Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the high-tempo Medusa ransomware encryption phase by identifying a large number of file renaming operations that append the '.medusa' extension within a short timeframe (1 minute). This rule specifically looks for more than 50 such rename events per device per minute.
Detects path traversal exploitation attempts targeting Dell Wyse Management Suite (WMS) processes or Java components, specifically looking for attempts to access sensitive system files such as SAM, NTDS.dit, or registry hive files via directory traversal sequences.
Detects high volumes of file operations (creation, rename, or modification) where files are given extensions typically associated with ransomware (e.g., .locked, .encrypted). The rule aggregates activity by process and endpoint and triggers an alert when the number of such operations exceeds a defined threshold, while excluding known legitimate backup and security software.
Detects file creation, copy, or rename operations within known VPN application directories (CyberGhost, ExpressVPN, NordVPN) when initiated by Chromium Embedded Framework (CEF) related processes (CefSharp.BrowsersSubprocess). This behavior is highly irregular as standard web browser components should not be modifying the local configuration or installation directories of VPN software.
This rule monitors for processes named 'setup.exe' executing from user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Downloads, Temp) that load unsigned or non-Microsoft DLLs from the same suspicious directories. This pattern is commonly associated with DLL side-loading or malicious installation attempts where a process attempts to load illegitimate code from local user space.
Detects the opening of suspected APT28 (Fancy Bear) spearphishing lure documents by Microsoft Office or Outlook. The rule monitors for file access, creation, or renaming events where the filename matches known lure patterns associated with APT28 activities, such as naming conventions containing 'BULLETEN', 'OperInformativ', 'Courses', 'Consultation', 'Weapons', or 'Smuggling' in Word or Outlook processes.
Detects reconnaissance activities associated with the MYRA RAT, specifically the enumeration of network connections by reading /proc/net/tcp and /proc/net/udp, originating from the systemd-userdbd process. This behavior is indicative of malware attempting to map network state via proc filesystem parsing.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by identifying the rapid encryption of multiple common document and database file types, indicated by the '.prinzeugen' extension. It specifically looks for at least 20 such files being created or modified within a 10-minute window on a single device.
Detects unauthorized processes reading, copying, or renaming Kerberos ticket cache files (ccache) located in common temporary directories. This behavior is often associated with credential theft and potential Pass the Ticket attacks where adversaries attempt to extract session credentials to perform lateral movement or privilege escalation.
Detects the use of 'hdiutil' to mount disk images with the '-nobrowse' flag, initiated by common command-line or scripting interpreters. The '-nobrowse' flag prevents the mounted volume from appearing on the desktop or in Finder, which is a common technique used by attackers to mount malicious disk images stealthily to facilitate execution of payloads while avoiding user detection.
This rule detects potentially malicious software supply chain activity by monitoring for the execution of 'node-gyp' or 'node-pre-gyp' during the installation of Node.js packages (e.g., via npm or yarn). It specifically flags instances where the process or its parent involves suspicious file names or directory paths often associated with 'Miasma' supply chain campaigns, such as references to 'leo-logger', 'binding.gyp', or 'index.js' inside 'node_modules' directories.
This rule detects the creation of shortcut (.lnk) files within the Windows Startup folder initiated by potentially suspicious processes such as WinRAR, unrar, or PowerShell. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to achieve persistence by ensuring the execution of a malicious file upon user login.
Detects activity associated with VAPT (Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Testing) frameworks, specifically looking for marker strings in process command lines and known VAPT malware names in file and process events. This rule aims to identify potential privilege escalation attempts or the presence of VAPT tools on a system.
Detects various activities associated with Operation Poisson Havoc Demon, including the loading of 'senti.dll' (a shellcode carrier), PowerShell execution spawned from 'explorer.exe' (indicating potential shellcode injection), execution of 'RevS.ps1' (a PowerShell reverse shell), and the presence of other suspicious files like 'PhantomBackdoor' and 'TencShell'.
Detects rapid sequential file rename/write operations across multiple directories within a short window, which is a behavioral signature of active ransomware encryption activity. The rule specifically looks for more than 200 file operations (renamed or created) with a file extension matching a 4-8 character alphanumeric pattern, across more than 5 unique folders, all occurring within a 2-minute window and completing within 120 seconds.
This rule detects a high volume of file rename events where the new file extension is not a commonly known good extension. This behavior is often associated with ransomware encrypting files and changing their extensions, or other forms of data destruction. The rule filters out common system directories to reduce false positives and aggregates events by process and device to identify the source of the suspicious activity.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for the creation, modification, or renaming of files with the '.prinzeugen' extension. This extension is commonly associated with specific ransomware families. The rule triggers if 10 or more such files are observed within a one-hour window on a single device, indicating a bulk encryption event.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for the creation, modification, or renaming of files with the '.prinzeugen' extension. This extension is commonly associated with specific ransomware families. The rule aggregates these file events by device and time, triggering an alert if 10 or more such files are observed within an hour on a single device, indicating a bulk encryption event.
Detects the creation, modification, or renaming of files with the '.prinzeugen' extension, which is commonly associated with ransomware activity. The rule aggregates these events by device and time, alerting if 10 or more such files are observed within an hour, indicating potential widespread encryption.
Detects Python reading the .env file or executing env commands to scrape Hugging Face tokens or AWS keys after loading a model.
This rule correlates the credential scraping phase with the invocation of zip, tar, or ditto to compress stolen artifacts into a single file in the /tmp directory. Specifically, it looks for these archiving utilities being executed with a command line that targets a .zip or .tar.gz file within /tmp, and joins this activity with the prior access of a file named 'Login Data' by the same initiating process.
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