Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects unauthorized modifications to Group Policy Objects (GPO) involving critical attributes (such as SYSVOL paths or extension configurations) combined with the creation of new script or executable files in the SYSVOL Scripts folder. This behavior is indicative of potential GPO tampering to gain persistence or facilitate large-scale execution, such as ransomware deployment via GPOs.
Detects anomalous multi-agent chaining where one AI-enabled agent instance initiates a connection to an AI API and subsequently hands off information to a second, distinct agent instance, which then performs an suspicious downstream action such as spawning a shell or initiating an unauthorized external network connection. This behavior is intended to identify potential abuse of AI-coding assistant tools for automated execution chains.
Detects modifications to the .zshrc configuration file followed by shell commands interacting with the file, or the execution of commands that source the .repair-run script within a shell environment. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms where an adversary modifies startup scripts to maintain access or execute malicious code upon shell initialization.
This rule detects modifications or creation of Git hooks ('pre-commit', 'post-checkout') within local repository directories. Attackers can leverage these hooks as an execution trigger for arbitrary code whenever standard Git actions occur, facilitating persistence or privilege escalation on compromised developer machines.
This rule detects a sequence of events indicative of MacSync credential phishing on macOS. It identifies the tampering of Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) configuration files or SecurityAgent plugins (often used to hook authentication processes), immediately followed by the use of osascript to display a spoofed password dialog to the user. This combined activity suggests an adversary is attempting to harvest local user account credentials.
Detects execution of Node.js processes loading specifically named JavaScript files ('sharedLoad.min.js') within the 'node_modules/indexed-btree' directory, or file modifications involving these specific paths, which may indicate a malicious loader or supply chain compromise attempt.
This rule detects modifications to Group Policy Objects (GPOs) that are either explicitly marked as malicious based on known indicators (GUIDs or 'PAYLOAD' strings) or involve unauthorized modifications to domain-root or organizational unit GPO links. It monitors Active Directory security event logs for object changes.
Detects coordinated usage of 'xattr' to manipulate the com.apple.quarantine attribute and 'chmod' to grant executable permissions on sensitive macOS system or library paths. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass Gatekeeper or bypass execution restrictions on malicious payloads placed in system directories.
Detects the creation or modification of script files (bat, ps1, vbs, cmd) within the Windows Startup folder initiated by processes commonly associated with AI agents or developer frameworks (e.g., dotnet, python, w3wp). This activity indicates an AI agent environment being exploited to establish persistence, potentially facilitating delayed remote code execution upon user logon.
This rule detects the creation or modification of browser native messaging host configuration files (e.g., com.lunex.explorer.json) combined with the simultaneous or subsequent termination of common web browsers. This pattern is indicative of potential browser hijacking, where an adversary sets up a malicious native messaging host to facilitate persistence or intercept browser communications and subsequently restarts or terminates the browser process to reload the configuration.
Detects evidence of persistence mechanisms targeting Docker environments on Linux systems. The rule identifies suspicious modifications using crontab, systemctl (service creation/start), and chattr (to make files immutable), specifically monitoring for artifacts related to '.docker-network-monitor' and 'docker-network-resolver'. It flags systems where multiple such configuration changes occur within a single day.
Detects behavior associated with the TeamFiltration backdoor, where a user account downloads a file from OneDrive, modifies or replaces that file, and re-uploads it within a short timeframe (30 minutes). This pattern is consistent with the 'taint shared content' technique used to distribute malicious files through legitimate cloud storage.
This rule detects the creation, modification, or renaming of files within specific sensitive directories under Local AppData (such as ComponentTask33, INetCache/FilterManager, or Shell/RemoteTempPrimary) that are closely timed with the execution of a PowerShell script named '*_scatter.ps1'. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious staging, data dropping, or modular deployment associated with a specific script-based attack chain.
Detects the insertion of malicious prompt injection payloads—containing imperative commands to AI agents or hidden unicode/non-printable characters—into wiki pages, ticketing systems, or other shared knowledge bases. These payloads are designed to be ingested by AI agents or Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipelines, leading to unauthorized instructions or behavioral overrides upon retrieval.
Detects a Redis process connecting to a suspected rogue replication master (using non-standard ports or known malicious IPs) followed by a file modification to a system cron directory. This sequence is indicative of a Redis Rogue Replication exploit where a crafted RDB file is used to achieve persistence by writing a malicious entry to a cron job.
Detects the presence or execution of the 'Boot Time Removal Tool' (BTR.sys) driver when it originates from locations outside of the legitimate Windows Defender platform or is initiated by processes not associated with the Defender ecosystem. This behavior is indicative of potential BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attacks where attackers deploy known vulnerable drivers to gain kernel-mode privileges or interfere with security software.
Detects sensitive cPanel/WHM administrative commands or system file modifications occurring within one hour of a suspected authentication bypass event, indicative of potential post-exploitation activity related to CVE-2026-41940.
Detects the use of PowerShell to remove the 'Zone.Identifier' NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) from files. This stream is responsible for the 'Mark-of-the-Web' (MOTW) which triggers security warnings in Windows, including SmartScreen and Protected View. Adversaries use this technique to evade security controls on downloaded malicious files.
Detects anomalous multi-agent chaining where one AI-enabled agent instance initiates a connection to an AI API and subsequently hands off information to a second, distinct agent instance, which then performs an suspicious downstream action such as spawning a shell or initiating an unauthorized external network connection. This behavior is intended to identify potential abuse of AI-coding assistant tools for automated execution chains.
Detects anomalous multi-agent chaining where one AI-enabled agent instance initiates a connection to an AI API and subsequently hands off information to a second, distinct agent instance, which then performs an suspicious downstream action such as spawning a shell or initiating an unauthorized external network connection. This behavior is intended to identify potential abuse of AI-coding assistant tools for automated execution chains.
Detects anomalous multi-agent chaining where one AI-enabled agent instance initiates a connection to an AI API and subsequently hands off information to a second, distinct agent instance, which then performs an suspicious downstream action such as spawning a shell or initiating an unauthorized external network connection. This behavior is intended to identify potential abuse of AI-coding assistant tools for automated execution chains.
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