Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
653 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
268
245
33
31
27
Contributors
207
128
118
98
20
Categories
20,456
11,839
5,876
5,155
4,865
653
Platforms
430
207
97
32
29
Products / Services
270
154
77
73
39
MITRE Techniques
326
308
201
105
97
CVEs
5
2
2
1
1
IDS Classtypes
177
67
11
9
3
IDS Protocols
129
108
16
7
3
This rule detects network connections on port 21 (FTP) where the remote URL contains keywords indicative of NetWare directory listings or related services (netware, NDS, bindery, ncf). This could indicate an attempt to discover or interact with NetWare services, potentially exploiting vulnerabilities like Squidbleed.
Detects anomalous device network activity involving 5G-specific protocol ports (e.g., GTP-U, SIP). The rule aggregates unique port usage per device over 1-hour intervals to identify potential network reconnaissance, scanning, or unauthorized control plane communication.
Detects the execution of the fscan network scanner binary, its use with common scanning arguments, or any network communication with the known staging IP address associated with the fscan deployment.
Detects anomalous device network activity involving 5G-specific protocol ports (e.g., GTP-U, SIP). The rule aggregates unique port usage per device over 1-hour intervals to identify potential network reconnaissance, scanning, or unauthorized control plane communication.
Detects execution of common network reconnaissance tools such as nmap, masscan, and zmap, or PowerShell commands that utilize Test-NetConnection for automated port sweeping across a defined range.
Detects potential reconnaissance activities directed at a domain controller, specifically monitoring for DNS zone transfer (AXFR) requests or unusually high volumes of DNS 'ANY' queries. These behaviors are often associated with adversaries attempting to map network infrastructure or discover internal resources.
Detects the execution of various reconnaissance tools and scripts identified as part of the Kimera framework, utilized by the threat actor group MexicanMafia in Operation Escaneo. This rule monitors for specific tool names (subfinder, assetfinder, gobuster, dnsx, naabu, httpx, gowitness, findomain), associated Python scripts, and specific command-line arguments indicative of aggressive scanning behavior.
Detects execution of known reconnaissance tools and scripts associated with the Kimera framework, including subdomain and asset enumeration utilities (e.g., subfinder, nuclei, httpx) or custom Python scripts. The rule also monitors for reconnaissance-related ulimit adjustments and concurrent bursts of multiple enumeration tools, which are indicative of automated scanning activity.
Detects post-exploitation activities associated with the StrikeShark framework, specifically the use of FScan and Searchall tools for internal network port scanning and domain group enumeration using built-in Windows net commands.
Detects enumeration of hardware asset inventories via web or network
Detects stealth port scan techniques for reconnaissance evasion
Detects directory brute force tools like Gobuster, ffuf, feroxbuster
Detects high-volume TCP SYN scanning across IP blocks indicating active reconnaissance
This rule detects a high frequency of successful network connections from a single device to multiple unique destination IP addresses within a one-hour window. The targeted ports (445, 139, 3389, 22, 21) are commonly used for remote administrative access, file transfers, and remote shell services, which are frequently leveraged by adversaries for lateral movement. The threshold of 3 unique targets in an hour may indicate automated scanning or credential brute-forcing activity across the network.
Detects potential internal network scanning activity by identifying devices attempting connections to 5 or more distinct sensitive ports within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of reconnaissance activities aimed at identifying vulnerable services such as SSH, SMB, RDP, or various database management systems.
Detects high-frequency requests (over 30 unique paths within a 5-minute window) to sensitive VPN-related URL paths that result in 403 (Forbidden) or 404 (Not Found) status codes from non-internal IP addresses. This behavior is indicative of an adversary performing directory enumeration or vulnerability scanning on public-facing infrastructure.
Detects high-frequency requests (over 30 unique paths within a 5-minute window) to sensitive VPN-related URL paths that result in 403 (Forbidden) or 404 (Not Found) status codes from non-internal IP addresses. This behavior is indicative of an adversary performing directory enumeration or vulnerability scanning on public-facing infrastructure.
Detects high-frequency port scanning activity from external, non-private IP addresses targeting common network services. The rule identifies different scanning profiles, including wide port sweeps and targeted multi-port scans, which are consistent with reconnaissance behaviors observed in botnet activity like the KV/JDY clusters.
Detects high-frequency TCP SYN scanning behavior targeting Telnet (port 23) and SSH (port 22) ports, characteristic of Mirai botnet propagation and reconnaissance activities.
Detects the execution of known network scanning and reconnaissance tools (e.g., fscan, httpdf) or commands containing specific suspicious strings often associated with threat actor activity.
This rule detects a high volume of web requests (20 or more within 5 minutes from a single IP address) containing keywords commonly associated with denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, performance testing, or reconnaissance activities against web applications. Keywords include 'sleep', 'benchmark', and 'loadtest' in the URI query string.
Page 16 of 32