Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the presence of MicroStealer malware by matching known MD5, SHA1, or SHA256 hashes of its binaries against file events on monitored devices. MicroStealer is a credential stealer that targets various applications to exfiltrate sensitive information.
This rule detects the presence of files on endpoints that match a list of known malicious SHA256 hashes associated with the Nuso malware. It queries DeviceFileEvents to identify any file with a matching hash.
Detects GhostBackdoor malware execution via known file hash.
Detects instances where the Dllhost.exe (COM Surrogate) process writes executable files, scripts, or library files to common temporary or public directories. This behavior is often associated with COM hijacking, lateral movement, or malicious payload staging by adversaries.
Detects processes that execute and remain dormant for more than 120 seconds before performing a high volume of file operations (greater than 50) or initiating a high volume of network connections (greater than 20). This pattern is consistent with malware or beaconing implants attempting to evade detection during automated sandbox analysis.
Detects two suspicious behaviors related to OpenSSH. The first scenario identifies unauthorized modifications, creations, or renames of core OpenSSH binaries (/usr/sbin/sshd, /usr/bin/ssh, /usr/bin/scp) that are not initiated by common package managers, which could indicate persistence mechanisms or backdooring. The second scenario monitors ssh/sshd/scp processes creating or modifying files in common temporary or world-writable directories (/tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm, etc.), which is often indicative of credential harvesting or data staging.
Detects execution activity associated with the Kimsuky NUKESPED loader, specifically identified by the script interpreter spawning processes or making network requests related to specific decoy URLs (NHIS health portal) or opening decoy PDF files from the user's Downloads directory.
Detects the macOS.Gaslight Python-based secondary collection module copying login.keychain-db from ~/Library/Keychains/ to a staging directory and compressing collected data into temp/collected_data.zip for exfiltration. This activity is associated with DPRK-aligned Contagious Interview / PhantomCaptcha campaigns.
Detects instances where the creation timestamp of a file is reported as being significantly older (more than 30 days) than the actual file creation event time, as recorded by Sysmon Event ID 2. This is a common indicator of timestomping, where attackers modify file creation metadata to evade detection or blend in with legitimate system files.
Detects unauthorized file operations (Creation, Modification, Rename, Deletion) on sensitive browser-related credential files (e.g., Login Data, Cookies, key4.db) by potentially unauthorized or suspicious processes identified by name.
Detects unauthorized file operations (Creation, Modification, Rename, Deletion) on sensitive browser-related credential files (e.g., Login Data, Cookies, key4.db) by potentially unauthorized or suspicious processes identified by name.
Detects file operations (creation, modification, deletion, renaming) involving common SSH key files (id_rsa, id_ed25519) or files located within .ssh directories, initiated by processes typically associated with AI/LLM tools (chatgpt, perplexity, etc.) or generic process names. This may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate or manipulate authentication credentials by unauthorized applications.
Detects the loading of an unsigned DLL by 'quick_share.exe', 'NearbyShare.exe', or 'nearby_sharing.exe' from suspicious directory paths such as User Temp, AppData, or Downloads folders. This behavior is highly indicative of DLL side-loading attempts where an adversary leverages a legitimate, known process to execute malicious code.
Detects instances where a digitally signed process loads a DLL file from a user-writable directory (e.g., AppData, Downloads, or Temp). This behavior is characteristic of DLL side-loading or search-order hijacking, where an adversary attempts to execute malicious code within the context of a trusted, signed application.
Detects the creation of ZIP/RAR/7z archives by processes residing within the Turla STOCKSTAY installation directory (%LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\SMN\) or by known STOCKSTAY malicious components. This behavior is associated with the STOCKSTAY 'Get' command, which gathers files and archives them in-memory for base64-encoded exfiltration.
Detects instances where a digitally signed process loads a DLL file from a user-writable directory (e.g., AppData, Downloads, or Temp). This behavior is characteristic of DLL side-loading or search-order hijacking, where an adversary attempts to execute malicious code within the context of a trusted, signed application.
Detects the creation of image-related files with generic names in common temporary or user download directories that fall within a specific file size range (100KB-1000KB). These characteristics are often indicative of steganography where malicious payloads or data are embedded within seemingly benign image files to bypass security controls.
Detects registry run key and logon persistence modifications commonly used by the StrikeShark campaign. This rule monitors for entries in standard Windows autorun registry keys and Winlogon persistence locations where the associated file path is located in user-writable directories (AppData, Temp, Public) or contains suspicious file extension patterns, which are indicative of malware such as Sharkloader.
Detects file write or delete operations involving cmd.exe by processes potentially associated with the TrymeLocker ransomware, specifically looking for indicators of ownership or permission modification (takeown, icacls) and suspicious file paths.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized installation of extensions in Visual Studio Code (VSIX) or plugins in JetBrains IDEs (IntelliJ, PyCharm, WebStorm). It flags installations that do not originate from verified official marketplaces, which may indicate the manual installation of malicious or supply-chain compromised development environment extensions.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to access or perform operations on sensitive files such as browser credentials, SSH keys, crypto wallets, and password manager databases. The rule specifically looks for non-standard or unsigned processes interacting with a high volume of these files in a short time frame, which is indicative of credential harvesting by infostealer malware like Lumma, Redline, or Vidar.
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