Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,294 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,284
250
199
142
138
Contributors
660
544
375
96
95
Categories
20,456
11,839
5,876
5,155
4,865
2,294
Platforms
1,505
929
381
70
51
Products / Services
743
407
225
164
140
MITRE Techniques
856
683
604
437
302
CVEs
12
10
9
9
8
IDS Classtypes
24
4
3
1
1
IDS Protocols
20
6
6
1
Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host modifying ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, or shell commands appending the svc-telemetry label / embedded Ed25519 key, as used by the trojanized anthropic.claude-code extension.
Detects indicators of compromise associated with a trojanized Claude Code VS Code extension distributed through Cursor's marketplace. The rule identifies file modifications to authorized_keys, process executions establishing reverse SSH tunnels, specific hardcoded C2 IP addresses, and references to the attacker's SSH key 'svc-telemetry'.
Detects potential remote code execution, web shell activity, and post-exploitation behaviors originating from PHP worker processes on internet-facing hosts, referencing patterns associated with php2shell vulnerabilities. PHP-UP-2026
Detects post-exploitation activity targeting PaperCut servers, including shells spawned by the PaperCut Java process or the creation of malicious files (such as .class files in lib/ or .txt webshells in custom/web/) by the Java application.
Detects modifications to Certificate Authority (CA) trust stores, configuration files, or blocklists on Linux and macOS endpoints, followed by trust store update commands within a 30-minute window.
Detects Salat Stealer dropping and executing copies of Lightshot.exe in trusted directories such as Windows NT, Edge, and Chrome application paths, as well as process spawn chains involving masqueraded Lightshot executables.
Detects the sequence where a private key file is written to the host followed by the execution of ssh.exe with parameters indicating a reverse port forwarding tunnel (-R), an identity file (-i), and background execution (-N or -f) within a 30-minute window.
Detects files written under Magento pub/media/custom_options/quote by a web server or PHP process, and flags when a subsequent process command line references the uploaded file, indicating potential web shell activity.
Detects node or agent-initiated npm installation commands (such as npm install or npm i) executed within 24 hours of creating or modifying a developer assistant instruction file (such as AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules) in common user directories like Downloads, Desktop, or Temp.
The detection targets these behaviours:
- Attempts to take ownership of or replace explorer.exe and gpedit.msc.
- Changes to Microsoft Edge's Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debugger.
- Changes to HTTP, HTTPS, HTML, and Microsoft Edge protocol handlers.
- Disabling Explorer's Run command and changing keyboard scancode mappings.
- Creation of temporary VBScript files used for relaunching, elevation prompts, or deceptive messages
- Attempts to take ownership of or replace explorer.exe and gpedit.msc.
- Changes to Microsoft Edge's Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debugger.
- Changes to HTTP, HTTPS, HTML, and Microsoft Edge protocol handlers.
- Disabling Explorer's Run command and changing keyboard scancode mappings.
- Creation of temporary VBScript files used for relaunching, elevation prompts, or deceptive messages
Detects the creation of cook.pth or cook.py in Python site-packages or dist-packages directories by package managers or interpreters, followed by a Python interpreter execution on the same device within one hour. This pattern matches the malicious supply chain behavior observed in compromised LiteLLM versions (e.g., 1.107.0) utilizing .pth auto-import chains for persistence and execution.
Detects anomalous activities associated with potential PHP2Shell exploitation or webshell deployment where a web server worker (such as Apache, HTTPD, or PHP) spawns a Unix shell containing suspicious utility tokens, drops a PHP file outside excluded directories, or creates a PHP session-derived file.
Detects the execution of the AI prompt hook script 'project_context_hook.py' or the creation/modification of the associated investigation state files (scope.md, surface.md, notes.md) within the same folder.
Detects the execution of PaperCut reverse SOCKS5 bridge kit operator-side scripts (such as admin_bridge.py, live_reverse_socks5.py, start_socks.sh) or the creation of related Java bridge class artifacts.
Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host modifying ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, or shell commands appending the svc-telemetry label / embedded Ed25519 key, as used by the trojanized anthropic.claude-code extension.
Detects credential harvesting tooling and activity targeting PaperCut configuration and log files by identifying specific parser script executions, searches for PaperCut credential key patterns in process command lines, and the creation of related harvest artifacts.
Detects behavioral indicators of shell-driven cryptocurrency miner staging where a hidden .trace file or binary is created, executed, or referenced via command-line arguments within go2rtc or shared memory directories (/config/, /opt/go2rtc/, /etc/go2rtc/, /.config/go2rtc/, /dev/shm/), alongside indicators of mining pools or software such as XMRig.
Detects the creation of cook.pth or cook.py in Python site-packages or dist-packages directories by package managers or interpreters, followed by a Python interpreter execution on the same device within one hour. This pattern matches the malicious supply chain behavior observed in compromised LiteLLM versions (e.g., 1.107.0) utilizing .pth auto-import chains for persistence and execution.
Detects modification or creation of .htaccess files within WordPress directory structures followed within 24 hours by the creation or modification of .cache files in the same directory. This behavioral pattern is often indicative of web shell deployment or persistence installation via compromised web applications.
Detects a burst of file modifications producing common
ransomware encryption extensions on a single host within a short window. This
captures the destructive-scripting / data-encryption impact behaviour that
AI-assisted cybercrime can drive, where a script rapidly renames or rewrites
large numbers of files after execution.
ransomware encryption extensions on a single host within a short window. This
captures the destructive-scripting / data-encryption impact behaviour that
AI-assisted cybercrime can drive, where a script rapidly renames or rewrites
large numbers of files after execution.
Detects web server processes writing PHP files into sensitive WordPress directories (such as mu-plugins or rank-math-pro/includes) shortly after deleting them within a 1-hour window. This behavior often indicates the rebuilding or updating of a webshell or backdoor for persistence.
Page 1 of 110





