Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
4,228 detections
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This rule detects potential exploitation attempts targeting the Splunk REST API (CVE-2026-20253) by monitoring for unauthenticated inbound requests to the /services/ path. It specifically looks for requests that lack the required Authorization or Cookie headers.
Detects network traffic matching the default HTTP check-in pattern of Mythic C2 agents. This rule monitors for POST requests using a specific hardcoded User-Agent string and Content-Type header commonly used in default Mythic agent configurations, indicating a potential active command-and-control session.
This rule monitors network appliance logs (Fortinet, Cisco, Meraki, WatchGuard, Sophos) for patterns associated with known vulnerabilities, including authentication bypass (CVE-2022-40684), SQL injection, path traversal, and command injection attempts within URL parameters. It also flags high-severity IPS/IDS alerts generated by these devices.
This rule monitors network device logs for patterns indicative of reconnaissance or vulnerability scanning against management and VPN interfaces of common firewall and network appliances (FortiGate, Meraki, WatchGuard, Sophos). It flags sources that either request multiple sensitive paths related to system status and configuration or employ known scanning tools (Nmap, masscan, Nuclei, zgrab, curl) in the user-agent string.
This rule monitors network device logs for patterns indicative of reconnaissance or vulnerability scanning against management and VPN interfaces of common firewall and network appliances (FortiGate, Meraki, WatchGuard, Sophos). It flags sources that either request multiple sensitive paths related to system status and configuration or employ known scanning tools (Nmap, masscan, Nuclei, zgrab, curl) in the user-agent string.
This rule monitors network appliance logs (Fortinet, Cisco, Meraki, WatchGuard, Sophos) for patterns associated with known vulnerabilities, including authentication bypass (CVE-2022-40684), SQL injection, path traversal, and command injection attempts within URL parameters. It also flags high-severity IPS/IDS alerts generated by these devices.
This rule detects anomalous, high-frequency unauthenticated POST requests targeting NetScaler ADC and Gateway management or service endpoints (/vpn/, /logon/, /nitro/). Such patterns are characteristic of automated reconnaissance and exploitation attempts, specifically targeting vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772.
This rule detects network beaconing behavior consistent with Cobalt Strike's default malleable C2 profiles. It monitors HTTP GET and POST requests for specific URI patterns commonly used by default Cobalt Strike configurations and triggers when multiple such requests are observed from a single host over a 15-minute window.
This rule detects potential exploitation of the Oracle PeopleSoft PSEMHUB component vulnerability (CVE-2026-35273). It identifies suspicious POST requests to the PSEMHUB HttpListeningConnector servlet, including obfuscated URL paths, followed by the creation of suspiciously named .jsp or .jspx files in the PSEMHUB.war application directory, which is indicative of a web shell deployment.
Detects an exploitation attempt against PaperCut MF software leveraging SQL injection to deliver a Java bytecode loader (identified by the 'cafebabe' magic bytes) via a POST request.
Detects repeated attempts to perform IIS 8.3 tilde short-filename enumeration. This reconnaissance technique exploits the legacy DOS 8.3 file naming convention to identify the existence and naming of files or directories on a Microsoft IIS web server.
Detects browser-side malicious activity involving communication with Cloudflare Workers (workers.dev) endpoints typically associated with C2 beaconing (relays, ICE, socket) or the retrieval of trojanized JavaScript dependencies like 'jquery.mousewheel' which often precede second-stage agent execution.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to 'letsdiskuss.com' with a URI pattern of '/user/', which is characteristic of the 'STAC4924' loader utilizing a dead-drop resolver for command-and-control communication.
Detects network activity related to the 'Blinder Tunnel' C2 infrastructure. The rules identify a Chisel tunnel client initiating a WebSocket handshake (identifiable by the 'chisel-v3-channel' header) to external infrastructure and a DNS lookup for a specific domain (soroshpasargad.com) identified as a relay nameserver used by the threat actor CL-STA-1178.
Detects network activity related to the 'Blinder Tunnel' C2 infrastructure. The rules identify a Chisel tunnel client initiating a WebSocket handshake (identifiable by the 'chisel-v3-channel' header) to external infrastructure and a DNS lookup for a specific domain (soroshpasargad.com) identified as a relay nameserver used by the threat actor CL-STA-1178.
Detects network activity related to the 'Blinder Tunnel' C2 infrastructure. The rules identify a Chisel tunnel client initiating a WebSocket handshake (identifiable by the 'chisel-v3-channel' header) to external infrastructure and a DNS lookup for a specific domain (soroshpasargad.com) identified as a relay nameserver used by the threat actor CL-STA-1178.
Detects network activity (DNS queries, HTTP Host headers, and TLS SNI) directed towards the known Blinder Tunnel staging domain 'asdfafadafg.online'. This behavior is indicative of command-and-control (C2) communication or initial staging of malicious payloads.
Detects network activity (DNS queries, HTTP Host headers, and TLS SNI) directed towards the known Blinder Tunnel staging domain 'asdfafadafg.online'. This behavior is indicative of command-and-control (C2) communication or initial staging of malicious payloads.
Detects network activity (DNS queries, HTTP Host headers, and TLS SNI) directed towards the known Blinder Tunnel staging domain 'asdfafadafg.online'. This behavior is indicative of command-and-control (C2) communication or initial staging of malicious payloads.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where Kubernetes API resources (namespaces, secrets, configmaps, pods, or nodes) are enumerated, followed by a search query against the Slack API, indicative of a potential reconnaissance phase or sandbox escape attempt.
Detects SQL injection exploitation attempts against MOVEit Transfer targeting the CVE-2023-34362 vulnerability, followed by the deployment and subsequent interaction with the 'human2.aspx' webshell associated with Cl0p ransomware mass-exploitation campaigns.
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