Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a suspicious sequence of events where Kubernetes API resources (namespaces, secrets, configmaps, pods, or nodes) are enumerated, followed by a search query against the Slack API, indicative of a potential reconnaissance phase or sandbox escape attempt.
Detects SQL injection exploitation attempts against MOVEit Transfer targeting the CVE-2023-34362 vulnerability, followed by the deployment and subsequent interaction with the 'human2.aspx' webshell associated with Cl0p ransomware mass-exploitation campaigns.
Detects SQL injection attempts on the WordPress REST API batch endpoint, specifically targeting the wp_users table to extract user credentials (user_pass and user_login), a technique used by attackers to compromise WordPress installations.
Detects HTTP GET requests for AgtaBackupAgent.msi or AgtaBackupAgent.version, which are indicative of the download phase of the AgtaBackup Remote Access Trojan (RAT).
Detects the 'HCENC1:' marker in HTTP request and response bodies, which is associated with RUSTYSHADE malware used by the APT36 (Transparent Tribe) threat group for Command and Control communications.
Detects HTTP GET requests to Backblaze B2 storage hosting specific archive files identified as payloads for the RustyShade/RustyMove malware family, often used by the APT36 threat group.
Detects HTTP traffic containing the 'User-token' header, which is indicative of command-and-control (C2) communication patterns associated with the curlRAT backdoor, often attributed to North Korean threat actors such as APT37, Lazarus, or Kimsuky.
Detects network activity associated with a malicious NPM package (typosquatting) beaconing to a known C2 server (69.48.229.140) and performing command and control operations, including command polling and data exfiltration, specifically from a Node.js environment.
This rule detects administrative or user activity within Azure via AzureActivity logs and web request patterns in AppServiceHTTPLogs that originate from a predefined list of known malicious IP addresses.
Detects DNS queries, HTTP host headers, and TLS SNI traffic associated with known credential-phishing domains used by the threat actor TA419. The rule monitors for communication to a specific list of domains identified as malicious or used in phishing campaigns.
Detects direct prompt-injection attempts submitted to an LLM or AI gateway. The rule monitors HTTP POST requests for common adversarial techniques such as attempting to override system instructions, reassign model roles, bypass safety guidelines, or initiate jailbreak modes (e.g., DAN). It includes stateful tracking to flag users who perform multiple such attempts within a 10-minute window, increasing the risk score for persistent malicious behavior.
This rule monitors network appliance logs (Fortinet, Cisco, Meraki, WatchGuard, Sophos) for patterns associated with known vulnerabilities, including authentication bypass (CVE-2022-40684), SQL injection, path traversal, and command injection attempts within URL parameters. It also flags high-severity IPS/IDS alerts generated by these devices.
Detects two distinct suspicious patterns: first, the deletion of executable files residing in common user-writable temporary directories (e.g., Temp, Downloads, AppData) using command-line tools like 'del' or 'erase', which is often indicative of anti-forensic activity after malware execution. Second, it monitors for network traffic involving HTTP POST requests or specific SOAP headers related to 'tempuri.org', which are commonly associated with default .NET WCF service scaffolding and may be used by adversaries for C2 communication or exfiltration.
This rule detects potential exploitation of the Oracle PeopleSoft PSEMHUB component vulnerability (CVE-2026-35273). It identifies suspicious POST requests to the PSEMHUB HttpListeningConnector servlet, including obfuscated URL paths, followed by the creation of suspiciously named .jsp or .jspx files in the PSEMHUB.war application directory, which is indicative of a web shell deployment.
This rule detects potential credential stuffing attacks by monitoring high-volume authentication attempts against web application login endpoints. It specifically flags scenarios where a high number of unique source IP addresses interact with a login endpoint (e.g., /login, /signin) within a short window, which is characteristic of automated, distributed credential stuffing tools using proxy networks to rotate IPs.
Detects incoming web server requests containing suspicious, URL-encoded SQL injection patterns indicative of automated probing or exploitation attempts, such as UNION SELECT, boolean-based injection fragments, and comment sequences.
Detects HTTP requests containing common web exploit patterns (SQLi, XSS, RCE) that exhibit characteristics of automated, mutating payload generation often utilized in AI-assisted fuzzing or vulnerability scanning tools. The rule monitors for encoded, obfuscated, or highly varied payload syntax within URI query strings.
Detects unauthenticated HTTP POST requests to the /prompt endpoint of a ComfyUI instance, which is indicative of an attempt to remotely execute workflows on an exposed instance.
Detects inbound HTTP POST requests to the /generate endpoint of a Hugging Face Text Generation Inference (TGI) server. Such requests indicate attempts to use or interact with the inference API, potentially without authentication, which could lead to unauthorized resource utilization or model interaction if the service is not properly secured.
This rule detects external reconnaissance attempts targeting MLflow Tracking Servers by monitoring for inbound HTTP GET requests to the default MLflow API path '/api/2.0/mlflow/'. This behavior is indicative of an adversary scanning for exposed machine learning infrastructure, potentially to facilitate subsequent unauthorized access or exploitation of the tracking server.
Detects network traffic indicators associated with Cobalt Strike beaconing activity, specifically focusing on common default or near-default Malleable C2 HTTP profile patterns. This includes hardcoded URI paths often used in default configurations (e.g., jQuery library names, pixel gifs) and specific combinations of HTTP headers and user-agent strings commonly observed in adversary C2 frameworks.
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