Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,918 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,568
780
216
110
94
Contributors
703
507
419
236
211
Categories
20,443
11,831
5,875
5,151
4,864
2,918
Platforms
2,584
507
385
83
17
Products / Services
1,265
605
83
82
72
MITRE Techniques
841
797
582
344
307
CVEs
24
8
8
5
5
Detects persistence via an Internet Shortcut (.url) file in a startup folder that points to a local executable (file://). This is a known TTP of the PHALT#BLYX campaign.
Detects activity related to OpenClaw (aka Clawdbot or Moltbot) by searching for specific process command line strings, file path keywords, network listeners on port 18789, or scheduled tasks named 'OpenClaw'.
This rule detects activity associated with a developer-targeting campaign leveraging malicious Next.js repositories. It identifies suspicious network connections to known Vercel staging domains and C2 IPs/ports/paths, as well as suspicious process execution patterns involving Node.js or VS Code related processes, and file events related to specific repository artifacts or sensitive file access by developer-adjacent processes. The detection logic covers network communication, process execution, and file system activities indicative of this specific threat.
This rule detects files by their SHA256 hash that are known to be associated with the exploitation of CVE-2026-1731. This includes payloads such as SparkRAT, VShell, and various web shells and droppers.
This rule set detects indicators of compromise associated with the RESURGE activity targeting Ivanti Connect Secure devices, as described by CISA. It looks for specific file hashes, the presence of a covert socket path (.logsrv), and modifications to key Ivanti filesystem artifacts such as LD_PRELOAD, DSUpgrade.pm, coreboot.img, and scanner.py. A match indicates potential compromise and requires further investigation to confirm the asset role, timing of file appearance, and comparison with approved maintenance windows. If hits are found, collect logs and file copies, reduce external exposure, and look for unusual activity like unexpected administrator actions or unfamiliar outbound connections.
Detects creation or modification of repository controlled Claude Code project configuration files (.claude/settings.json or .mcp.json) which were abused for code execution and token exfiltration.
This rule helps identify suspicious repository files that may try to run code automatically when a developer opens a project in an editor or when a build starts. It searches for the exact wording used by the editor to auto run tasks when a folder is opened, and it also looks for a set of web addresses published in public reporting that were used to deliver additional code. A match does not always mean the repository is malicious, but it does mean the file deserves careful review before it is executed on a developer machine. If you see a hit, confirm the repository source, check for unexpected scripts or obfuscated code, and review recent network traffic for connections to the listed staging sites. If the repository is not clearly trusted, isolate the environment, remove the project from production developer workstations, and rotate any secrets that may have been available. This rule is meant to provide a clear and understandable safety check for teams that regularly clone and run new code.
Detects the presence of malicious Chrome extensions associated with the 10xprofit affiliate hijacking campaign. These extensions are installed as folders with the extension ID as the name in the user's browser profile directory. The rule identifies file events in common browser extension paths for Chrome and Edge, extracts the extension ID, and checks if it matches a known list of malicious IDs.
Detects files with hashes reported as the ransomware payload in the incident report.
Detects a process performing rapid, high-volume file system enumeration across multiple drives while deliberately avoiding critical system directories, a behavior consistent with the reconnaissance phase of Gunra ransomware.
This rule detects activities associated with the XWorm LATAM campaign. It identifies network indicators such as specific C2 domains (jholycf100.ddns.com.br, voulerlivros.com.br, res.cloudinary.com), a specific IP address (152.249.17.145), and a destination port (7000). It also looks for the abuse of CasPol.exe making outbound connections to the identified C2 infrastructure. Furthermore, the rule detects PowerShell processes spawned by WMI (WmiPrvSE.exe) that attempt to fetch content from Cloudinary and load assemblies in memory, indicating potential in-memory execution. Finally, it includes a specific SHA256 file hash (7befeacf0b3480fb675d0cab7767b5b9697edc9d0e05982025a06ead0054afd5) associated with the campaign.
