utility such as
certutil, bitsadmin or curl. ClickFix pasted commands frequently chain cmd.exe with
these built-in binaries to fetch the secondary malware stage.
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Georg Lauenstein@gsec
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SecOps Signals
21 days ago
33015
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