Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
653 detections
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Detects high-frequency connection attempts to SMB (445) or RDP (3389) ports originating from a single source, which is characteristic of the SoftPerfect Network Scanner (NetScan) tool performing reconnaissance or network discovery sweeps.
Detects a sequence of events where a host connects to 'speedtest.net' followed by a burst of outbound SYN packets to TCP port 37777. This pattern may indicate an adversary using legitimate web traffic to calibrate their scanning rate or bypass network controls before performing a targeted scan.
Detects common Windows command-line utilities used for internal network reconnaissance, including ARP cache queries, NetBIOS enumeration, SMB share/session discovery, and subnet ping sweeps. These techniques are frequently employed by adversaries for lateral movement preparation and internal network mapping.
Detects high-volume outbound network scanning activity from a single compute resource, characterized by a significant number of distinct destination IP addresses and ports within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of automated service discovery and reconnaissance, often associated with adversary-orchestrated exploitation pipelines or botnet activity.
This analytic identifies instances where an internal host has attempted to communicate with 250 or more destination IP addresses using on of the NMAP top 20 ports. Horizontal port scans from internal hosts can indicate reconnaissance or scanning activities, potentially signaling malicious intent or misconfiguration. By monitoring network traffic logs, this detection helps detect and respond to such behavior promptly, enhancing network security and preventing potential threats.
This rule identifies potential network scanning or propagation activity by detecting a single host initiating SMB (TCP 445) connections to a high number (more than 20) of unique destination IP addresses within a given timeframe. This behavior is often indicative of internal reconnaissance, lateral movement, or worm-like propagation.
Detects high-frequency, unauthenticated Redis PING/AUTH attempts indicative of a reconnaissance scan against the Redis service. This activity typically represents an adversary performing mass fingerprinting or attempting to identify unsecured Redis instances.
Detects a rapid, multi-stage intrusion sequence on a single host involving discovery, lateral movement, and high-volume file modifications. The rule identifies anomalous behavior where diverse reconnaissance and lateral movement commands are executed within a compressed timeframe, characteristic of automated or LLM-driven orchestration of ransomware operations.
Detects anomalous sequential SMB scanning patterns across a /24 subnet and subsequent SMB share enumeration attempts (NetShareEnum) from a single host, consistent with reconnaissance activities associated with the DragonForce threat actor group.
Detects high-frequency TCP connection attempts to port 37777, commonly associated with Dahua surveillance devices. The rule uses a threshold of 200 connection attempts within 60 seconds from a single source, which is characteristic of mass-scanning or brute-force activity.
Detects high-frequency TCP SYN scanning activity targeting port 37777, commonly associated with the discovery of vulnerable Dahua DVR and NVR devices.
This rule detects various common command-line techniques used for network reconnaissance and internal environment enumeration on Windows systems. It tracks the execution of native tools such as ARP for ARP cache dumping, Ping for subnet sweeps, and NetBIOS or SMB-related commands (nbtstat, net view, net share, net session) to identify remote systems, network shares, and active sessions.
Detects host-based network reconnaissance behaviors commonly associated with the threat group APT36 (Transparent Tribe). The rule identifies the execution of various built-in Windows network discovery commands including arp, nbtstat, net view/share/session, and automated ping sweeps or PowerShell-based subnet enumeration scripts, which are used to map reachable hosts and network shares.
Detects high-volume DNS queries for subdomains of 'twilio.com' originating from a single source IP within a short 5-minute window, indicative of subdomain enumeration or reconnaissance.
This rule detects potential automated reconnaissance activity characteristic of the 'Strix' tool against web applications. It uses two detection mechanisms: tracking high-frequency requests that match typical scanning path patterns (excluding OPTIONS requests) and monitoring for a surge in 404 or 400 error responses, which often indicates an automated vulnerability scanner attempting to probe non-existent resources.
Detects the execution of netscan.exe, a common network scanning tool often used by adversaries to enumerate network resources, hosts, and services within a compromised environment.
This rule detects rapid, repetitive TCP connection attempts to port 445 (SMB) originating from a single source within a 30-second window. Such activity is indicative of automated network scanning and enumeration, often used for discovery of vulnerable SMB shares or lateral movement preparation.
Detects anomalous Telnet (TCP port 23) traffic associated with Mirai-variant botnet propagation, such as scanning for new targets or inbound compromise attempts, often following cPanel/WHM vulnerabilities.
Detects usage of the 'finger' utility via command line within scripts or batch files, or network connections originating from the 'finger' process on port 79 to non-internal destinations. This activity is commonly associated with internal network reconnaissance to gather user information or system details.
This rule detects potential scanning activity by identifying high-frequency network connection attempts from a source to multiple distinct internal targets within a short 2-minute time window, specifically targeting suspicious ports (9191, 9192) or a known malicious IP address (45.142.193.132).
Detects network traffic consistent with automated penetration testing frameworks such as Nuclei, ffuf, or sqlmap. This rule monitors HTTP user-agent strings and triggers an alert if high-frequency scanning activity from a single source is observed within a 60-second window, which is indicative of automated reconnaissance or vulnerability scanning.
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