Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of `sqlcmd.exe` with command-line arguments indicative of database enumeration or backup activities, specifically targeting common system databases and processes. This pattern has been associated with Conti ransomware for dumping database contents.
Detects attempts to exfiltrate data by posting a file using the `wget` utility. This can be particularly dangerous if an adversary leverages misconfigured sudo permissions for `wget` to read sensitive files like `/etc/shadow` and then exfiltrate them.
This rule detects attempts to export an AWS EC2 instance, specifically when the 'CreateInstanceExportTask' event is logged in AWS CloudTrail. This action can be an indicator of an adversary attempting to exfiltrate data from a compromised EC2 instance by exporting it as a virtual machine image. The rule specifically looks for successful export task creations, filtering out events that contain error messages or codes, or indicate a 'Failure' in the response elements.
This rule detects when an AWS RDS database instance is restored from a snapshot and configured to be publicly accessible. This activity could indicate an attempt to exfiltrate data by making a copy of a database publicly available.
This rule detects outbound network connections to ngrok tunneling service endpoints. Ngrok is a legitimate tool that can be used to expose local servers to the internet, but it is also frequently leveraged by malicious actors for data exfiltration, command and control, and bypassing network restrictions. Detection of communication to these specific ngrok domains could indicate unauthorized use of the service for malicious purposes.
Detects the execution of 'openssl' with specific command-line arguments to connect to an IP address on ports 443 or 8080. This activity has been observed in campaigns by UNC4841 for SSL certificate exfiltration and as a C2 channel using named pipes. Further investigation of commands executed in the temporal vicinity of this activity is recommended.
Detects the creation of files with a specific naming pattern '/mail/tmp/[a-zA-Z0-9]{3}[0-9]{3}.tar.gz' which has been observed to be used by the threat actor UNC4841 for staging and exfiltration of email-related data.
This rule detects the execution of the 'split' command on Linux systems. The 'split' command is used to break a file into smaller pieces, which can be a technique used by adversaries to bypass data transfer size limits during exfiltration or to make files easier to transfer.
Detects the execution of known tunneling and exfiltration tools such as httptunnel, plink, socat, and stunnel. These tools can be abused by adversaries to establish covert communication channels, bypass network restrictions, and exfiltrate data from compromised systems.
Detects DNS queries for subdomains related to the MEGA cloud storage service. This activity can indicate data exfiltration to cloud storage, potentially using tools like Rclone.
Detects the execution of the Rclone utility, which is often used by ransomware strains like REvil, Conti, and FiveHands for data exfiltration to cloud storage services. The rule looks for specific command-line arguments and image names associated with Rclone.
Detects the use of rclone, a command-line program to manage files on cloud storage, by identifying its default user-agent string in proxy logs. This activity can indicate data exfiltration to cloud storage services.
Detects DNS queries to "ufile.io", which has been observed as a method for data exfiltration by malware and threat actors. This rule specifically looks for Event ID 3008 in the Microsoft-Windows-DNS Client Events/Operational log where the QueryName contains 'ufile.io'.
Detects suspicious process patterns indicative of NTDS.DIT exfiltration attempts. This includes the use of specific tools like NTDSDumpEx, PowerShell scripts (e.g., NTDSgrab.ps1), and command-line utilities (ntdsutil.exe, copy command) to access or copy the ntds.dit file. The rule also looks for these activities originating from suspicious image folders like Apache, Tomcat, AppData, Temp, Public, or PerfLogs.
Detects when Microsoft Cloud App Security identifies a user or IP address using an unsanctioned application to perform activities resembling data exfiltration from the organization. This rule specifically triggers on 'Data exfiltration to unsanctioned apps' events with a 'success' status from the SecurityComplianceCenter event source.
This rule detects the execution of the 'split' command, which is commonly used to break large files into smaller, more manageable pieces. Adversaries may use this technique to circumvent data transfer size limits during exfiltration or to prepare data for transfer through channels with size restrictions. The detection focuses on the command line execution of the 'split' utility.
This rule detects suspicious Windows file path strings (e.g., 'C:/Users', 'C:/Windows', 'C:/Program Files') within the URI query component of web requests. The presence of such strings in a URI could indicate an attempt to exfiltrate data from a Windows system or communicate with a webshell that is attempting to access local files or directories. The rule looks for both standard and URL-encoded variations of these paths.
Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to access the default Windows Mail App mailbox data. This activity could indicate an adversary trying to manipulate, exfiltrate, or delete stored emails. The detection specifically looks for the string '\Comms\Unistore\data' within PowerShell script blocks, which points to the location where the Windows Mail App stores its data.
This rule detects DNS queries for subdomains associated with the MEGA cloud storage service, specifically 'userstorage.mega.co.nz'. Such queries can indicate attempts to exfiltrate data to MEGA, potentially using tools like Rclone, or legitimate usage of the service. The rule focuses on the DNS layer to identify communication with this cloud storage provider.
Detects DNS queries to "ufile.io", which has been observed as a method for data exfiltration by malware and threat actors. This service can be used to upload and share files, making it a convenient target for adversaries to move stolen data out of a compromised network.
Alert when a user has performed an export to a search using 'New-ComplianceSearchAction' with the '-Export' flag. This detection will detect PST export even if the 'eDiscovery search or exported' alert is disabled in the O365. This rule will apply to ExchangePowerShell usage and from the cloud.
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