Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of a hidden directory under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Google Chrome. This technique is used by a Vietnamese threat actor associated with the PureRAT campaign to stage malicious components while blending in with legitimate application data.
Detects the presence and execution of Defendnot components. This tool is used to disable Microsoft Defender by exploiting the Windows Security Center trust model, which involves injecting a malicious DLL into the trusted Task Manager process.
Detects the creation of a macOS Launch Agent by a suspicious process or with a name matching patterns used by the BlueNoroff group. BlueNoroff uses Launch Agents for persistence on compromised macOS systems.
Detects the installation of malicious browser extensions associated with the DarkSpectre threat actor, which includes the ShadyPanda, Zoom Stealer, and GhostPoster campaigns. Detection is based on known malicious extension IDs observed in file paths and registry keys for Chrome, Edge, and Firefox.
This rule detects suspicious process creation patterns indicative of the MuddyWater (also known as RustyWater) APT group. Specifically, it looks for Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) launching scripting or Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBins) such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe. The detection is further narrowed down by checking if these processes are created in suspicious writable paths like ProgramData, Users\Public, AppData\Roaming, or AppData\Local\Temp. Additionally, the rule includes optional enrichment for known MuddyWater/RustyWater payload names (reddit.exe, art.exe, cloud.exe, nginx.exe), persistence via the Run registry key, and the dropping of a specific staging artifact named 'CertificationKit.ini'.
Detects the installation of malicious Chrome extensions known to steal ChatGPT/DeepSeek conversations by looking for the creation of files in directories named with specific malicious extension IDs. This rule identifies file creation events within folders corresponding to known malicious Chrome extension IDs, indicating their installation on a device.
Detects ransom note creation associated with Yurei ransomware.
Detects AI/ML model configuration files (e.g., config.json, model_config.yaml) containing a suspicious '_target_' value, which could indicate an attempt to exploit a Hydra instantiation vulnerability for remote code execution (RCE).
Detects a script process (wscript.exe/cscript.exe) creating files in a specific HP-themed path and then creating a Run key for persistence, indicative of the Turla Kazuar VBScript dropper.
This query detects when a user downloads a potentially malicious or unauthorized file type (e.g., executable, script, archive) from the internet using a web browser. It leverages endpoint file creation events from data mapped to the Elastic Common Schema (ECS).
This rule detects when Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) create INI files within the `C:\ProgramData\` directory. This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity, such as macro-enabled documents dropping configuration files or payloads, or other forms of malware attempting to establish persistence or store data in a less scrutinized location.
This detection identifies the creation of an Internet Shortcut (.url) file in a user's Startup folder. This is a persistence mechanism (T1547.001) used by adversaries like the PHALT#BLYX campaign, which created a .url file pointing to a local executable using the 'file:///' protocol to launch malware at logon. The rule specifically looks for the creation of '.url' files in the Startup folder and includes a filter for a known IOC ('DeleteApp.url') from the PHALT#BLYX campaign, as well as excluding common legitimate processes like web browsers and explorer.exe as initiating processes.
Detects the creation and subsequent execution of a masqueraded binary named "CertificationKit.ini" in the C:\ProgramData directory. This technique has been observed in recent MuddyWater campaigns where a .ini file extension is used to disguise an executable, which is then launched via cmd.exe.
vvs-stealer
KQL
This rule detects activities associated with the VVS Stealer malware, as described in the Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 blog. It identifies the malware through specific SHA256 hashes of known VVS Stealer executables, network connections to hardcoded Discord webhook URLs used for exfiltration, persistence mechanisms via creation of executables in Windows startup folders, creation of '_vault.zip' files (likely containing stolen data), and suspicious Discord-related process activity indicative of the stealer's operation.
Detects the creation of abnormally large Windows shortcut (.lnk) files. This is a known TTP of APT36 (Transparent Tribe), who embed PDF content within LNK files to inflate their size and masquerade as legitimate documents to deceive users. The rule specifically looks for .lnk files with a size greater than 1MB.
PHALT BLYX Startup URL Persistence
Cortex XDR
Detects the creation of .url files in the Windows Startup folder, which can be used for persistence. Specifically identifies a known IOC for PHALT BLYX malware ('DeleteApp.url') and flags other suspicious .url file creations in the Startup folder. This rule filters out common browser processes that might legitimately create .url files.
This rule detects several suspicious activities often associated with post-exploitation and defense evasion. It identifies PowerShell commands used for recursively searching for msbuild.exe, tampering with Windows Defender settings (disabling real-time monitoring or adding exclusions), and downloading files from the internet to common temporary or application data directories. Additionally, it flags msbuild.exe executing suspicious .proj files from temporary directories, and any executable launched from temporary or program data folders by PowerShell or MSBuild. The rule also includes detection for persistence via .url file creation in the Startup folder and the dropping of specific suspicious files (.proj, pins.dat, staxs.exe, tybd7.exe) by PowerShell or MSBuild in temporary or program data directories.
Detects the creation of DLL files named with a GUID pattern in common staging directories. This technique was observed being used by the threat actor UKC-1230 to drop surrogate COM DLLs for persistence.
Detects malicious browser extensions associated with the DarkSpectre 'Zoom Stealer' campaign by identifying known malicious extension IDs. The campaign uses these extensions for corporate espionage by stealing meeting intelligence from various video conferencing platforms.
This rule detects the creation of files with specific malicious extension IDs on devices. These extensions are typically associated with browser-based malware or unwanted programs that modify browser behavior, steal data, or perform other malicious activities. The rule specifically looks for `FileCreated` events where the `FileName` matches any of the predefined malicious extension IDs.
Detects suspicious file creations in temporary or user application data directories immediately following browser process activities, indicating potential injected content saved to disk. Aligns with MITRE DET0349 guidance.
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