Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects indicators of Akira ransomware activity, specifically the deletion of Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin, the creation of known Akira ransom notes (akira_readme.txt, restore_files.txt), and the generation of files with the .akira extension.
This rule detects the creation or modification of .aspx or .php files within a 'wwwroot/images' directory, specifically where the time difference between consecutive creation events for the same file path exceeds 24 hours (86400 seconds). This behavior is often associated with the placement of web shells or backdoors in web server directories, where adversaries attempt to masquerade malicious scripts as image files.
Detects a suspicious pattern where a large volume of files (documents, archives, or media) are written to common user directories, followed within 10 minutes by attempts to impair system recovery (deleting shadow copies) or disable Microsoft Defender exclusions using native Windows utilities such as vssadmin, wmic, or PowerShell. This behavior is highly indicative of ransomware staging activities.
Detects endpoint file creation or modification events involving PDF files with suspicious, lure-like filenames (e.g., 'Settlement Agreement') being written by email clients or web browsers. This rule acts as a proxy for identifying potential spearphishing attachment execution on the endpoint.
This rule detects malicious activity associated with Kimsuky JSE loaders, which leverage XML DOM manipulation (e.g., bin.base64) and ADODB.Stream components to decode and drop base64-encoded payloads into the ProgramData directory. It further monitors for subsequent decoding attempts using certutil and the presence of specific, suspicious file extensions (e.g., .a9oc, .lpXD, .lpxQ) often used by this threat actor.
This rule detects file creation, writing, or opening events related to a known malicious Chrome extension ID (flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd). This specific ID is often associated with malicious browser extensions used for credential theft, unauthorized data exfiltration, or establishing persistence.
This rule detects file creation, writing, or opening events related to a known malicious Chrome extension ID (flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd). This specific ID is often associated with malicious browser extensions used for credential theft, unauthorized data exfiltration, or establishing persistence.
This rule detects activity associated with the malicious 'Search for perplexity ai' browser extension (ID: flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd). It specifically identifies DNS queries and network connections to the malicious domain 'perplexity-ai.online' initiated by common web browser processes, as well as file system evidence of the extension's presence.
Detects the creation or modification of an mcp.json file within IDE configuration directories (.vscode, .amazonq), followed shortly by the execution of shell or interpreter processes (bash, sh, cmd, powershell, npx) by the IDE process. This behavior suggests the installation of a malicious Model Context Protocol (MCP) server configuration that could facilitate command execution or persistence within the developer environment.
Detects potential ransomware activity characterized by a high volume of file modifications (create, write, rename) involving common document/data extensions, combined with the execution of commands designed to inhibit system recovery (shadow copy deletion, BCD modifications) or perform network share enumeration within the same timeframe and on the same host.
This rule detects potential web shell activity on Windows IIS servers by monitoring for suspicious process creation and file write events originating from the w3wp.exe worker process. Specifically, it flags when w3wp.exe spawns command shells (cmd, powershell), database management utilities (sqlcmd, osql), or network discovery/transfer tools (curl, wget, certutil, bitsadmin). It also detects the creation or modification of common web shell file extensions (.aspx, .ashx, .asmx) within web root directories.
Detects high-volume file modification or renaming operations targeted at specific file extensions (dcm, tf, parquet) commonly associated with sensitive data (DICOM imaging, Terraform states, database parquet files) or operations occurring within Docker volume directories. The detection uses an aggregation logic to identify when a process performs more than 20 such file operations on an endpoint, which may indicate bulk data exfiltration, encryption, or tampering.
Detects various phases of the Grixba infostealer infection lifecycle, including persistence via file drops in public user directories, malicious DLL/payload creation, reconnaissance data exfiltration, security software tampering (Windows Defender, AMSI, WLDP), and event log clearing via wevtutil.
This rule detects a high frequency of file rename or modification events targeting files with extensions commonly associated with ransomware. It filters out activity from processes signed by trusted vendors like Microsoft, Symantec, Sophos, and Trend Micro to reduce noise, flagging mass rename operations that could indicate an active ransomware encryption process.
Detects the configuration and usage of personal Microsoft OneDrive accounts on corporate endpoints. This is achieved by monitoring for OneDrive process execution with personal account command-line arguments, OneDrive setup utilities configured with personal tenant identifiers, and file system activity within directory paths associated with personal OneDrive synchronization.
This rule detects attempts to tamper with critical Linux log files such as /var/log/auth.log, /var/log/syslog, and /var/log/audit/audit.log. It specifically looks for file deletion or modification events, or process creation events that involve commands like 'rm', 'shred', 'truncate', 'unlink', or 'dd' targeting these log files. Legitimate processes like 'logrotate', 'rsyslog', 'syslog-ng', 'auditd', 'systemd', and 'journald' are excluded to reduce false positives.
Detects potential abuse of Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) by monitoring for suspicious command-line activity from 'certreq.exe' and 'certutil.exe' associated with certificate enrollment, submission, or management. It also identifies the staging of certificate-related files (.pem, .pfx, .p12, .crt, .cer, .key) in common user directories.
Detects unauthorized access or modification to common CI/CD credential files (.npmrc, .pypirc, .git-credentials, jenkins credentials.xml) and CI/CD configuration files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml). The rule monitors both file system activities by non-standard processes and the execution of command-line tools that reference these sensitive files.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity on Linux-based SD-WAN appliances (e.g., vManage, vBond, vSmart) including unauthorized file deletion, log tampering, and credential backup manipulation. It specifically flags operations like removing system logs, deleting configuration/tenant files, or copying sensitive files like /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow, which are common indicators of post-exploitation activity or attempts to hide malicious footprints.
Detects attempts by a user or process to clear audit logs, system logs, or command history, often used by adversaries to cover their tracks on a compromised system. The rule monitors for file deletion (rm, shred), content truncation (truncate), selective line removal (sed -i), and shell history suppression (HISTFILE=/dev/null, history -c) against sensitive log and history paths.
Detects attempts to perform a container escape using path traversal via the 'docker cp' command. This rule monitors for malicious directory traversal sequences, the creation of specific artifacts used in known PoC exploits for container escapes, and the subsequent execution of scripts or shell interpreters by container management processes.
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