Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

4,230 detections

Detects successful POST requests to better-auth API key creation or update endpoints that appear to be unauthenticated. This pattern is indicative of exploitation of CVE-2025-61928, where an attacker can create or modify API keys for any user without a valid session.
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michael lohn@mlohn1984
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Detections.ai Community
8 months ago
6074
Detects exploitation attempts of CVE-2026-22769 by identifying PUT requests directed at the Tomcat Manager application deployment endpoint. This is used by UNC6201 to deploy malicious WAR files containing the SLAYSTYLE webshell.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
8 months ago
0022
Detects suspicious web requests to the Tomcat Manager on Dell RecoverPoint appliances. This technique is used by UNC6201 to exploit CVE-2026-22769 and upload malicious WAR files.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
8 months ago
6072
Detects processes masquerading as legitimate software making HTTP requests to specific API endpoints associated with the TrustConnect/DocConnect RAT C2.
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nomit vyas@xoxo
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Detections.ai Community
8 months ago
2043
This rule detects attempts to exploit Ivanti EPMM vulnerabilities CVE-2025-4427 and CVE-2025-4428. The first signature identifies requests to the '/api/v2/featureusage' endpoint containing patterns indicative of remote code execution (e.g., '${', 'Runtime', 'getRuntime', 'exec'). The second signature detects requests for a '.jsp' file named '403', which could indicate a backdoor or web shell deployment post-exploitation.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
8 months ago
0027
Detects HTTP GET requests to Ivanti EPMM endpoints containing the 'gPath' parameter, which is indicative of exploitation attempts against CVE-2026-1281 and CVE-2026-1340.
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nomit vyas@xoxo
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Detections.ai Community
8 months ago
0037
Detects outgoing network connections using the User-Agent 'ArkanixStealer/1.0', which is hardcoded in the C++ variant of the Arkanix Stealer.
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Tim Peck@timpeck
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Detections.ai Community
8 months ago
1037
This rule detects HTTP requests for 'install.sh' from the domains 'clawd.bot' or 'openclaw.ai'. These domains are associated with the OpenClaw/Clawd malware, indicating an attempt to download a malicious installation script.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
9 months ago
1186
This rule set detects attempts to download an 'install.sh' script from the domains 'clawd.bot' or 'openclaw.ai' using various methods. The first rule, 'openclaw_curl_install_script', specifically targets command-line tools like curl, wget, aria2c, and fetch. The 'openclaw_powershell_download' rule focuses on PowerShell commands (Invoke-WebRequest, iwr, Invoke-RestMethod, irm) used for downloading. The 'openclaw_aria2c_fetch_download' rule is redundant with the first rule, as it also targets aria2c and fetch. The 'openclaw_lolbin_download' rule identifies the use of Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBins) such as certutil, bitsadmin, and mshta for the same download activity. Finally, the 'openclaw_http_install_sh' rule detects direct HTTP network requests to the 'install.sh' path on these domains. Collectively, these rules aim to identify potential initial access or execution attempts involving a suspicious installation script from specific domains.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
9 months ago
4084
Detects events that may indicate a user is being enrolled into a Bitwarden organization's account recovery policy under malicious circumstances. As described by researchers, a malicious or compromised server can silently add a user to an attacker-controlled organization and enable an account recovery policy. The victim's client will then encrypt the user's vault key with an attacker-provided public key and upload it, leading to a full vault compromise.
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Duo Tech@duotech
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Detections.ai Community
9 months ago
1036
OysterLoader uses a Windows scheduled task to keep itself running. It creates a task with a name that looks like a normal security or updater tool, so it blends in. The task runs repeatedly in the background, helping the malware come back even after a restart and making it harder to notice or remove.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
9 months ago
1055
Detects a specific two-step HTTP pattern characteristic of OysterLoader's initial C2 communication. The malware first sends a registration request containing a 'WordPressAgent' User-Agent string, followed by a login request with a 'FingerPrint' User-Agent string to the same destination. This version checks for the User-Agent strings in the 'AdditionalFields' column.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
9 months ago
170112
This rule set detects network communication associated with macOS infostealers, including C2 infrastructure, SHub stealer heartbeat and exfiltration, and ClickFix staging and landing pages. It identifies specific hostnames and URI paths used by these malicious campaigns.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
9 months ago
0070
This rule detects potential exploitation attempts targeting Ivanti EPMM vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-4427/4428) and subsequent post-exploitation activities. It has two main parts:

1. Web Request Analysis: It identifies web requests to the `/api/v2/featureusage` endpoint that contain suspicious patterns indicative of command injection or expression language injection attempts.

2. Process Creation Analysis: It looks for unusual process creations where Java or Tomcat-related processes (`java.exe`, `javaw.exe`, `catalina.bat`, `catalina.sh`) spawn command-line interpreters (`cmd.exe`, `bash`, `sh`, `powershell.exe`) or processes whose command lines contain keywords like `sliver` or `implant`, suggesting the deployment of malicious implants or sleeper shells.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
9 months ago
3072
Detects a sequence of HTTP requests where the User-Agent shifts from 'WordPressAgent' to 'FingerPrint' within a short time window, a behavior associated with OysterLoader C2 registration and payload retrieval.
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Tim Peck@timpeck
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SecOps Signals
9 months ago
3153
Detects potential exploitation of Apache bRPC command injection vulnerability (CVE-2025-60021) via the /pprof/heap endpoint.
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nomit vyas@xoxo
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Detections.ai Community
9 months ago
3081
Detects an unusual exfiltration technique where a URL, typically from temp.sh, is embedded within the User-Agent string of an HTTP request. This TTP was observed in the Notepad++ supply chain attack in 2025 for exfiltrating system information.
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nomit vyas@xoxo
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Detections.ai Community
9 months ago
1083
Detects a browser visiting a URL with phishing-related keywords, followed by a direct network connection to a known Large Language Model (LLM) API endpoint from the same device within a short time window. This correlated behavior is a strong indicator of the "runtime assembly" attack pattern, where a malicious page dynamically generates a phishing payload by calling an LLM service.
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Rudra Verma@Rudraverma
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CyberHawk Consultancy
9 months ago
110108
ET PHISHING Microsoft ClickFix Landing Domain
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
9 months ago
1021
This rule set detects potential post-exploitation activity and exploitation attempts targeting Ivanti EPMM (formerly MobileIron Core). The first rule, `ivanti_epmm_java_spawns_shell`, identifies suspicious process creation where a Java or Tomcat process (parent process) spawns a shell process (cmd.exe, bash, sh, or powershell.exe). This behavior is indicative of an attacker gaining remote code execution and using the compromised Java/Tomcat process to execute system commands. The second rule, `ivanti_epmm_http_featureusage_exploit`, detects HTTP requests to the `/api/v2/featureusage` endpoint that contain parameters indicative of Expression Language (EL) injection or format string abuse, specifically looking for `format=` along with keywords like `${`, `Runtime`, `exec`, or `getRuntime` in the URL. This suggests an attempt to exploit a vulnerability in the Ivanti EPMM application to achieve remote code execution.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
9 months ago
0031
ET PHISHING Microsoft ClickFix Landing Domain
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
9 months ago
0017
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