Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the creation or modification of core Chrome extension files (manifest.json, background.js, search.html) within the Chrome User Data directory by processes other than standard Chrome executables (chrome.exe, chromium.exe, googleupdate.exe). It also includes a specific alert for a known extension identifier. This activity is often indicative of unauthorized browser extension installation, potentially for persistence, credential theft, or malicious C2 activity.
Detects the download of JPEG image files to suspicious system directories (e.g., C:\Windows\, C:\ProgramData\) followed by subsequent file read operations by non-image viewer processes, which is indicative of steganographic payload extraction used in campaigns such as Operation DragonReturn/DcRAT.
This rule detects activities indicative of the RoguePlanet exploit, which utilizes NTFS junction swapping to stage malicious operations. It monitors for the creation of suspicious system-like directories within temporary paths, writing of executables (like wermgr.exe) to those paths, unprivileged manipulation of the Windows Defender Quarantine directory, and virtual disk image mounting from user-writable directories.
Detects attempts to perform container escapes or escalate privileges within a Gitea Actions runner environment. The rule monitors for the execution of dangerous container options (e.g., --pid=host, --privileged, --cap-add=ALL) in CI/CD workflow configurations, the spawning of 'nsenter' by the runner process, and writes to sensitive host system paths from containerized processes.
Detects indicators of exploitation attempts against the CVE-2026-55200 libssh2 heap out-of-bounds write vulnerability. The rule identifies the creation of known PoC artifacts on disk, execution of exploit harnesses or probe binaries, Python scripts masquerading as or interacting with the PoC server, and libssh2-dependent client applications making network connections to the non-standard port 2222 used by the exploit scaffold.
Detects the creation or modification of a .vscode/tasks.json file, followed by the execution of a process (specifically node.exe) that targets a script file without a standard JavaScript extension (.js, .mjs, .cjs). This behavior is consistent with an adversary configuring a hidden VS Code task (e.g., using 'hide:true' and 'runOn:folderOpen') to silently execute arbitrary code or assets when a project folder is opened.
Detects the presence, file creation, or execution of known proof-of-concept (PoC) scripts, binaries, and directories associated with the exploitation of the libssh2 CVE-2026-55200 vulnerability.
Detects potentially malicious activity involving MySQL processes, specifically focusing on the creation of files within the /var/lib/mysql-files/ directory, use of SQL 'INTO OUTFILE' for file output, or the use of 'LOAD_FILE()' to read sensitive system files like /etc/hostname or /proc/1/mountinfo, often indicative of SQL injection exploitation or unauthorized data access.
Detects signs of a supply chain attack, specifically referencing the IronWorm/Shai-Hulud pattern, involving the backdating of git commits, manipulation of git environment variables (GIT_COMMITTER_DATE/GIT_AUTHOR_DATE) to mask malicious activity history, and the use of 'touch' commands to modify file timestamps on project-related binaries and configuration files.
Detects post-compromise persistence techniques, including crontab modifications, SSH authorized_keys updates, and systemd service creation, when performed by child processes of AI agentic tools like Claude, Node.js, or Python. This activity suggests malicious persistence establishment following an indirect prompt injection or supply-chain compromise of the AI agent environment.
Detects unauthorized processes (non-browser related) attempting to modify Chrome/Chromium user profile preference files or sensitive browser registry keys related to search providers and security MACs. This activity is often associated with browser hijacking, malware persistence, or unauthorized manipulation of browser settings.
Detects activity associated with the 'MiniBrowse.exe' process, which exhibits behaviors characteristic of unauthorized browser credential and cookie harvesting. This includes targeting browser 'Login Data' files, accessing cookies, attempting to interact with legitimate browser processes (chrome.exe, msedge.exe) via cross-process operations, and writing logs to 'edgeLog.txt'.
This rule monitors Sysmon Event ID 11 (FileCreate) to detect high-volume file creation activity across multiple unique directories. By filtering out common file types, it identifies potential signs of mass file modification, staging for exfiltration, or malicious encryption characteristic of ransomware or data destructive operations.
Detects the creation or modification of known malicious files associated with the StegoAd (DarkSpectre) campaign. The rule monitors popular Chromium-based browsers (Chrome, Edge, Brave) dropping specific files like 'msn.woff' (malicious font), WebP containers (steganography), and 'setting.conf' (C2 configuration) into browser-related directories such as AppData or extension storage folders.
Detects indicators of the DirtyClone (CVE-2026-43503) Linux kernel local privilege escalation exploit. The rule identifies the execution or compilation of the PoC binary, the specific su invocation used for shell spawning by the exploit, and subsequent post-exploitation actions including modifying sensitive files (/etc/passwd, /etc/sudoers) and creating new local accounts with sudo privileges.
Detects anomalous activities associated with the CitrixBleed2 campaign where the ScreenConnect remote access tool is used to deploy or execute QEMU virtual machine artifacts. The rule monitors for the spawning of virtualization binaries (e.g., qemu-system-x86_64) via the ScreenConnect service, the dropping of QEMU-related files into ScreenConnect directories, and the suspicious creation of local administrator accounts (CtxAppVCOMService).
Detects suspicious command-line patterns on Linux systems commonly associated with post-exploitation activity, including the establishment of reverse shells, encoded payload delivery via DNS, and manual modifications to crontab or SSH authorized_keys for persistence.
Detects techniques used by adversaries to hide files, directories, or modify access permissions on Windows systems. This includes the use of 'attrib.exe' to set the hidden attribute, PowerShell cmdlets to set file attributes, 'icacls' to modify or deny permissions, and the creation of hidden Unix-style dot-prefixed files within common Windows user directories.
Detects network traffic attempting to modify SSH authorized_keys or the sshd_config file using SCP or SFTP protocols, which is a common technique used by attackers to maintain persistence on compromised systems.
Detects evidence of arbitrary command execution originating from OpenVPN Connect, potentially via an echoed script payload that executes commands upon disconnect, bypassing security controls. The rule identifies suspicious child processes spawned by OpenVPNConnect.exe and detects the creation of a known proof-of-concept marker file.
Detects artifacts and network activity associated with a malicious Chromium extension (ID: flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd) that uses declarativeNetRequest rules to redirect browser search traffic to a typosquatted domain (perplexity-ai.online). The rule correlates file creation, registry modifications, and outbound network connections to the malicious domain from common web browsers.
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