Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
653 detections
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Detects high-frequency HTTP requests targeting Salesforce Aura endpoints associated with structural introspection, such as retrieving component definitions or field metadata. This behavior is consistent with the use of the AuraInspector reconnaissance tool to map the internal structure of a Salesforce application.
Detects an suspicious progression of activities originating from identified AI assistant/agent processes. The rule monitors for a chain of behaviors occurring within a 15-minute window: execution of an AI agent/tool, followed by host discovery (network/system enumeration), access to sensitive local credential files, archival of data, and outbound network communication to common file-sharing/exfiltration platforms.
Detects an suspicious progression of activities originating from identified AI assistant/agent processes. The rule monitors for a chain of behaviors occurring within a 15-minute window: execution of an AI agent/tool, followed by host discovery (network/system enumeration), access to sensitive local credential files, archival of data, and outbound network communication to common file-sharing/exfiltration platforms.
This rule detects potential automated subdomain enumeration by monitoring for a high volume of DNS queries (200 or more within 60 seconds) originating from a single host. Such behavior is characteristic of reconnaissance activities used to discover subdomains and map out network infrastructure.
Detects high-frequency network scanning patterns characterized by a large volume of unique destination ports or hosts contacted by a single source within a short timeframe. This behavior indicates potential automated reconnaissance, often associated with autonomous agent frameworks or AI-driven tools performing rapid network discovery.
Detects anomalous activity associated with the CARBONATO worm, specifically monitoring for unauthorized creation of 'net-setup' containers or pulling 'system/resolved' images via the Docker API port 2375. Additionally, the rule identifies rapid, sequential network scanning behavior targeting the Docker API port across internal IP ranges.
Detects unauthorized access attempts to a Docker Registry API on port 5000. The rule identifies attempts to enumerate the image catalog and extract sensitive environment variable information from configuration blobs, which may contain hardcoded credentials or indicators of compromise.
Detects a network activity pattern from a single host characterized by a high volume of connections to a wide range of remote hosts and ports, combined with an exceptionally low coefficient of variation in inter-request timing. This pattern is indicative of an automated, scriptable agent or AI-driven reconnaissance tool rather than a human-operated scanner, likely performing automated asset discovery or network enumeration.
Detects a single source IP address rapidly attempting connections to multiple distinct devices and ports within a short time window. This behavior is indicative of an automated agent or scanner performing reconnaissance and potentially attempting to chain exploitation across multiple targets.
Detects high-frequency connection attempts from a single source IP to multiple destination IPs over the non-standard DVRIP port 37777, often used by Dahua surveillance equipment. This behavior is indicative of automated scanning, brute-forcing, or exploitation attempts targeting vulnerable IoT/CCTV devices.
Detects anomalous Telnet (TCP port 23) traffic associated with Mirai-variant botnet propagation, such as scanning for new targets or inbound compromise attempts, often following cPanel/WHM vulnerabilities.
Detects anomalous Telnet (TCP port 23) traffic associated with Mirai-variant botnet propagation, such as scanning for new targets or inbound compromise attempts, often following cPanel/WHM vulnerabilities.
Detects anomalous, rapid execution of a high volume of diverse offensive security tools (scanners, exploitation frameworks, and C2 agents) from a single parent process within a short window, which is characteristic of automated LLM-driven orchestration or scripted attack tool chaining.
Detects anomalous, rapid execution of a high volume of diverse offensive security tools (scanners, exploitation frameworks, and C2 agents) from a single parent process within a short window, which is characteristic of automated LLM-driven orchestration or scripted attack tool chaining.
Detects network discovery activities including ICMP sweeps, ARP cache checks, and SMB share/session enumeration, which are common tactics used for internal reconnaissance by the threat group APT36 (Transparent Tribe).
Detects anomalous, rapid execution of a high volume of diverse offensive security tools (scanners, exploitation frameworks, and C2 agents) from a single parent process within a short window, which is characteristic of automated LLM-driven orchestration or scripted attack tool chaining.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency requests from a single source IP targeting sensitive NetScaler/Citrix ADC Gateway paths. This behavior is indicative of automated reconnaissance or vulnerability scanning often preceding exploitation attempts.
Detects potential reconnaissance activities targeting Redis services on port 6379, specifically looking for unauthenticated 'PING' commands and subsequent responses indicating either authentication requirements or an open, unauthenticated instance.
Detects high-volume account enumeration activity associated with the TeamFiltration tool, characterized by the use of legacy Microsoft Teams desktop client User-Agent strings (specific versions of Teams, Electron, and Chrome) within a short time window.
This rule detects potential automated network scanning activity originating from hosts that have recently executed cPanel-related processes or binaries. It flags devices that exhibit a high frequency of connection attempts across a diverse range of remote ports and IP addresses within a short timeframe after cPanel interaction, which is characteristic of worm propagation or automated exploitation attempts targeting web server management interfaces.
Detects rapid TCP connection attempts to port 445 (SMB) from a single source IP address, indicative of network scanning or reconnaissance activities typically used by the DragonForce ransomware or similar automated threats for lateral movement.
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