Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known IOCs from the trojanized anthropic.claude-code (Open-VSX v2.1.313) SSH backdoor: C2 IP 134.209.82.225, beacon URL, extension.js and tunnel key SHA-256 hashes, and ifconfig.me lookups from VS Code-family/extension-host processes. Results are summarized per device and IOC.
Detects potential DLL sideloading where the legitimate Avira antivirus binary (avscan.exe) loads a custom DLL (avscan.dll) from user-writable directories such as AppData, Public, or ProgramData, potentially accompanied by a configuration file.
Detects DLL files written to user-writable profile folders (Desktop, Downloads, Documents and similar) on Windows endpoints. Attackers use these folders to stage a malicious DLL next to a legitimate executable, often from a phishing archive, so the executable loads it via DLL side-loading. Events are grouped by endpoint and path with DLL names, vendor, SHA-256 and the writing process. Installers and portable apps also match, so triage by hash, vendor, writing process and download source.
Hunts DeviceFileCertificateInfo for files signed by certificates issued by the eight eMudhra (and eight Sectigo) intermediate CAs with compromised weak keys. It matches on issuer hash, issuer name and CA serial, with an optional broader eMudhra/emSign match.
Detects the Tensorlake npm compromise (tensorlake@0.5.144, Shai-Hulud) through the two payload hashes, gh-token-monitor persistence, node or bun running lib/setup.mjs or Math_Symbol.js and node or bun connections to iseekaigogo.com or public Ethereum RPC hosts. It needs Defender for Endpoint events from developer machines and does not see lockfile or package cache contents. The query ran without errors in a live tenant
Detects malicious file hashes, suspicious process executions involving Node.js/Bun running setup scripts, schtasks/powershell persistence monitoring tasks, and connections to known domains/RPC endpoints associated with threat activity. The query ran without errors in a live tenant.
Detects potential staging and execution of files from the Microsoft Vault directory within AppData, often associated with adversary tooling or credential theft.
Detects the correlation of two or more distinct discovery tools or artifacts (such as SharpShares, NetScan, NetExec, ShareFinder, and specific nltest.exe domain trust commands) executed on the same device within a one-hour window.
Detects outdated or vulnerable installations of GitLab and Ruby across devices using TVM software inventory, software vulnerabilities, process events, and file events, checking against known fixed versions for specific CVEs.
Detects the Tensorlake npm 0.5.144 compromise (Shai-Hulud worm via preinstall). Includes a baseline query to identify the affected package/version across Defender inventory, file, network, device and process events, plus preinstall download/obfuscated-exec behaviour. Results are summarized per device/account.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known IOCs from the trojanized anthropic.claude-code (Open-VSX v2.1.313) SSH backdoor: C2 IP 134.209.82.225, beacon URL, extension.js and tunnel key SHA-256 hashes, and ifconfig.me lookups from VS Code-family/extension-host processes. Results are summarized per device and IOC.
Detects potential local privilege escalation (LPE) attempts leveraging the afd.sys vulnerability by correlating LPEClient or FudModule artifact creation, image loads, or process execution with subsequent afd.sys driver loading or exploit guard blocking events within a 60-minute window.
Detects the presence of the OrbitalVoyage payload package or related artifact names in device file and process telemetry, including suspicious APK installations outside of authorized paths.
Detects potential abuse of Tailscale SSH Unix socket forwarding where the tailscaled daemon touches sensitive files/sockets (such as docker.sock or /etc/shadow) or creates/replaces Unix sockets following an SSH session.
Detects endpoint, network, and security log activity matching known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with PEERSTITCH / CL-STA-0954, including specific file hashes, IP addresses, and URLs.
Detects the presence of Cisco SD-WAN vManage software, vulnerabilities related to CVE-2026-76504, associated file artifacts, and process executions across endpoints using inventory and event logs.
Detects the download of potentially suspicious executables, scripts, or archives originating from code hosting platforms like GitHub, GitLab, and various mirrors where files have low prevalence and lack valid signatures.
Detects potential abuse of Tailscale SSH Unix socket forwarding where the tailscaled daemon touches sensitive files/sockets (such as docker.sock or /etc/shadow) or creates/replaces Unix sockets following an SSH session.
Detects host-side telemetry indicating Cairn agent worker artifacts, including specific process command line terms, tsec skill files and environment variables, combined with network connections to OpenRouter from the same host.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known IOCs from the trojanized anthropic.claude-code (Open-VSX v2.1.313) SSH backdoor: C2 IP 134.209.82.225, beacon URL, extension.js and tunnel key SHA-256 hashes, and ifconfig.me lookups from VS Code-family/extension-host processes. Results are summarized per device and IOC.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known IOCs from the trojanized anthropic.claude-code (Open-VSX v2.1.313) SSH backdoor: C2 IP 134.209.82.225, beacon URL, extension.js and tunnel key SHA-256 hashes, and ifconfig.me lookups from VS Code-family/extension-host processes. Results are summarized per device and IOC.
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