Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects suspicious file downloads by the Telegram application on a Windows system. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 15 to identify instances where Telegram.exe creates files with a Zone.Identifier, indicating a download. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary using Telegram to download malicious tools, such as network scanners, for further exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to network mapping, lateral movement, and potential compromise of additional systems within the network.
Performs an IOC sweep for a known XMRig cryptojacking campaign exploiting a REDCap vulnerability (CVE-2026-90817), detecting matching network connections, file hashes, and process activities across endpoints.
Performs an IOC sweep for a known XMRig cryptojacking campaign exploiting a REDCap vulnerability (CVE-2026-90817), detecting matching network connections, file hashes, and process activities across endpoints.
Detects the presence of known MD5 file hashes associated with the TraderTraitor trojanized Terraform provider campaign (also known as FLATROOF/ROOFDECK). The query sweeps DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceImageLoadEvents across the last 30 days.
Point-in-time sweep of the 16 published BraZetsu sample SHA-256 hashes across file, process and image-load telemetry. Hashes rotated across five versions, so absence of a hit does not rule out BraZetsu.
Sweeps Defender XDR telemetry for known NEBULA / KNTRAT indicators (SHA256 hashes, C2 IP, decoy domain and URLs, burner publisher emails). Hash matching is scoped per table (execution hash only in process events), noisy tooling is excluded from command-line matches, network hits are limited to connection events, and results are aggregated per device and IOC.
Correlates ARTEX tool artifacts on a device with that device contacting the ARTEX host, xcai.pro, or the DeepSeek API within 24 hours.
This rule detects indicator of compromise (IOC) sweep events associated with the AhsayCBS campaign (CVE-2026-105133 and CVE-2026-105134) involving XMRig cryptominer activity. It checks for specific file and process SHA256 hashes, remote IP addresses, and domain connections related to known mining pools or attacker infrastructure using Sentinel Device tables.
This rule detects indicator of compromise (IOC) sweep events associated with the AhsayCBS campaign (CVE-2026-105133 and CVE-2026-105134) involving XMRig cryptominer activity. It checks for specific file and process SHA256 hashes, remote IP addresses, and domain connections related to known mining pools or attacker infrastructure using Sentinel Device tables.
Detects legitimate applications writing any type of file to uncommon or suspicious locations that are not typical for application data storage or execution.
Adversaries may leverage legitimate applications (Living off the Land Binaries - LOLBins) to drop or download malicious files to uncommon locations on the system to evade detection by security solutions.
Adversaries may leverage legitimate applications (Living off the Land Binaries - LOLBins) to drop or download malicious files to uncommon locations on the system to evade detection by security solutions.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known UAC-0099 MATCHBOIL/LONEPAGE indicators: SHA256 hashes, C2 IPs, C2 domains (including subdomains), and payload/C2 URLs. Matches are limited to public outbound connections, Defender self-activity is excluded from file hits, and repeat hits are collapsed to one row per device and indicator. The lists are a subset of the 142 IOCs in the source report.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known UAC-0099 MATCHBOIL/LONEPAGE indicators: SHA256 hashes, C2 IPs, C2 domains (including subdomains), and payload/C2 URLs. Matches are limited to public outbound connections, Defender self-activity is excluded from file hits, and repeat hits are collapsed to one row per device and indicator. The lists are a subset of the 142 IOCs in the source report.
Performs an IOC sweep for a known XMRig cryptojacking campaign exploiting a REDCap vulnerability (CVE-2026-90817), detecting matching network connections, file hashes, and process activities across endpoints.
Detects file events involving NCrypt.exe, which may indicate process execution or file modification related to cryptographic functions or potential masquerading.
Detects the presence of known Candiru Windows DLL implant IOC hashes across device file events, process events, image loads, and email attachments.
Detects the presence of known Candiru Windows DLL implant IOC hashes across device file events, process events, image loads, and email attachments.
Detects the presence of known Candiru Windows DLL implant IOC hashes across device file events, process events, image loads, and email attachments.
Detects the presence of known Candiru Windows DLL implant IOC hashes across device file events, process events, image loads, and email attachments.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known UAC-0099 MATCHBOIL/LONEPAGE indicators: SHA256 hashes, C2 IPs, C2 domains (including subdomains), and payload/C2 URLs. Matches are limited to public outbound connections, Defender self-activity is excluded from file hits, and repeat hits are collapsed to one row per device and indicator. The lists are a subset of the 142 IOCs in the source report.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known UAC-0099 MATCHBOIL/LONEPAGE indicators: SHA256 hashes, C2 IPs, C2 domains (including subdomains), and payload/C2 URLs. Matches are limited to public outbound connections, Defender self-activity is excluded from file hits, and repeat hits are collapsed to one row per device and indicator. The lists are a subset of the 142 IOCs in the source report.
The following analytic detects the use of the 'dd' command to overwrite files on a Linux system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because adversaries often use the 'dd' command to destroy or irreversibly overwrite files, disrupting system availability and services. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to data destruction, making recovery difficult and potentially causing significant operational disruptions.
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