Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects file operations (creation, modification, deletion, renaming) involving common SSH key files (id_rsa, id_ed25519) or files located within .ssh directories, initiated by processes typically associated with AI/LLM tools (chatgpt, perplexity, etc.) or generic process names. This may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate or manipulate authentication credentials by unauthorized applications.
Detects attempts to extract the Security Account Manager (SAM) database, either by using the 'reg save' utility to export registry hives containing the SAM or by directly creating/modifying the SAM file on disk outside of known legitimate system processes.
Detects post-exploitation activities on SD-WAN appliances, including unauthorized tenant list uploads related to CVE-2026-20245, creation of unauthorized 'troot' accounts in sensitive system files, staging of system files, unauthorized permission modifications via chmod/chown, and privilege escalation attempts using su.
Detects command-line execution of 'rm' or 'cp -a' targeting specific sensitive system, credential, or configuration files on Linux systems. This behavior often indicates an attempt to remove evidence, destroy logs, or stage sensitive data for exfiltration.
Detects indicators of exploitation related to CVE-2026-20245 on Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN controllers, including malicious tenant CSV uploads, unauthorized account creation (troot), privilege escalation via su, anti-forensic backup of system configuration files, and configuration changes such as PermitRootLogin enabled.
This rule detects potentially suspicious activity related to VS Code extensions or development environments, specifically targeting the creation of 'tasks.json' files by Node.js processes, or the spawning of suspicious child processes (such as shells or interpreters) by VS Code-related processes with command lines associated with common malicious patterns or unauthorized automation.
Detects network traffic attempting to modify SSH authorized_keys or the sshd_config file using SCP or SFTP protocols, which is a common technique used by attackers to maintain persistence on compromised systems.
This rule monitors for potential abuse of the Microsoft Management Console (mmc.exe) to proxy malicious activity. It detects three primary behaviors: 1) mmc.exe being launched with a .msc file originating from user-writable or suspicious directories; 2) mmc.exe spawning known suspicious child processes (e.g., powershell.exe, cmd.exe, rundll32.exe); and 3) the creation or modification of .msc files in suspicious locations by processes other than mmc.exe or msiexec.exe.
This rule detects ransomware activity by identifying two primary indicators: a high volume of file renames to common ransomware extensions within a 5-minute window, and the creation of known ransom notes across multiple directories. It excludes processes signed by trusted vendors to minimize noise.
Detects potential dynamic linker hijacking on Linux systems by monitoring for the use of non-standard LD_PRELOAD paths in process command lines or unauthorized modifications to the /etc/ld.so.preload configuration file, which can be used to inject malicious code into processes.
Detects techniques associated with Golden SAML attacks, including the use of Mimikatz for ADFS token-signing certificate extraction, the execution of AADInternals PowerShell cmdlets for SAML token forgery, and unauthorized access to the ADFS configuration database (AdfsConfiguration.mdf).
This rule detects indicators of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing infrastructure, specifically targeting Evilginx2 and similar proxy frameworks. It identifies unauthorized execution of Evilginx2 binaries, the presence of specific session and configuration files (.evilginx/, phishlets, session databases), unauthorized modifications to Nginx configurations, and the dropping of suspicious HTML lure files into web document roots by scripting interpreters.
Detects the abuse of the CertUtil.exe Windows utility to download, decode, encode, or split files. This behavior is considered suspicious when initiated by common command-line shells or Office applications, which are frequently used as entry points for malicious scripts or macro-based attacks.
Detects various techniques used by an attacker to escape a container environment or gain unauthorized access to host-level resources. This includes the execution of namespace manipulation tools (nsenter, unshare, chroot), unauthorized access to the docker.sock Unix socket, mounting of host filesystems from within a container, and direct attempts to access the host's /proc/1 namespace files.
Detects potential PrintNightmare or Print Spooler exploitation by monitoring for the spoolsv.exe service spawning suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd, powershell, rundll32) and unauthorized files being dropped into the printer driver directory.
Detects behavior consistent with the SharkLoader malware, including the creation of malicious components in %APPDATA% subdirectories (xwreg, xgdf), the execution of SystemSettings.exe from these non-standard directories, and the execution of commands via cmd.exe initiated from these paths. It also identifies file staging activities in %TEMP%\aswerf.
Detects file write or delete operations involving cmd.exe by processes potentially associated with the TrymeLocker ransomware, specifically looking for indicators of ownership or permission modification (takeown, icacls) and suspicious file paths.
This rule detects file creation or modification events associated with the Miasma campaign. It identifies specific payload files (e.g., .claude/setup.mjs, .vscode/tasks.json), the use of specific marker strings in file metadata or origin URLs, and obfuscated task configurations in VS Code directories that leverage bun or node to execute base64-encoded or character-encoded commands.
Detects instances where the legitimate Windows utility 'Fondue.exe' (Features on Demand) loads the control panel library 'APPWIZ.cpl' from non-standard locations such as C:\Users\Public or AppData directories. It also identifies the staging phase where 'APPWIZ.cpl' is written to 'C:\Users\Public', which is indicative of a DLL side-loading attack sequence, often associated with the Elephant malware dropper.
Detects the use of the 'fsutil.exe' utility with the 'setZeroData' argument to perform zero-byte file filling, often used to make files unrecoverable. The rule further filters for command lines containing common file deletion commands like 'del' or network connectivity tests like 'ping', indicating possible malicious file removal or destruction activity.
Detects the creation, reading, or execution of payloads stored within NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS). This technique is commonly used by adversaries to hide malicious content within file metadata to evade security tools. The rule monitors process command-line arguments for ADS syntax, identifies usage of utilities like type, Get-Content, wmic, or various LOLBins (e.g., regsvr32, rundll32) interacting with ADS paths, and flags anomalous file creation/modification events that involve ADS, excluding known system-generated streams.
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