Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects modifications or renames to critical Windows accessibility feature binaries (sethc.exe, utilman.exe, osk.exe, magnify.exe) located in System32. Adversaries frequently replace these binaries with malicious counterparts or command shells to achieve persistence and gain SYSTEM-level execution via accessibility shortcuts at the logon screen.
Detects suspicious activity related to the Print Spooler service (spoolsv.exe), specifically focusing on the spawning of known command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe) by spoolsv.exe, as well as the creation or modification of DLL files within the system print spool drivers directory by processes other than spoolsv.exe. This activity is often associated with privilege escalation and persistence techniques involving print spooler service abuse.
Detects when a non-root user modifies, creates, or renames files within common cron directories or the main crontab file on Linux systems. This activity can indicate an attempt to establish persistence or schedule malicious tasks.
Detects modifications to the AdminSDHolder object in Active Directory via Windows Security Event ID 5136. The AdminSDHolder object maintains the security permissions for all objects protected by the AdminSDHolder process. Adversaries often modify this object to establish persistence and gain unauthorized access to highly privileged accounts within the domain.
Detects modification of macOS TCC database to grant unauthorized permissions
Detects the creation or modification of a large file named 'logs.dat' (100KB or greater) within common user-related directories such as AppData, Temp, Users, or Documents. This pattern can indicate data staging for exfiltration, where an adversary collects sensitive information into a single file before attempting to move it off the system.
This rule detects potential wiper activity by monitoring for high-frequency deletion or modification of specific file types (e.g., .docx, .xlsx, .pdf, .db, .bak) within a short window. It triggers when a process like PowerShell or Cmd is observed executing destructive commands (e.g., 'del', 'erase', 'Remove-Item') on a large number of files across multiple directories, which is a common behavior of malware attempting to destroy data.
This rule detects a sequence of suspicious activities: the creation or modification of an executable file (.exe or .dll) within a directory path containing update-related keywords, followed by the execution of a file in that same location, and culminating in an outbound network connection from that process. This pattern is characteristic of a software supply chain compromise or an adversary deploying a malicious payload via a fake or compromised update mechanism.
Detects the use of the Windows attrib.exe command with the +h (hidden) attribute flag applied to files within the AppData\Roaming or AppData\Local directories. This behavior is commonly associated with malware attempting to hide malicious components for persistence or evasion.
Identifies file, registry, network, and process indicators associated with the @mastra/* npm supply chain compromise. This rule detects the presence of specific malicious files, registry modifications for persistence, outbound network connections to known command and control (C2) infrastructure, and the execution of malicious scripts related to the attack.
Detects anomalous file modifications to web-accessible directories (such as index.html, dist, public, or wwwroot) by common JavaScript execution environments including node.exe, bun.exe, or npm. This activity is consistent with post-compromise tampering of web assets as observed in the Miasma/Hades campaign, likely involving the abuse of stolen repository credentials to deploy malicious content.
Detects the obfuscated 'setup.cjs' dropper associated with the easy-day-js npm supply chain attack. The rule identifies unique obfuscated variable names, XOR-encoded marker bytes, and specific campaign-related strings, including postinstall commands, package names, second-stage payload filenames, self-deletion patterns, and TLS bypass indicators.
This rule detects activities associated with the DirtyClone (CVE-2026-43503) privilege escalation vulnerability on Linux systems. It monitors for the execution of exploit binaries from world-writable directories, the modification of critical process memory mapping files (/proc/self/uid_map, /proc/self/gid_map, /proc/self/setgroups) by non-root users, the use of unshare to create user namespaces as a precondition, and the anomalous spawning of shells by the SUID binary /usr/bin/su.
Detects the creation of GitHub Actions workflow files within the .github/workflows/ directory that mimic Dependabot naming conventions while containing suspicious indicators associated with the Miasma/Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attack. Indicators include hardcoded secret references, specific operational markers like 'RevokeAndItGoesKaboom', and unauthorized OIDC token permissions.
Supply chain worm targeting npm packages and GitHub Actions, linked to Shai-Hulud/Hades lineage
Detects the creation or modification of suspicious LaunchAgent or LaunchDaemon plist files on macOS. Specifically looks for files named 'com.apple.accountsd.plist' or files within a hidden directory '.com.apple.accountsd' in common LaunchAgent/Daemon paths. This pattern is often used by malware for persistence.
This rule detects potential malicious activity associated with the 'CadenceOptimizer' service and related 'agt.dll' library. It monitors for the creation or modification of Windows Registry keys for persistence, the creation or loading of a specific DLL in the 'ProgramData\CorsairUtil' directory, and the injection of code into 'svchost.exe' via 'Brn_Agent' command line arguments.
Detects high-frequency file creation or modification events within directories matching the 'RP_<UUID>' naming pattern in Windows temporary folders. This behavior is indicative of Poseidon generator/worker threads attempting to cause I/O saturation to exploit Time-of-Check Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) vulnerabilities in security products like Microsoft Defender (MsMpEng.exe).
Detects high-volume file modifications or renames performed by a single process over a short window, affecting many unique file paths. This behavioral pattern is highly indicative of ransomware activity attempting to encrypt data for impact.
Detects unauthorized modifications to cron jobs or RC scripts on Linux and BSD edge appliances, which is a persistence technique observed in the VerdantBamboo BRICKSTORM campaign. The rule flags suspicious file modifications in persistence-related directories, excluding activity from legitimate package managers.
This rule detects suspicious use of sudo, modification of the sudoers file, or privilege escalation patterns specifically targeting edge network appliances (e.g., pfSense, Synology, Egnyte). It monitors for commands like sudo tee, sudo -l for permission enumeration, or the introduction of NOPASSWD entries, which are common indicators of persistence or privilege escalation attempts by service accounts.
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