Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects the execution of regasm.exe establishing a network connection to a public IP address, excluding private IP ranges. This detection leverages Sysmon EventID 3 logs to identify such behavior. This activity is significant as regasm.exe is a legitimate Microsoft-signed binary that can be exploited to bypass application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an adversary's attempt to establish a remote Command and Control (C2) channel, potentially leading to privilege escalation and further malicious actions within the environment.
The following analytic identifies instances of Regsvcs.exe establishing a network connection to a public IP address, excluding private IP ranges. This detection leverages Sysmon EventID 3 logs to monitor network connections initiated by Regsvcs.exe. This activity is significant as Regsvcs.exe, a legitimate Microsoft-signed binary, can be exploited to bypass application control mechanisms and establish remote Command and Control (C2) channels. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to escalate privileges, persist in the environment, and exfiltrate sensitive data. Immediate investigation and remediation are recommended.
This analytic detects the presence of "api.telegram.org" in the command line of a process. This activity is significant because the Telegram API has been used as an exfiltration mechanism or as a Command and Control (C2) channel by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate an attacker or malware is exfiltrating data or receiving additional C2 instructions, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the network. The rule leverages process execution logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents.
Detects the execution of suspicious commands often used in Command and Control (C2) activities, as identified in Florian Roth's 'Best Practice Auditd Configuration'. These commands include `wget`, `curl`, `base64`, `nc`, `netcat`, `ncat`, `ssh`, `socat`, `wireshark`, `rawshark`, `rdesktop`, and `nmap`. These tools can be leveraged for various adversarial techniques such as data transfer, remote access, network discovery, and data encoding.
The analytic detects FTP connections initiated by processes located in non-standard installation paths on Windows systems. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 3 to identify network connections where the process image path does not match common directories like "Program Files" or "Windows\System32". This activity is significant as FTP is often used by adversaries and malware, such as AgentTesla, for Command and Control (C2) communications to exfiltrate stolen data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data transfer, exposing sensitive information and compromising the integrity of the affected host.
This rule detects the use of various web request commands and cmdlets within PowerShell script block logs. It specifically looks for common methods used to initiate web requests or file transfers, such as `[System.Net.WebRequest]::create`, `curl`, `Invoke-RestMethod`, `Invoke-WebRequest`, `irm`, `iwr`, `Resume-BitsTransfer`, `Start-BitsTransfer`, `wget`, and `WinHttp.WinHttpRequest`. The rule aims to identify suspicious activity where PowerShell is used to download or interact with remote resources, potentially for ingress tool transfer or command and control. A filter is applied to exclude paths starting with 'C:\Packages\Plugins\Microsoft.GuestConfiguration.ConfigurationforWindows\', which are likely legitimate system activities.
The analytic detects the execution of `gpupdate.exe` without command line arguments and with an active network connection. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process execution and network traffic data. It is significant because `gpupdate.exe` typically runs with specific arguments, and its execution without them, especially with network activity, is often associated with malicious software like Cobalt Strike. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attacker leveraging `gpupdate.exe` for lateral movement, command and control, or other nefarious purposes, potentially leading to system compromise.
Detects DNS queries containing patterns associated with Kerberos coercion attacks via DNS object spoofing.
The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073.
The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073.
The analytic detects instances of `searchprotocolhost.exe` running without command line arguments but with an active network connection. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process execution and network traffic data. It is significant because `searchprotocolhost.exe` typically runs with specific command line arguments, and deviations from this norm can indicate malicious activity, such as Cobalt Strike usage. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to establish network connections for command and control, potentially leading to data exfiltration or further system compromise.
Detects a non-browser process launching a browser with automation flags, which subsequently connects to WhatsApp Web. This behavior is consistent with the Maverick banking trojan's use of Selenium and WPPConnect to hijack WhatsApp sessions for self-propagation.
This rule detects potential SVG-based phishing attempts originating from Microsoft Outlook. It correlates network access, file downloads, and URL click telemetry to identify instances where Outlook initiates connections to or downloads files ending with '.svg'. This is particularly relevant for detecting phishing campaigns that leverage malicious SVG files to embed JavaScript, redirectors, or Base64-encoded HTML payloads for credential harvesting or other malicious activities.
This rule detects attempts by non-system accounts to create or write to files on administrative shares (e.g., C$) via Server Message Block (SMB). This activity is often associated with lateral movement or persistence techniques where attackers drop tools or establish footholds on remote systems.
Detects abnormal network activity and connectivity issues in Ollama including non-localhost API access attempts and warning-level network errors such as DNS lookup failures, TCP connection issues, or host resolution problems that may indicate network-based attacks, unauthorized access attempts, or infrastructure reconnaissance activity.
This analytic detects suspicious downloads from common file sharing and content delivery platforms using known living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) such as 'curl.exe', 'certutil.exe', 'msiexec.exe', 'powershell.exe', 'wmic.exe', and others. It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module logs to correlate network flow activity with process context, including command-line arguments, process path, and parent process information. These tools are often abused by adversaries and malware to retrieve payloads from public hosting platforms such as GitHub, Discord CDN, Transfer.sh, or Pastebin. This detection helps identify potential initial access, payload staging, or command and control activity using legitimate services.
This detection helps to identify if an ASN that typically handles an average of X connection requests per day over a consistent 7-day period suddenly triples—or more—the number of requests. (You can adjust this line to define the exact multiplication threshold). In addition, identify if during the last week, a new ASN has triggered more than 1K connection attempt during a day.
This analytic identifies Office applications spawning child processes that attempt to download content via HTTP/HTTPS. It focuses on process creation events where Office applications (e.g., Word, Excel) initiate network connections, specifically excluding common web browsers. This activity is significant because it often indicates the use of malicious documents to execute living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) for payload delivery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further malware deployment, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
The following analytic detects MSIExec making network connections over ports 443 or 80. This behavior is identified by correlating process creation events from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents with network traffic logs. Typically, MSIExec does not perform network communication to the internet, making this activity unusual and potentially indicative of malicious behavior. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could be using MSIExec to download or communicate with external servers, potentially leading to data exfiltration, command and control (C2) communication, or further malware deployment.
Detects potential Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks or rate limit abuse against Ollama API endpoints by identifying excessive request volumes from individual client IP addresses. This detection monitors GIN-formatted Ollama server logs to identify clients generating abnormally high request rates within short time windows, which may indicate automated attacks, botnet activity, or resource exhaustion attempts targeting local AI model infrastructure.
The analytic detects the use of Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) to make remote HTTP or HTTPS connections. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line arguments containing URLs. This activity is significant because adversaries often use mshta.exe to download and execute remote .hta files, bypassing security controls. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further network infiltration.
This rule detects the installation or execution of a wide range of common third-party VPN clients by monitoring process creation events. It specifically looks for process names associated with over 100 different VPN services. The rule includes exclusions for legitimate security software like Microsoft Defender and Microsoft Intune Agent, as well as Cisco AnyConnect VPN client installations.
Detects network connections to the Discord API from non-Discord processes, a behavior associated with the ChaosBot malware.
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