Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detection attempts to modify package manager configurations to point to potentially malicious repositories, enabling supply chain attacks through dependency confusion.
Detects known file hashes and C2 domains associated with the Dohdoor malware campaign. This rule combines file and network indicators; it may need to be split into two separate rules (e.g., for file events and network events) depending on the SIEM implementation.
Detects PowerShell launched with ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted and stdin command execution (-Command -), matching behavior described in fake Windows 11 installer campaign.
This rule detects the use of the malicious GitHub Action 'ci-quality/code-quality-check@v1' associated with the SANDWORM_MODE campaign. This action is designed to harvest CI secrets and propagate the malware by being referenced in a GitHub workflow file. The rule searches for the specific string of the malicious GitHub action within file content or file/audit paths, specifically targeting GitHub workflow files (.yml or .yaml) in '.github/workflows/' directories.
Hunts for modifications to RC initialization scripts. This could point to persistence
Detects the presence or execution of known TeamPCP malware and infrastructure tools (proxy.sh, kube.py, pcpcat.py, and tunneling tools like FRPS/gost) based on their MD5 file hashes. The group uses these standardized payloads to automate their operations.
Detects Python executing pip installs for common Arkanix loader dependencies (requests, pycryptodome, psutil) as described in the report.
This rule detects the creation or modification of specific files associated with the SHub v2.0 infostealer on macOS. It looks for a fake 'GoogleUpdate' binary within the '~/Library/Application Support/Google/' directory or a LaunchAgent plist file named 'com.google.keystone.agent.plist' in the 'LaunchAgents/' directory. These file paths are indicative of the SHub stealer's persistence mechanism, which impersonates legitimate Google update components.
This rule detects the dropping of specific DLL files associated with OysterLoader malware within the 'AppData\Roaming' directory. The detection logic specifically looks for file creation events where the target filename contains 'AppData\Roaming' and one of the following strings: 'COPYING3.dll', 'VisualUpdater', 'AlphaSecurity', or 'DetectorSpywareSecurity'. This activity is indicative of a stage 3 drop by OysterLoader before a scheduled task is created, as detailed in a Sekoia report.
Detects malicious activity related to the TCC.db, commonly abused by macOS malware
to bypass Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) restrictions.
to bypass Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) restrictions.
Detects file activity associated with the LunarApplication malware, either by the known installer hash or by creation of files/directories within its installation path. This rule combines a high-fidelity hash with a specific folder path.
Detects malicious activity related to the TCC.db, commonly abused by macOS malware to bypass Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) restrictions.
Detects unauthorized interactive modifications to CI/CD pipeline configurations that could indicate supply chain attack or malicious dependency code injection attempts.
Detects the creation of files with a .sys extension in the C:\Windows\System32\drivers\ directory that are actually portable executables (DLLs/EXEs). This is a staging technique used by the REF4033 group to deploy the BADIIS malware.
Detects a Microsoft Office application creating script files with GUID-like names in the user's profile directory. This is the primary method used by the "Operation MacroMaze" macro to drop its initial set of malicious scripts onto the victim's machine.
Detects Notepad++ installer and portable files where the file hash does not match a list of known legitimate hashes. This could indicate a malicious file masquerading as Notepad++.
Detects file operations involving known malicious hashes associated with a Notepad++ supply chain compromise. The rule identifies files with specific SHA1 hashes and provides contextual information such as action type, device name, file path, and initiating process details. The enhanced version further categorizes risk levels, enriches data with Notepad++ specific context, and aggregates events for a summary view, including threat metrics and prioritization for response actions.
This rule detects activity related to the Chrysalis Backdoor, which is associated with the Lotus Blossom threat group. It identifies malicious activity through three main components: 1. File and process events matching a list of known malicious SHA256 hashes. 2. Network connections to known malicious IP addresses or domains. 3. Suspicious execution of 'svchost.exe' from non-standard Windows directories with specific command-line arguments, indicating potential masquerading or malicious execution.
Detects the creation of a JavaScript file in unusual subdirectories of the Google Chrome user data or application support folders. This behavior was observed in the 'graphalgo' campaign by the Lazarus Group to stage second-stage payloads.
Detects the creation of potentially suspicious files by OpenEDR's ITSMService process.
The ITSMService is responsible for remote management operations and can create files on the system through the Process Explorer or file management features.
While legitimate for IT operations, creation of executable or script files could indicate unauthorized file uploads, data staging, or malicious file deployment.
The ITSMService is responsible for remote management operations and can create files on the system through the Process Explorer or file management features.
While legitimate for IT operations, creation of executable or script files could indicate unauthorized file uploads, data staging, or malicious file deployment.
Detects default file names outputted by the BloodHound collection tool SharpHound
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