Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects unauthorized access to wermgr.exe residing within Volume Shadow Copy paths or staged in specific temp directories. This behavior is associated with the RoguePlanet exploit, which uses this pattern to obtain SYSTEM-readable handles for subsequent oplock placement and TOCTOU (Time-of-Check Time-of-Use) race conditions to achieve privilege escalation.
This rule detects suspicious file activity involving Alternate Data Streams (ADS) and file names containing 'WDFOO' or 'wermgr.exe' within specific 'RP_' staging directories. Such activity is often associated with file-based staging, persistence, or potential obfuscation techniques using NTFS streams.
This rule detects potential DLL sideloading by identifying instances where a process executing from a user-writable path (e.g., \Users, \ProgramData, \Temp) loads a DLL that resides in the same directory. This pattern is commonly associated with malicious payloads delivered via phishing archives where a legitimate binary and a malicious DLL are placed in the same folder to facilitate sideloading.
Commodity .NET keylogger and remote access trojan
Commodity .NET keylogger and remote access trojan
Detects a non-browser process reading browser profiles, cookies, form stores, or session files from Chrome, Edge, Brave, or Opera browsers. The rule specifically looks for file events (creation, writing, deletion) on browser-related files like 'Cookies', 'Login Data', 'Web Data', 'History', or 'Local State' within browser user data directories, where the process performing the action has a filename matching common RAT patterns like 'banana', 'client', 'update', or 'service'.
This rule detects a process identified as a Go-compiled binary (via command-line arguments like 'goroutine' or 'runtime.main') that exhibits rapid, high-volume file interactions (more than 100 files accessed or created in a 60-second window) alongside outbound network connectivity. This behavior is indicative of malicious automated activity such as file encryption for ransomware or rapid data staging and exfiltration.
This rule detects a process identified as a Go-compiled binary (via command-line arguments like 'goroutine' or 'runtime.main') that exhibits rapid, high-volume file interactions (more than 100 files accessed or created in a 60-second window) alongside outbound network connectivity. This behavior is indicative of malicious automated activity such as file encryption for ransomware or rapid data staging and exfiltration.
Identifies the execution of the elementary.pth payload natively triggering on Python interpreter startup. This rule correlates process events for Python execution with file events indicating the presence of an 'elementary.pth' file on the same device.
Detects instances where a Node.js process accesses or modifies browser-related credential, cookie, or configuration files. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized data collection or credential harvesting from locally stored web browser profiles.
This rule detects the presence of components associated with the MYRA rootkit, including specific filenames ('libcache.so', 'memfd_loader') and references to the 'apintergrationpost' npm package or the author 'kimijohn01'. It monitors process command lines, file events, and syslog messages for these indicators.
This rule detects the presence of Blackbeard malware by identifying known SHA256 hashes of its components or network connections to its known C2 infrastructure. It correlates file events with specific hashes and network events with specific remote IP addresses.
Detects LampoRAT malware based on known file hash execution.
Description- Detects PDF invoice files associated with Crimson Kingsnake using consistent metadata author “hpins”.
Detects known malicious invoice PDFs and email samples used in Crimson Kingsnake campaigns.
Identifies .lnk files dropped into Startup folders, a persistence technique tied to WinRAR exploitation.
This rule detects suspicious file system enumeration activities that often precede ransomware encryption. It specifically looks for a high volume of command-line executions of 'dir /s', 'dir /r', or 'tree' commands within a short timeframe (5 minutes) on a single computer by a single account. These commands are commonly used by adversaries to discover files and directories before encrypting them.
Detects suspicious process behavior, memory modifications, and file loading associated with the SPECTRALVIPER threat actor. The rule monitors for remote thread creation, shellcode injection, and the loading of a specific malicious DLL named DtlCrashCatch.dll, often associated with IntelAudioService.exe process abuse.
This rule detects unauthorized access or modification attempts to the Microsoft WinGet DSC (Desired State Configuration) configuration history database and associated YAML configuration files. WinGet stores execution history and DSC configuration files in specific directories; unauthorized processes interacting with these files may indicate an attempt to gain persistence, escalate privileges, or conduct reconnaissance on configured system states by inspecting or tampering with deployment manifests.
Detects processes that execute and remain dormant for more than 120 seconds before performing a high volume of file operations (greater than 50) or initiating a high volume of network connections (greater than 20). This pattern is consistent with malware or beaconing implants attempting to evade detection during automated sandbox analysis.
This rule detects potential malicious activity characterized by a high volume of file write operations (at least 20 within a 30-minute window) followed by an attempt to delete those files or the files themselves. The rule monitors Sysmon events, specifically looking for processes that exhibit significant write behavior and then initiate a deletion command via cmd.exe, PowerShell, or the native Windows MoveFileEx self-deletion mechanism.
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