Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
653 detections
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Correlates devices touched by known IoC IP scan waves with PHP software inventory, vulnerability management data for PHP CVEs, and active PHP process execution telemetry to identify vulnerable exposed web servers.
Detects the execution of two or more distinct Active Directory discovery, credential extraction, or coercion tools (such as NetExec, Kerbrute, noPac, PetitPotam, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, or Impacket scripts) on the same device within a 1-hour window.
Detects the execution of OpenConnect VPN clients on non-sanctioned devices followed within a 4-hour window by high-volume internal network connections across multiple ports indicative of network service discovery or pivoting activity.
Detects processes that make outbound API calls to known Large Language Model (LLM) domains while simultaneously performing high-volume network connection attempts or scanning-like fan-out activity across multiple public IP addresses.
Detects high volume and diverse URI requests targeting login, search, or inquiry endpoints on IIS servers within a short time window, indicative of web brute force or active reconnaissance scanning.
Detects potential vulnerability scanning, enumeration, or bulk data extraction against Request Tracker (RT) web paths by monitoring high request volumes, distinct URI counts, or large response byte sizes within CommonSecurityLog data.
Detects the execution of Wireshark or tshark with command-line arguments indicating TLS key logging or packet capture file handling, followed shortly by a crash handler process (WerFault.exe or WerFaultSecure.exe) for the same process.
Detects high volume and diverse URI requests targeting login, search, or inquiry endpoints on IIS servers within a short time window, indicative of web brute force or active reconnaissance scanning.
Detects repeated blocked access requests through Zscaler Private Access. ZPA brokers
access to internal applications without exposing the network, so a user repeatedly
blocked is probing for applications they are not entitled to reach — the zero trust
equivalent of internal port scanning.
Onboarding: ZSCALER-SPA is ingested via the Zscaler connector (Bloo extractor 176).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=zpa-connector where sourcename='ZSCALER-SPA' and action='REQUEST_BLOCKED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, distinct_count(app)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 5
access to internal applications without exposing the network, so a user repeatedly
blocked is probing for applications they are not entitled to reach — the zero trust
equivalent of internal port scanning.
Onboarding: ZSCALER-SPA is ingested via the Zscaler connector (Bloo extractor 176).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=zpa-connector where sourcename='ZSCALER-SPA' and action='REQUEST_BLOCKED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, distinct_count(app)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 5
Detects endpoint execution of specific known brute-force scripts and tools (such as ssh_brute.py, brute3.py, auto_login.py, etc.) using Python or shell interpreters, correlated with a high outbound network connection fan-out (50 or more distinct target IPs) from the same process.
Detects endpoint execution of specific known brute-force scripts and tools (such as ssh_brute.py, brute3.py, auto_login.py, etc.) using Python or shell interpreters, correlated with a high outbound network connection fan-out (50 or more distinct target IPs) from the same process.
Detects clients reaching for ports that are unreachable or not permitted. A client
repeatedly attempting wrong ports against brokered applications is enumerating what
the broker will allow, which is reconnaissance conducted entirely inside an
authenticated zero trust session.
Onboarding: ZSCALER-SPA is ingested via the Zscaler connector (Bloo extractor 176).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=zpa-connector where sourcename='ZSCALER-SPA'
and action in ('CLIENT_WRONG_PORT', 'PORT_UNREACHABLE')
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, distinct_count(dstport)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 10
repeatedly attempting wrong ports against brokered applications is enumerating what
the broker will allow, which is reconnaissance conducted entirely inside an
authenticated zero trust session.
Onboarding: ZSCALER-SPA is ingested via the Zscaler connector (Bloo extractor 176).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=zpa-connector where sourcename='ZSCALER-SPA'
and action in ('CLIENT_WRONG_PORT', 'PORT_UNREACHABLE')
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, distinct_count(dstport)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 10
Detects processes that make outbound API calls to known Large Language Model (LLM) domains while simultaneously performing high-volume network connection attempts or scanning-like fan-out activity across multiple public IP addresses.
Detects non-browser Python-based HTTP clients (such as python-requests, python-urllib, aiohttp, or httpx) targeting specific API endpoints (/user, /profile, /order, /upload) while exhibiting indicators of SQL injection or high-volume object ID enumeration.
Detects non-browser Python-based HTTP clients (such as python-requests, python-urllib, aiohttp, or httpx) targeting specific API endpoints (/user, /profile, /order, /upload) while exhibiting indicators of SQL injection or high-volume object ID enumeration.
Detects non-browser Python-based HTTP clients (such as python-requests, python-urllib, aiohttp, or httpx) targeting specific API endpoints (/user, /profile, /order, /upload) while exhibiting indicators of SQL injection or high-volume object ID enumeration.
Detects non-browser Python-based HTTP clients (such as python-requests, python-urllib, aiohttp, or httpx) targeting specific API endpoints (/user, /profile, /order, /upload) while exhibiting indicators of SQL injection or high-volume object ID enumeration.
Detects endpoint execution of specific known brute-force scripts and tools (such as ssh_brute.py, brute3.py, auto_login.py, etc.) using Python or shell interpreters, correlated with a high outbound network connection fan-out (50 or more distinct target IPs) from the same process.
Detects endpoint execution of specific known brute-force scripts and tools (such as ssh_brute.py, brute3.py, auto_login.py, etc.) using Python or shell interpreters, correlated with a high outbound network connection fan-out (50 or more distinct target IPs) from the same process.
Detects non-browser Python-based HTTP clients (such as python-requests, python-urllib, aiohttp, or httpx) targeting specific API endpoints (/user, /profile, /order, /upload) while exhibiting indicators of SQL injection or high-volume object ID enumeration.
Detects a source generating blocked packets across many destination ports. Branch
edge firewalls see lateral scanning between sites that a central firewall never
observes, because that traffic does not traverse the core.
Onboarding: VERSA-NETWORKS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 806).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=firewall where sourcename='VERSA-NETWORKS' and action='PACKET_BLOCKED'
| duration 10m
| groupby srcip
| select srcip, distinct_count(dstport)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 25
edge firewalls see lateral scanning between sites that a central firewall never
observes, because that traffic does not traverse the core.
Onboarding: VERSA-NETWORKS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 806).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=firewall where sourcename='VERSA-NETWORKS' and action='PACKET_BLOCKED'
| duration 10m
| groupby srcip
| select srcip, distinct_count(dstport)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 25
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