Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects persistence attempts by monitoring modifications to Windows registry run keys (Run, RunOnce, Winlogon Shell/Userinit) or file creation within the Startup folder. It alerts when these locations are updated to reference suspicious file paths (Temp/AppData) or execute scripts (vbs, ps1, js, wsf, bat, hta).
Detects modifications to Windows Registry persistence keys (Run, RunOnce, RunServices, RunServicesOnce) where the referenced executable or script path resides in low-trust locations such as AppData, Temp, or Public directories. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistence after initial execution.
Detects the modification of registry keys under HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\...\InProcServer32, which is a common method for achieving persistence. The rule flags when these registry keys point to file paths within the local user profile (AppData), which is frequently used by malicious actors to load custom DLLs when the corresponding COM object is initialized.
Detects the modification or creation of COM InProcServer32 registry keys within HKCU or HKU hives where the associated server value points to a DLL located in the AppData directory. This pattern is commonly used for persistence and privilege escalation via COM hijacking.
This rule detects suspicious persistence activity involving known tools or names that are often masqueraded. It looks for the creation of registry run keys or scheduled tasks using names associated with common tools ('Canon Configuration Reader', 'Stardock DeElevation Tool') when the initiating process is not located in the expected vendor-authorized directories. The rule specifically alerts on devices exhibiting these behaviors within a short time window.
This rule detects suspicious persistence activity involving known tools or names that are often masqueraded. It looks for the creation of registry run keys or scheduled tasks using names associated with common tools ('Canon Configuration Reader', 'Stardock DeElevation Tool') when the initiating process is not located in the expected vendor-authorized directories. The rule specifically alerts on devices exhibiting these behaviors within a short time window.
This rule detects suspicious persistence activity involving known tools or names that are often masqueraded. It looks for the creation of registry run keys or scheduled tasks using names associated with common tools ('Canon Configuration Reader', 'Stardock DeElevation Tool') when the initiating process is not located in the expected vendor-authorized directories. The rule specifically alerts on devices exhibiting these behaviors within a short time window.
Detects service-creation commands (sc create / New-Service / reg add under a Services key) whose COMMAND LINE itself references a known NeedyMantis binary name or sideload staging folder. Requiring the malicious reference to appear in the command being executed -- rather than merely in the calling process's own folder location -- removes false matches from unrelated legitimate software that happens to be installed under a similarly-named folder.
Detects a potential ClickFix delivery attack where a user navigates to an automotive-themed website, interacts with the system via the Windows Run dialog (RunMRU), and subsequently executes command-line interpreters (powershell, cmd, wscript, mshta) spawned by explorer.exe within a short time window.
Detects indicators of RMMCRAT malware installation, which masquerades as JivaChat software. The rule identifies suspicious process execution (e.g., rmm.exe), specific file artifacts created in ProgramData, and persistence mechanisms including Windows service registration, 'Load' registry value abuse, and a unique COM CLSID hijack. The logic enforces corroboration across different signal types (process, file, registry) or triggers on the unique CLSID.
Detects indicators of RMMCRAT malware installation, which masquerades as JivaChat software. The rule identifies suspicious process execution (e.g., rmm.exe), specific file artifacts created in ProgramData, and persistence mechanisms including Windows service registration, 'Load' registry value abuse, and a unique COM CLSID hijack. The logic enforces corroboration across different signal types (process, file, registry) or triggers on the unique CLSID.
Detects indicators of RMMCRAT malware installation, which masquerades as JivaChat software. The rule identifies suspicious process execution (e.g., rmm.exe), specific file artifacts created in ProgramData, and persistence mechanisms including Windows service registration, 'Load' registry value abuse, and a unique COM CLSID hijack. The logic enforces corroboration across different signal types (process, file, registry) or triggers on the unique CLSID.
Detects the creation or modification of Registry keys within 'Image File Execution Options' (IFEO) intended to associate a debugger with security-critical or monitoring binaries (e.g., Sysmon, Filebeat). This technique is used for defense evasion and persistence by intercepting or preventing the execution of security tools.
Detects modifications to the WDigest 'UseLogonCredential' registry key. Enabling this setting (setting it to 1) forces the WDigest SSP to store plaintext credentials in memory, which facilitates easier credential harvesting by attackers using memory dumping techniques.
Detects suspicious command-line strings stored in the Windows Explorer RunMRU registry key. Adversaries may use this location to store persistence commands or to obfuscate command-line arguments that are intended to be executed by the user or via automated processes.
Detects the addition of a 'DailyFitnessTracker' entry to the HKCU Windows Registry Run key, which is a technique used by Golang-based RATs to establish persistence. The rule monitors both 'reg.exe' command-line operations and PowerShell 'New-ItemProperty' cmdlets targeting this specific registry path.
Detects the creation or modification of registry entries within the 'HKCU\...\Run' hive that point to executables located in suspicious or atypical directories such as 'ProgramData', 'Users\All Users', or specific non-standard application paths often used by malware for persistence.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender preferences by adding exclusion paths, processes, or extensions shortly after the creation of Registry Run keys. This sequence is characteristic of post-exploitation activity where an adversary establishes persistence and subsequently attempts to neutralize security software monitoring of their malicious payloads to avoid detection during future execution.
This rule monitors for coordinated persistence efforts by detecting the occurrence of at least two out of three specific persistence techniques (registry run key modification, scheduled task creation, or WMI-based script execution) on the same device within a 30-minute window. It explicitly filters out activities from signed binaries or those occurring in standard system/application directories, focusing on potentially malicious artifacts originating from user-writable locations.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with Microsoft Windows Defender via registry modifications or malicious PowerShell/reg.exe commands, specifically targeting security settings like DisableAntiSpyware, DisableRealtimeMonitoring, and exclusion paths.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with Microsoft Windows Defender via registry modifications or malicious PowerShell/reg.exe commands, specifically targeting security settings like DisableAntiSpyware, DisableRealtimeMonitoring, and exclusion paths.
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