Georg Lauenstein
@gsecTrusted contributorCompletionist
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211 detections
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Detects usage of wevtutil to clear Security or System event logs
as observed in The Gentlemen ransomware operations for defense evasion and
covering tracks of their malicious activities.
as observed in The Gentlemen ransomware operations for defense evasion and
covering tracks of their malicious activities.
Detects the use of vim and its siblings commands to execute a shell or proxy commands.\nSuch behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or breaking out from restricted environments.
Detects use of wmic to add Microsoft Defender scan exclusions via the
MSFT_MpPreference WMI class, targeting a program-files path and executable named to
impersonate Windows Defender. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) ran this exact wmic invocation
before deploying the CoolClient backdoor to a fake "Microsoft\Windows Defender"
directory, excluding both the folder and the renamed sideloader defender.exe from
scanning.
MSFT_MpPreference WMI class, targeting a program-files path and executable named to
impersonate Windows Defender. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) ran this exact wmic invocation
before deploying the CoolClient backdoor to a fake "Microsoft\Windows Defender"
directory, excluding both the folder and the renamed sideloader defender.exe from
scanning.
Detects wmic being used to add a Microsoft Defender exclusion for a fake "Microsoft\Windows Defender" installation directory. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) runs this command via the MSFT_MpPreference WMI class before dropping the CoolClient sideloader (defender.exe) and libngs.dll into that duplicated folder, ensuring the malware is never scanned. The legitimate Windows Defender path does not contain a "Microsoft\" subfolder, making this exclusion target distinctive.
Detects post-exploitation activity against Ivanti ICS / Connect Secure
appliances on Windows hosts, where a script host (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, w3wp.exe)
drops a web shell (.aspx/.ashx/.asmx) into the appliance WebRoot or reaches into the
CredentialStore / system binaries. These behaviors are the hallmark of attackers
converting an authenticated file-write or SSRF into persistent remote code execution
and credential theft on edge devices.
appliances on Windows hosts, where a script host (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, w3wp.exe)
drops a web shell (.aspx/.ashx/.asmx) into the appliance WebRoot or reaches into the
CredentialStore / system binaries. These behaviors are the hallmark of attackers
converting an authenticated file-write or SSRF into persistent remote code execution
and credential theft on edge devices.
Detects creation of a JSP/JSPX/WAR server-side script inside
an AhsayCBS installation or web application directory. In this campaign the
actors exploited critical AhsayCBS vulnerabilities and dropped webshells into
the application web directories to maintain persistent remote access. Legitimate
deployment writes scripts from the AhsayCBS updater, not ad-hoc into web roots.
an AhsayCBS installation or web application directory. In this campaign the
actors exploited critical AhsayCBS vulnerabilities and dropped webshells into
the application web directories to maintain persistent remote access. Legitimate
deployment writes scripts from the AhsayCBS updater, not ad-hoc into web roots.
Detects creation of Windows registry hive files (ntuser.dat or UsrClass.dat) outside the expected user profile path hierarchy. LegacyHive writes a modified ntuser.dat to a GUID-named staging directory at C:\\ root (e.g. C:\\{GUID}\\ntuser.dat) and copies UsrClass.dat there as well to set up the oplock-based race condition. Any hive file materialising outside C:\\Users\\ or C:\\Windows\\ is a strong indicator of this exploit chain or equivalent offline hive manipulation.
Detects the odbcconf LOLBin delivery step assessed for the MuddyWater-linked PatchAgent chain: 'odbcconf /f cloud.rsp' launched from a PatchAgent working directory, typically via a ClickFix lure (explorer -> conhost --headless -> cmd -> odbcconf) fetching the response file over WebDAV. odbcconf executing a .rsp response file is rare in legitimate use and is high-fidelity when paired with WebDAV or a user-writable working directory.
Detects creation of a scheduled task named "Windows Defender Advanced
Threat Protection Service" configured to run at system startup with SYSTEM privileges
and launch an executable named defender.exe. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) used this exact
schtasks command to establish boot persistence for the CoolClient backdoor sideloader,
masquerading the task and binary as a legitimate Windows Defender component.
Threat Protection Service" configured to run at system startup with SYSTEM privileges
and launch an executable named defender.exe. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) used this exact
schtasks command to establish boot persistence for the CoolClient backdoor sideloader,
masquerading the task and binary as a legitimate Windows Defender component.
Detects schtasks.exe creating a scheduled task named "Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection Service" that launches defender.exe (a renamed Sangfor executable abused for DLL sideloading) with SYSTEM privileges at startup. This is the exact persistence mechanism HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) uses to relaunch the CoolClient backdoor chain from the fake "Microsoft\Windows Defender" directory on every boot.
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