Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
653 detections
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Detects a single source IP address attempting to connect to multiple hosts over TCP port 3389 (RDP) within a short timeframe (10 attempts in 60 seconds). This behavior is indicative of a host scanning the network for accessible RDP services, a common precursor to lateral movement or brute force attacks.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a host performs multiple reconnaissance-style probes (health checks, documentation, or OpenAPI definitions) followed within 10 minutes by access to sensitive artifact-related URLs on the same remote host. This pattern is indicative of an attacker profiling a target server for metadata and then proceeding to exfiltrate files or sensitive artifacts.
Detects a suspicious sequence of reconnaissance activities associated with ShinyHunters campaigns targeting PeopleSoft environments. The pattern involves reading '/etc/hosts' using standard utilities ('cat', 'grep', 'awk') followed by rapid network discovery or probing attempts using 'curl', 'wget', 'nmap', or 'nc' from the same host within a 10-minute window.
This rule detects inbound network traffic directed at NetScaler ADC or Gateway devices originating from IP addresses flagged as malicious by threat intelligence feeds. It correlates activity logs with active threat intelligence data (categorized as Malware, C2, Exploit, Scanning, or related to known NetScaler/Citrix vulnerabilities) to identify potential reconnaissance or exploitation attempts.
Detects an suspicious progression of activities originating from identified AI assistant/agent processes. The rule monitors for a chain of behaviors occurring within a 15-minute window: execution of an AI agent/tool, followed by host discovery (network/system enumeration), access to sensitive local credential files, archival of data, and outbound network communication to common file-sharing/exfiltration platforms.
This rule detects potentially compromised accounts by correlating risky Entra ID sign-ins to Citrix NetScaler with subsequent VPN session establishment followed by rapid, high-volume outbound connection activity from the source IP address. This pattern is indicative of a threat actor using compromised credentials to gain access via VPN and immediately perform internal network scanning or data staging.
Detects external reconnaissance activity targeting AI backend services. Adversaries scan for known AI infrastructure ports (such as TensorFlow Serving, Triton, or Ray) and common API paths (e.g., /v1/models, /predict) to identify potential targets. The detection utilizes proxy logs to correlate these suspicious network attributes, high request rates, or known scanning user agents.
Detects unauthorized GET requests to common default paths associated with AI agent developer consoles and infrastructure, such as '/playground', '/api/predict', or '/_stcore'. These requests are identified by the absence of expected 'Authorization' or 'Cookie' headers, suggesting an unauthenticated probe or discovery attempt by an external actor looking for misconfigured or exposed AI development interfaces.
Detection of common web server reconnaissance, enumeration, and brute-force patterns targeting IIS environments. This includes detection of short-name (~1) probes, WebDAV method usage, NTFS alternate data stream requests, and brute-force attempts on login endpoints originating from PowerShell user agents.
Detects repeated attempts to enumerate available model endpoints on a LiteLLM server, a behavior often associated with reconnaissance targeting AI gateway services to identify exposed models.
Detects anomalous Telnet (TCP port 23) traffic associated with Mirai-variant botnet propagation, such as scanning for new targets or inbound compromise attempts, often following cPanel/WHM vulnerabilities.
This rule detects a single host performing a high volume of connection attempts to internal IP addresses across standard management and file-sharing ports (SMB 445, RDP 3389, WinRM 5985) within a 5-minute window. Such behavior is characteristic of network scanning or reconnaissance activities performed by adversaries attempting to identify targets for lateral movement.
Detects anomalous external traffic patterns indicative of automated API reconnaissance. The rule flags high-frequency requests from a single IP targeting a diverse set of API endpoints, particularly when characterized by a mixture of successful (200), unauthorized (403), or not found (404) status codes, or repeated attempts to access sensitive management/administrative API paths.
This rule monitors network device logs for patterns indicative of reconnaissance or vulnerability scanning against management and VPN interfaces of common firewall and network appliances (FortiGate, Meraki, WatchGuard, Sophos). It flags sources that either request multiple sensitive paths related to system status and configuration or employ known scanning tools (Nmap, masscan, Nuclei, zgrab, curl) in the user-agent string.
Detects high-frequency TCP SYN scanning activity originating from external networks targeting port 37777, commonly associated with the Dahua DVR P2P discovery service. This behavior is indicative of automated reconnaissance and scanning campaigns searching for vulnerable IoT devices.
Detects anomalous Telnet (TCP port 23) traffic associated with Mirai-variant botnet propagation, such as scanning for new targets or inbound compromise attempts, often following cPanel/WHM vulnerabilities.
Detects high-volume account enumeration activity associated with the TeamFiltration tool, characterized by the use of legacy Microsoft Teams desktop client User-Agent strings (specific versions of Teams, Electron, and Chrome) within a short time window.
Detects high-volume account enumeration activity associated with the TeamFiltration tool, characterized by the use of legacy Microsoft Teams desktop client User-Agent strings (specific versions of Teams, Electron, and Chrome) within a short time window.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a host performs multiple reconnaissance-style probes (health checks, documentation, or OpenAPI definitions) followed within 10 minutes by access to sensitive artifact-related URLs on the same remote host. This pattern is indicative of an attacker profiling a target server for metadata and then proceeding to exfiltrate files or sensitive artifacts.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a host performs multiple reconnaissance-style probes (health checks, documentation, or OpenAPI definitions) followed within 10 minutes by access to sensitive artifact-related URLs on the same remote host. This pattern is indicative of an attacker profiling a target server for metadata and then proceeding to exfiltrate files or sensitive artifacts.
Detects an abnormally high volume of POST requests from a single source to the Salesforce Aura API endpoint (/s/sfsites/aura) within a short window, which is indicative of automated guest profile enumeration and AuraInspector-style probing activity associated with the ShinyHunters Salesforce campaigns.
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