Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects macOS.Gaslight DPRK-aligned implant registering a LaunchAgent plist using the com.apple.system.services.activity label to masquerade within Apple's com.apple.* namespace for persistence. Key behavioral indicators include file writes to ~/Library/LaunchAgents with the spoofed label and use of __NSGetExecutablePath for binary path resolution.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a 'tc' (traffic control) command using 'pedit' is followed by a 'drop_caches' operation within a 5-minute window. This pattern is potentially associated with an evidence-wiping technique used to clear system caches after potentially malicious network manipulation or data staging activities, possibly linked to CVE-2026-46331.
Detects unprivileged processes creating a new user namespace (CLONE_NEWUSER) followed by a network namespace (CLONE_NEWNET) and modifying procfs mapping files (uid_map, gid_map). This sequence is characteristic of the exploitation staging phase for CVE-2026-43503 (DirtyClone) to gain CAP_NET_ADMIN privileges and overwrite the page cache.
Detects evidence of log deletion, logrotate configuration modification, or syslog daemon termination (rsyslog, syslog-ng, journald) occurring within 30 minutes of suspicious child process activity from common web application interpreters (e.g., python, node, java, php). This correlation pattern is a strong indicator of post-exploitation activity aimed at clearing tracks or impairing host logging services.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for two key signals: interaction with known canary/trap files designed to detect unauthorized access, and rapid, mass file modification of common user data extensions within a short timeframe. Either behavior is indicative of encryption or automated file destruction processes typical of ransomware attacks.
Detects indicators of the MYRA Linux RAT, including process masquerading as systemd-userdbd, persistent modifications to system locations like /etc/profile.d/ and /usr/local/lib/, and malicious cron scheduling, typically originating from a Node.js process.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with the MYRA Linux RAT, including the use of LD_PRELOAD to load a malicious shared library from a hidden path, persistent shell profile modification via /etc/profile.d/.sh.local, and process masquerading as systemd-userdbd. This rule is linked to the Polymarket Trap campaign involving malicious npm packages.
Detects potential sideloading of malicious Chrome extensions by monitoring for unauthorized file creation of 'manifest.json' files within the browser's extension directories and unauthorized registry modifications related to extension management. The rule specifically excludes legitimate processes like 'chrome.exe' and 'GoogleUpdate.exe', aiming to identify third-party processes attempting to register or install browser extensions.
This rule monitors for file system operations (creation, modification, deletion, or renaming) performed by a Node.js process when interacting with sensitive directories and files associated with web browser extensions and cryptocurrency wallets. This pattern is commonly observed in credential and private key theft activities where malicious scripts attempt to exfiltrate wallet data.
This rule detects when five or more driver-related files (.inf, .sys, or .drv) are created or modified within a one-hour window by the same initiating process account. This behavior can be indicative of malicious driver installation, rootkit activity, or other forms of persistence or privilege escalation.
Detects anomalous self-upgrade behavior in npm packages where a node process spawns child processes using npm pack or specific command-line arguments to overwrite installed package files. This pattern is associated with malicious supply chain activity, specifically seen in the wshu.net campaign where packages download and replace their own contents at runtime.
This rule detects potential wiper activity by monitoring for high-frequency deletion or modification of specific file types (e.g., .docx, .xlsx, .pdf, .db, .bak) within a short window. It triggers when a process like PowerShell or Cmd is observed executing destructive commands (e.g., 'del', 'erase', 'Remove-Item') on a large number of files across multiple directories, which is a common behavior of malware attempting to destroy data.
This rule detects a sequence of suspicious activities: the creation or modification of an executable file (.exe or .dll) within a directory path containing update-related keywords, followed by the execution of a file in that same location, and culminating in an outbound network connection from that process. This pattern is characteristic of a software supply chain compromise or an adversary deploying a malicious payload via a fake or compromised update mechanism.
Detects the use of PowerShell, PWSH, or CMD to modify file system timestamps, a technique commonly referred to as timestomping. This is often used by adversaries to hide malicious file activity or blend in with legitimate system files by manipulating file creation, modification, or access time metadata.
Detects the creation or modification of a file named 'help.php' within directories associated with REDCap deployments. This activity is a known persistence mechanism used by threat actors like UNC6508 to establish web shell access.
This rule detects the creation or modification of at least 10 files within an hour that have the '.prinzeugen' extension, which is indicative of the Prinz Eugen ransomware encrypting files using ChaCha20.
Detects indicators associated with the deployment and execution of NetSupport RAT, including the launch of 'client32.exe', loading of the 'pcicl32.dll' module, outbound network connections, and the creation of the 'client.ini' configuration file. It also flags execution chains where 'client32.exe' is spawned by common browser or living-off-the-land processes.
Detects evidence of credential dumping activities, including the execution of known Mimikatz-related binaries or command lines, unauthorized memory dumping of the LSASS process using tools like procdump or rundll32 with comsvcs.dll, and the presence of known credential dumping artifacts on disk. It also monitors cross-process access to lsass.exe by potentially unauthorized or unsigned processes.
Detects potential timestomping activities via PowerShell APIs or touch.exe usage, alongside the creation or modification of known webshell filenames in web directories or files placed in common web root subdirectories by web server processes.
Detects attempts to modify file timestamps (CreationTime, LastWriteTime, LastAccessTime) using PowerShell Set-ItemProperty cmdlets or command-line tools like 'touch'. This behavior is often associated with adversary attempts to hide artifacts or modify forensic timelines, specifically when targeting directories associated with web servers.
This rule detects potential file timestamp manipulation (timestomping) and suspicious file operations commonly associated with web shell installation on Windows systems. It monitors for PowerShell commands, touch.exe execution, and cmd.exe file copy operations directed at web directories, as well as file write events involving specific known web shell filenames.
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