Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects inbound HTTP POST requests directed at common paths associated with self-hosted OpenAI-compatible LLM inference APIs, such as LocalAI or vLLM. This rule identifies potentially unauthorized or unintended public exposure of internal LLM infrastructure, which could lead to unauthorized model usage, information disclosure, or exploitation of the inference engine.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity where specific suspicious API endpoints (/api/v1/ping.php and /api/v1/connect.php) are accessed by common system processes (msedge_proxy.exe or WindowsUpdate.exe). The logic clusters these network requests by device and process, triggering an alert when both endpoints are observed from the same process on a single device, a common indicator of a C2 communication pattern.
This Splunk query analyzes web logs to identify and categorize user agents, detecting various types of unwanted applications. This activity can signify possible compromised hosts on the network.
Detects suspicious activity associated with Cobalt Strike Beacon communication, specifically monitoring for known default named pipes and specific user-agent strings commonly used by Cobalt Strike in HTTP/S traffic.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests initiated by the Windows PowerShell User-Agent where the destination host is a decimal-encoded IP address. This pattern is commonly associated with ClickFix-style social engineering attacks, where users are tricked into executing obfuscated PowerShell commands to download malicious payloads.
Detects network traffic associated with the ClickFix Traffic Distribution System (TDS), specifically targeting requests to known malicious domains like fsputnik.com and uasputnik.com, as well as associated fake Cloudflare verification lure pages.
Detects network traffic directed towards known public DNS over HTTPS (DoH) resolvers, such as Cloudflare, Google, and Quad9. Adversaries often abuse DoH to tunnel Command and Control (C2) communication, effectively blending in with legitimate web traffic to evade traditional DNS monitoring.
Detects a process reading credential store files (Login Data) from multiple Chromium-based browsers, immediately followed by an HTTP POST request to a specific exfiltration endpoint associated with the Psychedelic Stealer malware.
Detects network traffic destined for api.telegram.org that follows the specific URL structure pattern associated with the CARBONATO Hermes Agent bot command-and-control channel.
Detects HTTP traffic where the Host header contains a decimal-encoded IP address, which is a technique often used in stager evasion and obfuscation (notably associated with 'ClickFix' or similar browser-based malvertising campaigns) to bypass domain-based filtering or reputation systems.
Detects unauthorized exfiltration of sensitive information, such as camera credentials or location data, directed to the Telegram Bot API as part of the 'Operation CameraSwarm' campaign.
Detects anomalous access to the SharePoint WebPartPages.asmx SOAP endpoint, specifically using the GetWebPartPageConnectionInfo method. This query identifies patterns consistent with the exploitation of CVE-2026-65660, where adversaries attempt to smuggle WebPart template markup (e.g., <%@ Register, XamlServices) after legitimate preview methods have been disabled.
Detects incoming HTTP traffic containing a custom 'X-Quad' header, which is indicative of exploitation attempts targeting PaperCut MF vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-82078/CVE-2026-81578). This header is associated with the deployment or interaction with a Java-based web shell to establish unauthorized access.
Detects HTTP POST requests originating from the internal network directed at a known suspicious C2 infrastructure IP address (156.227.0.13), indicating potential C2 check-in activity associated with AdaptixC2 malware.
This rule detects network traffic originating from internal hosts using a specific HTTP User-Agent string associated with the default configuration of the AdaptixC2 framework. This is a common indicator of a C2 implant performing heartbeat or command-and-control communication.
Detects HTTP GET requests to external servers for files identified as 'mscopilot.exe' or '65722.txt', which are associated with the AdaptixC2 framework/malware, indicating potential payload delivery or command and control activity.
Detects network traffic associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing kits that impersonate Microsoft and Google login pages. The rules identify the presence of specific HTML elements (like Cloudflare Turnstile anti-bot gates) and authentication session cookie headers served from non-authorized/non-official domains, indicating a reverse-proxy phishing attack.
Detects potential C2 beaconing activity by identifying repeated network connections to the same external host that exhibit consistent payload sizes (low variance) and frequency, or by flagging HTTP requests containing default URI patterns associated with Cobalt Strike profiles.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the 'CSuite' phishing and RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) campaign. It monitors network, DNS, proxy, email, URL click, and file creation telemetry over the past 24 hours to identify interactions with known-malicious IP addresses, domains, URLs, and file hashes related to the campaign.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the 'CSuite' phishing and RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) campaign. It monitors network, DNS, proxy, email, URL click, and file creation telemetry over the past 24 hours to identify interactions with known-malicious IP addresses, domains, URLs, and file hashes related to the campaign.
This rule monitors network traffic, DNS queries, and user web clicks to detect interactions with known malicious domains associated with credential harvesting and phishing campaigns, specifically those impersonating security or SSO portals.
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