Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects specific filenames, 'jpsetup.exe' and 'jpinst.exe', when they appear as the target filename in file events. These filenames have been associated with the SNAKE malware, as detailed in a CISA report. The rule aims to identify potential installations or presence of this malware on Windows systems.
Detects the creation of a specific DLL file ('api-ms-win-core-kernel32-legacy-l1.DLL') within a user's temporary directory. This pattern is indicative of a User Account Control (UAC) bypass technique that leverages NTFS reparse points and DLL hijacking, often associated with tools like UACMe (specifically UACMe 36). The rule looks for the exact file path in a user's AppData\Local\Temp directory.
This rule detects a specific User Account Control (UAC) bypass technique leveraging the Windows Media Player component. Specifically, it looks for the creation of a file named 'OskSupport.dll' within a user's temporary directory, combined with 'DllHost.exe' accessing 'osk.exe' located in the Windows Media Player directory. This pattern is indicative of the UACMe tool's method 32, which exploits a vulnerability related to Windows Media Player to elevate privileges without user interaction.
Detects file indicators associated with a 2018 phishing campaign attributed to APT29 (Cozy Bear), as reported by Mandiant. The rule specifically looks for the creation or modification of files named 'ds7002.lnk', 'ds7002.pdf', or 'ds7002.zip'.
Detects WerFault creating a dump file with a name that indicates the dump file could be an LSASS process memory dump, which contains user credentials. This technique is often used by adversaries to extract credentials for lateral movement or privilege escalation.
This rule detects a specific pattern indicative of a User Account Control (UAC) bypass technique using 'IEInstal.exe'. Specifically, it looks for 'IEInstal.exe' creating a file named 'consent.exe' within a user's temporary application data directory (e.g., 'C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Temp\'). This behavior is characteristic of UACMe, an open-source tool designed to exploit various UAC bypass methods.
Detects a specific User Account Control (UAC) bypass technique that involves modifying the msconfig GUI. This rule specifically looks for the creation of a file named 'pkgmgr.exe' within a user's temporary directory, which is a known indicator for the UACMe bypass method 55.
This rule detects PowerShell scripts that enumerate directories using `Get-ChildItem` and output the results to a file using `Out-File -append`. The detection logic specifically looks for the combination of `foreach`, `Get-ChildItem`, `-Path`, `-ErrorAction SilentlyContinue`, `Out-File`, and `-append` within the PowerShell script block text. This behavior has been associated with MAZE ransomware for directory discovery.
Detects potential DLL hijack of "iertutil.dll" found in the DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Class over the network. This rule specifically looks for file events where the 'System' process is writing to 'iertutil.dll' within the 'Internet Explorer' directory, which could indicate an attempt to replace or modify a legitimate DLL for malicious purposes, potentially leveraging DCOM for remote execution.
Detects specific filenames associated with Winnti dropper activity, as detailed in the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. The rule looks for the creation or modification of 'gthread-3.6.dll', 'sigcmm-2.4.dll', or 'Windows\Temp\tmp.bat', which are known indicators of compromise for Winnti malware.
This rule detects a specific UAC bypass technique (UACMe method 39) that leverages .NET Code Profiler and DLL hijacking against mmc.exe. It specifically looks for the creation of a DLL named 'pe386.dll' within a user's temporary AppData directory, which is characteristic of this bypass method.
Detects the use of the 'steghide' binary with the 'embed' command and specific flags ('-cf' or '-ef') to hide files using steganography. This technique can be used by adversaries to embed malicious payloads or sensitive data within legitimate-looking files, such as images, to evade detection.
Detects the creation of the PSEXEC key file, which is generated whenever a PsExec command is executed. This file is written to the file system and recorded in the USN Journal on the target system, serving as an indicator of PsExec activity.
Detects the creation of recent file shortcuts (.lnk) that point to disk image files (.iso, .img, .vhd, .vhdx). This activity is often observed in phishing attacks where adversaries use these file types to deliver malware. The rule specifically looks for these shortcuts within the 'Recent' folder of a user's profile, indicating that the user has recently interacted with such a file.
This rule detects the creation of temporary files in a specific path within the AppData\Local\Temp directory. The path contains a unique hash-like string, which is associated with the PCRE.NET package. This activity could indicate the execution or unpacking of applications that utilize the PCRE.NET library, potentially for malicious purposes such as code execution or payload delivery.
Detects a User Account Control (UAC) bypass technique that leverages the Windows Event Viewer (eventvwr.exe). This method involves manipulating the registry to execute an arbitrary binary or script with elevated privileges when eventvwr.exe is launched. The rule specifically looks for file creation events in the 'RecentViews' directory associated with Event Viewer, where the creating process is not a standard system process (i.e., not originating from C:\Windows\System32\ or C:\Windows\SysWOW64\).
Detects additions to the Emond Launch Daemon that adversaries may use to gain persistence and elevate privileges.
Detects potential persistence activity via startup add-ins that load when Microsoft Office starts (.wll/.xll are simply .dll fit for Word or Excel).
Detects the creation of shell scripts under the "profile.d" path.
Detects default CSExec service filename which indicates CSExec service installation and execution
Detects suspicious file type dropped by an Exchange component in IIS
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