Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects file events related to the 'plain-crypto-js' folder path, which has been associated with the AXIOS supply chain compromise. This rule monitors for any file activity within this specific folder, indicating potential malicious code injection or modification as part of a software supply chain attack.
This rule detects the forced removal of legitimate cryptocurrency wallet applications (Ledger Wallet, Trezor Suite, Exodus) followed by the extraction of new applications into the /Applications directory on macOS. It also looks for chmod commands to make the new applications executable and attempts to download suspicious zip files from 'wusetail.com'. This activity is indicative of the AMOS malware campaign, which aims to replace legitimate wallet applications with trojanized versions to steal cryptocurrency.
This query hunts for .lnk (shortcut) files that are either newly created or have the hidden attribute set, located in common Windows startup folders. Attackers often place LNK files in these locations to establish persistence.
Detects file creation, modification, or execution events involving the path '/Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond', which is the hardcoded drop location for the macOS C++ RAT deployed by the Axios supply chain attack.
This query hunts for .lnk (shortcut) files that are either newly created or have the hidden attribute set, located in common Windows startup folders. Attackers often place LNK files in these locations to establish persistence.
Detects the creation of a file named "msbuild.exe" within the Windows Startup folder. This behavior matches the persistence and masquerading techniques used by the TeamPCP threat actor following the compromise of the telnyx PyPI package.
Detects the creation or modification of .plist files on macOS systems. This activity can be indicative of various malicious behaviors, particularly those related to persistence or privilege escalation, as .plist files are often used to configure application settings, launch agents, or other system behaviors.
This rule detects artifacts associated with the Auto-Color Linux backdoor. Specifically, it looks for the presence of the malicious library 'libcext.so.2', which mimics a legitimate library, or modifications to '/etc/ld.preload' for persistence and dynamic linker hijacking. It also identifies specific file paths used by the malware, such as '/var/log/cross/auto-color' or files within '/tmp/cross/' with a 'config-err-' prefix.
High-fidelity correlation detecting DPRK Contagious Trader npm malware persistence: Node.js process modifying authorized_keys followed by ufw allowing SSH. Targets cryptocurrency traders via poisoned GitHub trading bot repositories.
Detects the creation or manipulation of the specific archive file (tpcp.tar.gz) used by TeamPCP to bundle stolen credentials. This rule monitors command line activity, cloud process execution, and file system events for references to 'tpcp.tar.gz'.
Detects the creation or modification of files within the misspelled 'Photoes' directory (e.g., \ProgramData\Photoes\). This directory is utilized by the BRUSHWORM backdoor for its main installation and by the BRUSHLOGGER keylogger for storing keystroke log files.
Detects the creation or modification of files within the misspelled 'Photoes' directory (e.g., \ProgramData\Photoes\). This directory is utilized by the BRUSHWORM backdoor for its main installation and by the BRUSHLOGGER keylogger for storing keystroke log files.
Detects the creation or modification of .NET application configuration files (`.exe.config`) in sensitive framework directories. This is a technique known as AppDomain Hijacking, used by the Silver Dragon APT group to hijack legitimate Windows services like `dfsvc.exe` and `tzsync.exe` for persistence and to load their malware (MonikerLoader).
High-fidelity correlation detecting DPRK Contagious Trader npm malware persistence: Node.js process modifying authorized_keys followed by ufw allowing SSH. Targets cryptocurrency traders via poisoned GitHub trading bot repositories.
This rule detects when the 'oskmenu.xml' file, located in 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\fsdefinitions', is accessed or modified by any process not running under the SYSTEM account. This file is associated with the On-Screen Keyboard and its modification by non-system accounts could indicate an attempt to alter its behavior, potentially for persistence or privilege escalation.
Detects the creation or modification of "app.asar" files, which are archives used by Electron-based applications. Adversaries can replace this file in a legitimate, signed application to execute malicious code, as seen in a recent ClickFix campaign trojanizing the WorkFlowy application.
This rule set detects components of the StegaBin supply-chain attack targeting npm packages. The first rule, 'stegabin_npm_loader', identifies malicious JavaScript loaders that utilize Pastebin for steganography and Vercel API paths for command and control. It looks for specific strings indicating Pastebin usage, Vercel API endpoints, and unique markers related to the steganographic decoding or payload. The second rule, 'StegaBin_VSCode_Tasks_Persistence', focuses on persistence mechanisms within VSCode's tasks.json files. It detects configurations that automatically execute malicious code upon folder opening, specifically looking for the 'runOn': 'folderOpen' property and references to the 'ext-checkdin.vercel.app' domain and associated API paths. Together, these rules aim to identify both the initial loader and the persistence mechanism used by the StegaBin campaign.
This rule detects files associated with two distinct malware chains, ShellFolder and LOTUSLITE, which have been observed in campaigns leveraging Middle East conflict themes as bait. The ShellFolder chain detection focuses on specific file names like 'ShellFolder.exe', 'ShellFolderDepend.dll', and 'BaiNetdisk', along with a unique decryption key '20260301@@@'. The LOTUSLITE downloader chain detection identifies specific DLLs ('libmemobook.dll', 'kugou.dll'), folder paths ('C:\ProgramData\CClipboardCm\', 'C:\ProgramData\WebFeatures\'), executable names ('WebFeatures.exe'), and hardcoded URLs/IP addresses ('www.e-kflower.com', '172.81.60.97') used for persistence and downloading next-stage malware. The rule aims to identify concrete indicators of compromise rather than broad patterns, focusing on the specific artifacts reported in related threat intelligence.
Detects malicious Message of the Day scripts for persistence
Detects the creation or modification of udev rules that execute suspicious commands or scripts from unusual locations. Udev rules are used by the Linux kernel device manager to handle hardware events and can be abused for persistence.
Detects malicious Message of the Day scripts being used for persistence, since these messages are ran at start time and will display to all users
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