Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
653 detections
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Detects high-frequency TCP/445 connection attempts (a 'connect sweep') characteristic of automated SMB share enumeration, which is commonly used for lateral movement reconnaissance. The rule triggers when a threshold of 40 connection requests occurs from a single source within a 30-second window, specifically targeting SMB-related lateral movement behaviors.
Detects a host performing high-volume outbound network scanning (connecting to 10 or more distinct public IP addresses within 15 minutes) followed by the execution of an executable file created in common suspicious directories (AppData, Temp, Downloads, or Users/Public) within a short window (10 minutes after the scan). This pattern is indicative of a compromised host scanning for lateral movement opportunities or propagation targets, followed by the deployment of malicious tooling.
Detects automated directory fuzzing attempts against Azure Storage blobs targeting sensitive files like .env, .pem, or configuration files. The rule identifies suspicious activity by aggregating requests from Anonymous or SAS-authenticated sources that exhibit high request volumes and access to multiple distinct sensitive paths, while excluding known legitimate bulk-transfer and synchronization tools.
Detects automated reconnaissance and enumeration of sensitive web application paths (admin, config, environment files, etc.) from a single source IP. The rule identifies high-frequency request patterns that target specific non-public surface areas while excluding known search engine crawlers and monitoring bots.
Detects high-rate scanning and automated service probing patterns consistent with network reconnaissance. This includes tracking TCP SYN floods to external segments, excessive HTTP/login requests, and automated fingerprinting probes (e.g., favicon or admin panel enumeration). The rule accounts for common uptime monitoring services to minimize false positives.
Detects an internal source IP that has communicated with a high number of unique destination IP addresses and ports within a 24-hour period. This behavior is indicative of network reconnaissance or internal port scanning.
Detects high-volume bursts of HTTP GET requests against specific paths associated with a Vite development server (/@vite/client, /@fs/, /src/) on port 5173. This pattern is indicative of automated reconnaissance or vulnerability scanning targeting an exposed development environment.
This rule monitors network traffic from internal devices and security logs for communication with a curated list of known malicious or suspicious scanner IP addresses, indicating potential reconnaissance or probing activity by external actors.
This rule monitors network traffic from internal devices and security logs for communication with a curated list of known malicious or suspicious scanner IP addresses, indicating potential reconnaissance or probing activity by external actors.
Detects rapid ICMP (ping) traffic directed towards specific internal and external hosts, characteristic of the RedTail Linux malware attempting to perform network discovery or validate connectivity to command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects usage of the 'finger' utility via command line within scripts or batch files, or network connections originating from the 'finger' process on port 79 to non-internal destinations. This activity is commonly associated with internal network reconnaissance to gather user information or system details.
Detects high-frequency TCP/445 connection attempts (a 'connect sweep') characteristic of automated SMB share enumeration, which is commonly used for lateral movement reconnaissance. The rule triggers when a threshold of 40 connection requests occurs from a single source within a 30-second window, specifically targeting SMB-related lateral movement behaviors.
Detects high-frequency SYN scanning activity targeting TCP port 37777 (commonly associated with Dahua devices) from an external source. This behavior is indicative of automated reconnaissance or mass-scanning campaigns, such as Operation CameraSwarm, attempting to identify exposed or potentially vulnerable IoT/surveillance hardware.
Detects high-frequency requests for 'tools/list' from a single source IP across multiple unique destination hosts. This pattern is indicative of a breadth-first scan attempting to identify reachable Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, rather than typical legitimate client-to-server communication.
This rule detects a high volume of inbound network connection attempts to the default Redis port (6379) originating from local loopback or local host addresses, excluding known legitimate Redis and web server processes. This activity is indicative of potential unauthorized access attempts or exploitation of local Redis instances.
Detects high-frequency requests for 'tools/list' from a single source IP across multiple unique destination hosts. This pattern is indicative of a breadth-first scan attempting to identify reachable Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, rather than typical legitimate client-to-server communication.
This rule monitors for internal network connection attempts initiated by the 'mcp-grafana' process to destinations it has not contacted in the previous 14 days. By establishing a baseline of legitimate data source connections, the rule alerts when the process performs a rapid fan-out or discovery against multiple new internal hosts, which may indicate unauthorized network reconnaissance or lateral movement attempts by the Grafana service.
Detects high-velocity, automated web activity originating from a single source IP that simultaneously performs widespread endpoint enumeration, tests sensitive authentication flows, and attempts common injection attack payloads. This behavior is indicative of an automated scanner, crawler, or malicious botnet agent performing rapid discovery and exploitation attempts.
Detects automated reconnaissance and enumeration of sensitive web application paths (admin, config, environment files, etc.) from a single source IP. The rule identifies high-frequency request patterns that target specific non-public surface areas while excluding known search engine crawlers and monitoring bots.
This rule detects the use of raw sockets by 'ERAAgent.exe' by monitoring for socket I/O control (Ioctl) operations involving 'SIO_RCVALL'. This configuration, often associated with promiscuous mode, allows an application to capture all network traffic received by the network interface, a behavior commonly used by network sniffing tools or malicious implants to intercept sensitive data.
Detects high-frequency requests for 'tools/list' from a single source IP across multiple unique destination hosts. This pattern is indicative of a breadth-first scan attempting to identify reachable Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, rather than typical legitimate client-to-server communication.
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