Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential web shell creation on a Microsoft Exchange server by monitoring for suspicious child processes spawned by the IIS web server process (w3wp.exe) that correlate with the creation or modification of web-accessible script files (.aspx, .ashx, .asp, .dll) within the Exchange virtual directories (ecp, owa, aspnet_client). This pattern is consistent with common post-exploitation activities used by attackers to gain persistent access via web shells.
Detects process executions, file deletions, renames, and movements initiated by known SparroWocky malware files or suspicious DLLs (winfsp-x64.dll, DukeQt.dll). This monitors malicious lifecycle activity on endpoints.
This rule detects the creation, modification, or renaming of a browser extension's 'manifest.json' file, which is a critical configuration file for browser extensions. It correlates this file activity with simultaneous or subsequent network requests to common web-based productivity or email services (e.g., Google, Microsoft, Perplexity). This combination of file modification in an extension directory and network activity to sensitive domains may indicate the installation of a malicious browser extension designed for session hijacking or unauthorized data collection.
This rule detects the creation or modification of specific files ('auth_codes.json' or files containing 'seria2') associated with the offline recovery process of Dahua devices. The presence of these files suggests an attempt to utilize or access deterministic recovery codes to bypass authentication on the device.
Detects the execution of the Windows cipher.exe utility with the /w flag, which is used to overwrite free space on a volume to permanently delete data, a common technique for anti-forensics and data destruction.
Detects instances where processes associated with Claude or Codex modify or create files within a plugin directory without a preceding legitimate installation or session command (such as 'install' or 'plugin add'). This behavior may indicate unauthorized plugin installation, persistence establishment, or malicious code injection into the development environment.
Detects the creation or modification of specific system driver files (nvfsflt64.sys, Alinubx.sys) combined with the installation or initiation of a Windows service associated with NVIDIA filter names. This behavior is often indicative of persistence mechanisms, potential rootkit activity, or the deployment of vulnerable drivers (BYOVD).
Detects the creation of hard links on a Windows system using utilities such as mklink or fsutil. Specifically, this rule identifies scenarios where a malicious executable located in %APPDATA% is linked to a backdoor binary stored in C:\ProgramData\, a technique used by adversaries to mask the true file path and evade security controls or detection mechanisms.
Detects the use of fsutil.exe to create a hardlink pointing to files within a user's AppData directory, specifically involving a folder named 'doxc'. This behavior is often associated with file manipulation to bypass security controls or masquerade malicious files.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating three distinct events: the execution of a suspicious, potentially obfuscated binary (matching a specific naming pattern of _win64.exe) from an untrusted location (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads), followed by a high volume of file modifications or renames with specific ransomware-related extensions (.locked), and the dropping of a known ransom note file (RESTORE_FILES.txt) within a short 15-minute time window.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating three distinct events: the execution of a suspicious, potentially obfuscated binary (matching a specific naming pattern of _win64.exe) from an untrusted location (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads), followed by a high volume of file modifications or renames with specific ransomware-related extensions (.locked), and the dropping of a known ransom note file (RESTORE_FILES.txt) within a short 15-minute time window.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating three distinct events: the execution of a suspicious, potentially obfuscated binary (matching a specific naming pattern of _win64.exe) from an untrusted location (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads), followed by a high volume of file modifications or renames with specific ransomware-related extensions (.locked), and the dropping of a known ransom note file (RESTORE_FILES.txt) within a short 15-minute time window.
This rule detects potential attempts to tamper with or bypass Windows Defender by monitoring for files or processes named 'ShieldCrash' occurring in close temporal proximity to the creation or modification of files within Windows Defender's shadow or scan directories (BaseNamedObjects\Restricted\WD_SHADOW_ or WD_SCAN). This behavior is often associated with malware attempting to evade security detection.
Detects compromised versions (2.35 and 2.36) of the 'Admin Menu Editor Pro' WordPress plugin that were distributed via the official update infrastructure. These versions include embedded web shell code, as indicated by the presence of both plugin identification strings and common PHP execution or command-line utility functions used in backdoors.
Detects the presence of PHP web shell code within specific versions (2.35/2.36) of the Admin Menu Editor Pro plugin. This rule targets malicious files introduced via a supply chain compromise of the plugin's update distribution channel, specifically looking for common PHP obfuscation and execution functions associated with web shells.
Detects unauthorized attempts to modify, delete, or truncate backup configuration files and data directories associated with cPanel, WHM, and Plesk environments. This rule monitors for common file manipulation commands (e.g., rm, mv, truncate) targeting sensitive paths like /etc/acronis, /etc/cpanel/backups, and other backup-related directories, excluding actions performed by authorized service accounts.
Detects the creation of persistence mechanisms on Linux systems using APT Pre/Post-Invoke hooks (e.g., /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/99sys-update) or user profile initialization scripts (e.g., /etc/profile.d/sys-init.sh). The rule monitors for these files containing suspicious command strings such as curl downloads, xmrig mining configurations, or specific init-hook markers often used by cryptomining botnets.
Detects instances where a Redis server process, or its child process, writes a file named 'verify.html' into the web root directory '/var/www/html/'. This behavior is characteristic of adversaries abusing compromised Redis instances to deploy web shells or command-and-control beacons for persistent access.
Detects network communication with identified C2 infrastructure associated with VectraRAT, Amadey, and ClickFix campaigns, as well as the presence of a specific 'callback.json' artifact in temporary directories, which is commonly used for C2 address overrides.
Detects network communication with identified C2 infrastructure associated with VectraRAT, Amadey, and ClickFix campaigns, as well as the presence of a specific 'callback.json' artifact in temporary directories, which is commonly used for C2 address overrides.
Detects browser extension manifest.json files requesting declarativeNetRequest and content_scripts/host_permissions covering AI assistant vendor domains (BragJack attack class)
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