Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects GitHub repository actions (git.clone, oauth_authorization.create, repo.download_zip) from actor IPs not seen for that user in the prior 30 days, requiring either 3+ actions or activity across 2+ distinct repositories from the new IP within the same day. Aggregating to burst/multi-repo behavior (rather than alerting on a single new-IP event) filters out one-off false positives from travel, VPNs, or dynamic IP reassignment while still surfacing sustained anomalous access patterns consistent with account compromise or bulk exfiltration.
Detects the exfiltration behavior of the Sauron Loader, where a process tree associated with rnpkeys.exe or its modules (rnp.dll, tdwp.dll) within the C:\ProgramData\keyroll directory performs a burst of numerous small HTTPS POST requests to a single destination. This pattern is characteristic of a screenshot image being fragmented into small chunks and exfiltrated.
Detects high-volume file download, access, or preview activity originating from known anonymous proxy services. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration or unauthorized mass data collection from cloud storage applications.
The following analytic identifies when an O365 email account sends an excessive number of email attachments to external recipients within a short period (within 1 hour).
This behavior may indicate a compromised account where the threat actor is attempting to exfiltrate data from the mailbox.
Threat actors may attempt to transfer data through email as a simple means of exfiltration from the compromised mailbox.
Some account owner legitimate behaviors can trigger this alert, however these actions may not be aligned with organizational expectations / best practice behaviors.
This behavior may indicate a compromised account where the threat actor is attempting to exfiltrate data from the mailbox.
Threat actors may attempt to transfer data through email as a simple means of exfiltration from the compromised mailbox.
Some account owner legitimate behaviors can trigger this alert, however these actions may not be aligned with organizational expectations / best practice behaviors.
Detects outbound HTTP/HTTPS POST requests where the URI, query string, or path contains evidence of sensitive credential material, such as AWS access keys, private key blocks, or common environment variable patterns, indicative of potential credential harvesting and exfiltration to an external destination.
Detects network traffic associated with the RisePro malware family, specifically identifying the use of 'serversendfile' commands, which indicates data exfiltration or file transfer activity via a command-and-control channel.
This rule detects outgoing HTTP POST requests to discord.com API webhooks, specifically containing patterns characteristic of XWorm malware, such as exfiltrating machine information identified by Username and IP fields.
Detects unauthorized outbound network traffic from browser processes to the lookalike domain 'pdf.gusercontent.com'. This domain is associated with a malicious Firefox browser extension, 'PDF Identity Verifier', which is designed to exfiltrate session telemetry and data from Google account sessions.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests associated with the Psychedelic Stealer malware, which attempts to exfiltrate data from web browser-based cryptocurrency wallet extensions by targeting specific API endpoints and wallet extension IDs.
Detects a specific command and control (C2) communication pattern characteristic of RatHat malware, involving the retrieval of HTML overlay templates followed by the submission of captured form or credential data from the same device within a one-hour window.
Detects network activity associated with the RatHat Android malware, specifically the exfiltration of accessibility tree data and calls to Google's Generative Language API (gemini-2.5-flash-lite) for UI target resolution and automation.
Detects communication patterns associated with the RatHat Android banking trojan. The rule identifies a multi-stage C2 flow: first, the device fetches malicious overlay configurations (templates for spoofed login screens) and subsequently exfiltrates captured credentials or form data to the adversary's infrastructure via POST requests.
Detects a specific behavioral chain associated with the CHOSEN BRICK implant. This rule identifies when a suspected malicious process writes image/screenshot files (.png, .jpg, .bmp) to disk, followed by a network connection to the Telegram Bot API within a 15-minute window, suggesting potential data exfiltration.
Detects execution of the CHOSEN BRICK implant (process names smdqservice.exe or winappx.exe) initiating a network connection to Telegram infrastructure (C2) followed by a network connection to a cloud object-storage provider (vultrobjects.com, storjshare.io, or backblazeb2.com) for data exfiltration within a 30-minute window.
Detects the installation of known AI-powered coding assistant extensions (e.g., Copilot, Tabnine, Cursor) on a device, followed by significant source-code repository cloning or archival activity by Git within two hours. This pattern is potentially indicative of intellectual property theft or sensitive source code exfiltration facilitated by a newly introduced AI tool.
Detects the installation of known AI-powered coding assistant extensions (e.g., Copilot, Tabnine, Cursor) on a device, followed by significant source-code repository cloning or archival activity by Git within two hours. This pattern is potentially indicative of intellectual property theft or sensitive source code exfiltration facilitated by a newly introduced AI tool.
Detects the use of command-line tools such as rclone, aws CLI, gsutil, and curl to upload files associated with machine learning models (e.g., weights, checkpoints, training datasets) to public cloud storage or AI model hosting platforms. This pattern may indicate the exfiltration of sensitive proprietary AI research or training data.
Detects outbound network traffic (TLS SNI and HTTP requests) directed to the Telegram Bot API endpoint. This behavior is often associated with malware using Telegram as a command-and-control (C2) channel or for the exfiltration of stolen data, credentials, or sensitive information.
This rule set detects network communication patterns associated with the AnonyMousKIT phishing kit, specifically targeting the exfiltration of captured user credentials to the Telegram Bot API and communication with known phishing panel infrastructure. It monitors for DNS lookups of 'anomkit.shop', established TCP connections to the associated backend relay, and HTTP requests containing specific credential-related keywords directed towards the Telegram API.
Detects network traffic to the Telegram Bot API originating from processes other than the official Telegram desktop client. The rule correlates this network activity with the presence of specific suspicious or renamed processes (e.g., SMQDService, winappx.exe) associated with the CHOSEN BRICK campaign.
Detects HTTP POST requests to a known suspicious endpoint ('/board.php') often used by the Chinotto Python backdoor. The rule monitors for outgoing web traffic containing 'data=' parameters or connections to known malicious domains, indicating potential exfiltration of base64-encoded command output.
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