This rule detects activity associated with the DYNOWIPER malware, identified by specific SHA256 hashes on endpoint telemetry or by network connections to known command and control (C2) IP addresses. The rule is split into two parts: one for endpoint detection based on file hashes and another for network/authentication logs based on IP addresses.
This rule detects activity related to the DKnife gateway AitM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) threat, as detailed in Talos Intelligence reporting. It identifies specific binary names (dknife.bin, sslmm.bin, postapi.bin, rules.bin, sshapi.bin, inotify.bin, curlapi.bin) associated with the threat, either as process names or file names. Additionally, it looks for configuration artifacts (rules.conf, sslmm.cfg, url.cfg) used by the proxy/redirect logic, either as file names or within process command lines. Finally, the rule identifies exfiltration or tagging markers (dkimsi=, 460110672021628, PASSWORD) observed in logs or artifacts, which are indicative of DKnife's reporting mechanisms.
This rule helps you find files that may be part of the EmEditor watering hole incident by looking for a small set of very specific clues that were described in public reporting. It searches for lookalike website names and a repeated campaign marker that appeared in the attacker’s network paths. A match does not automatically prove malware, but it is a strong hint that the file should be reviewed, especially if it is a script, configuration, or installer related content. If you get a hit, confirm where the file came from and whether it is expected for that machine. If it is unexpected, save the file for analysis, check for other related downloads, and look for signs of credential theft or surveillance activity. Also search for the same marker across endpoints, because campaigns often reuse the same identifier on multiple victims. The intent is to give defenders an easy, reliable starting point for triage using human readable clues.
Detects the creation of a Ruby runtime environment in unusual ProgramData subdirectories and the renaming of the Ruby interpreter to masquerade as a USB utility, a technique used by APT37's SNAKEDROPPER malware. Specifically looks for file events in 'C:\ProgramData\usbspeed' or 'C:\ProgramData\ruby3' where the filename is 'usbspeed.exe' or the previous filename was 'rubyw.exe'.
Detects creation or presence of NTDS.dit and SYSTEM hive files in a user desktop context, consistent with reported domain controller disk mount and offline credential dumping activity.
This rule detects activity associated with the DYNOWIPER malware. It identifies the malware through specific SHA256 file hashes, known filenames (dynacom_update.exe, source.exe, schtask.exe, dynacon_update.ps1, exp.ps1), and process names (dynacom_update.exe, source.exe, schtask.exe, powershell.exe). Additionally, it flags network connections to or from a set of known malicious IP addresses (185.200.177.10, 31.172.71.5, 193.200.17.163, 185.82.127.20, 72.62.35.76) which are associated with VPN logins or exfiltration reverse proxies used by DYNOWIPER.
Detects creation or modification of goon.zip, an attacker staging archive reported by Unit 42 in a Muddled Libra intrusion.
This rule helps you find files that may be connected to RESURGE activity affecting Ivanti Connect Secure devices, based on information shared by CISA. It can match in two ways: either the file has an exact fingerprint that CISA published, or the file contains a set of distinctive text clues that CISA included as part of its investigation material. A match should be treated as a strong lead that the device deserves immediate attention. First, confirm the match happened on an Ivanti appliance and not on a security tool repository or a harmless copy of the report. If it is on a live system, limit the device’s exposure, save copies of the matched files, and collect logs so you can understand when the change occurred and what else happened nearby. Use the result to prioritize triage and to guide deeper review of related files and activity on the same host.
Matches marker filenames and propagation strings described in the report.
This rule detects activities related to the DKnife gateway, which is associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) attacks. It identifies the creation of specific DKnife process names (dknife.bin, sslmm.bin, postapi.bin, rules.bin, sshapi.bin, inotify.bin, curlapi.bin), file events involving DKnife configuration artifacts (rules.conf, sslmm.cfg, url.cfg), and the presence of specific marker strings ("dkimsi=", "460110672021628", "PASSWORD") in logs or captured payloads. The rule aims to identify the presence and activity of DKnife components on Linux systems.
Page 106 of 139