Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects indicator of compromise (IOC) sweep events associated with the AhsayCBS campaign (CVE-2026-105133 and CVE-2026-105134) involving XMRig cryptominer activity. It checks for specific file and process SHA256 hashes, remote IP addresses, and domain connections related to known mining pools or attacker infrastructure using Sentinel Device tables.
This rule detects indicator of compromise (IOC) sweep events associated with the AhsayCBS campaign (CVE-2026-105133 and CVE-2026-105134) involving XMRig cryptominer activity. It checks for specific file and process SHA256 hashes, remote IP addresses, and domain connections related to known mining pools or attacker infrastructure using Sentinel Device tables.
Point-in-time sweep of the 16 published BraZetsu sample SHA-256 hashes across file, process and image-load telemetry. Hashes rotated across five versions, so absence of a hit does not rule out BraZetsu.
Point-in-time sweep of the 16 published BraZetsu sample SHA-256 hashes across file, process and image-load telemetry. Hashes rotated across five versions, so absence of a hit does not rule out BraZetsu.
Sweeps Defender XDR telemetry for known NEBULA / KNTRAT indicators (SHA256 hashes, C2 IP, decoy domain and URLs, burner publisher emails). Hash matching is scoped per table (execution hash only in process events), noisy tooling is excluded from command-line matches, network hits are limited to connection events, and results are aggregated per device and IOC.
Sweeps Defender XDR telemetry for known NEBULA / KNTRAT indicators (SHA256 hashes, C2 IP, decoy domain and URLs, burner publisher emails). Hash matching is scoped per table (execution hash only in process events), noisy tooling is excluded from command-line matches, network hits are limited to connection events, and results are aggregated per device and IOC.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the DragonForce TURN/MQTT campaign, as detailed in Lab52 threat research. It monitors for file and process activity matching known malicious hashes, as well as network connections to specific domains and URLs associated with the campaign's command-and-control infrastructure.
This rule detects known-malicious activity associated with Warlock ransomware and the ToolShell malware campaign (linked to Storm-2603). It monitors for process, file, and image-load events matching identified malicious file hashes, as well as network connection attempts to known malicious domains and URLs. It also includes monitoring for traffic to 'oastify.com', a domain commonly used for Burp Collaborator, which requires correlation with other indicators to confirm malicious intent.
This rule detects known-malicious activity associated with Warlock ransomware and the ToolShell malware campaign (linked to Storm-2603). It monitors for process, file, and image-load events matching identified malicious file hashes, as well as network connection attempts to known malicious domains and URLs. It also includes monitoring for traffic to 'oastify.com', a domain commonly used for Burp Collaborator, which requires correlation with other indicators to confirm malicious intent.
The following analytic detects the use of the 'dd' command to overwrite files on a Linux system. It leverages data from Linux Auditd telemetry, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because adversaries often use the 'dd' command to destroy or irreversibly overwrite files, disrupting system availability and services. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to data destruction, making recovery difficult and potentially causing significant operational disruptions.
Hunts telemetry for published NeedyMantis indicators: three known SHA-256 hashes (WinSparkle.dll first-stage loader and its encrypted archive, plus the older libcurl archive), the C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com, and the C2 URL path /library/zip/ on that domain. Domain/URL matching parses the actual host out of RemoteUrl and requires an EXACT match (not substring 'has/contains'), so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') or as a prefix of an unrelated domain (e.g. 'corp.tripswithengine.com.evil.net') cannot match. No malicious IP address has been published for this campaign, so IP-based matching is intentionally not included.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the DragonForce TURN/MQTT campaign, as detailed in Lab52 threat research. It monitors for file and process activity matching known malicious hashes, as well as network connections to specific domains and URLs associated with the campaign's command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects various indicators of compromise (IOCs) including known malicious file hashes, suspicious file names commonly associated with staging or initialization in web directories, and network communication to known malicious domains or URLs. It also monitors process execution command lines for references to these IOCs, excluding common browser processes.
Detects the modification of the wsl.exe binary from its installed location.
Attackers can replace the legitimate wsl.exe binary with a malicious payload in its place, which is then executed when the user runs WSL, acting as a proxy execution and defense evasion technique.
Attackers can replace the legitimate wsl.exe binary with a malicious payload in its place, which is then executed when the user runs WSL, acting as a proxy execution and defense evasion technique.
Correlates ARTEX tool artifacts on a device with that device contacting the ARTEX host, xcai.pro, or the DeepSeek API within 24 hours.
Detects a non-browser process creating a Chromium-style History database in a temporary directory, consistent with BraZetsu copying locked browser databases for reconnaissance.
Detects modifications to core NetScaler startup configuration files 'ns.conf' or 'rc.netscaler'. Attackers often target these files after initial access to establish persistence by injecting malicious commands, rewrite, or responder policies to maintain access to the appliance.
Detects runtime processes associated with AI agents or scripting environments (e.g., python, node, deno) accessing sensitive credential storage paths and files, such as SSH keys, cloud provider configuration directories, and local environment variables, which may indicate credential exfiltration.
Detects a suspicious pattern where a user authenticates to a remote access portal (like Citrix or VPN) without multi-factor authentication (MFA) or with an existing risk flag, followed by a surge in file activity (creation, modification, or renaming of >500 files or >200 distinct files) on the same account within a 24-hour window, potentially indicating compromised credential usage for staging data for exfiltration or ransomware.
Detects a specific persistence chain attributed to DragonForce where the 'javaw.exe' process side-loads a malicious 'jli.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory. The rule correlates this DLL image load with the subsequent reading of an encrypted, host-bound payload file ('rvsdiqw.txt') by the same process, which is then decrypted and injected into memory.
This rule detects activities associated with the Star Blizzard (also known as APT28 or Callisto) group's CosmicPulse malware, specifically the downloader and Python-based backdoor. It monitors for suspicious CPL file execution via UNC paths by rundll32.exe or control.exe, unauthorized modifications to the HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis registry key used for COM hijacking, and anomalous spawning of Python executables from control host processes in user-writable directories.
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