Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects signs of the ClosedQuorum implant by correlating at least two redundant persistence mechanisms (Registry Run keys, Scheduled Tasks, WMI execution) on the same host within a 10-minute window. The rule focuses on artifacts originating from suspicious user-writable paths or unsigned binaries, while excluding known legitimate installation paths.
This rule monitors for coordinated persistence efforts by detecting the occurrence of at least two out of three specific persistence techniques (registry run key modification, scheduled task creation, or WMI-based script execution) on the same device within a 30-minute window. It explicitly filters out activities from signed binaries or those occurring in standard system/application directories, focusing on potentially malicious artifacts originating from user-writable locations.
Detects a coordinated malicious installation chain involving the creation of specific mutexes, establishment of persistence via Windows Registry Run keys, and subsequent tampering with Microsoft Defender exclusions using PowerShell. This sequence is indicative of the CHOSEN BRICK malware installation process.
Detects the registration of the gitlab-runner Windows service as a custom Event Log provider under the Application registry key. This registry modification occurs during the installation of the GitLab Runner service. When observed on endpoints not intended for CI/CD operations, this activity may indicate an adversary is installing a GitLab Runner for use as a C2 implant.
Detects multiple endpoints setting their desktop wallpaper to a common file located on a remote UNC path or containing 'sysvol'. This behavior is often indicative of GPO-based configuration for persistence or malware staging, where a malicious 'payload.jpg' is used as a cover or to deliver code via vulnerabilities in image parsing libraries.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms associated with the GlobalProtect VPN application where the binary is unsigned. It specifically monitors for unauthorized 'RunOnce' registry entries, the creation of suspicious scheduled tasks, or updates to scheduled tasks involving 'GlobalProtect.exe'. These actions are initiated by either 'msiexec.exe' or 'GlobalProtect.exe', suggesting a possible attempt to masquerade malicious activity as a legitimate VPN update or installation process.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms associated with the GlobalProtect VPN application where the binary is unsigned. It specifically monitors for unauthorized 'RunOnce' registry entries, the creation of suspicious scheduled tasks, or updates to scheduled tasks involving 'GlobalProtect.exe'. These actions are initiated by either 'msiexec.exe' or 'GlobalProtect.exe', suggesting a possible attempt to masquerade malicious activity as a legitimate VPN update or installation process.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms associated with the GlobalProtect VPN application where the binary is unsigned. It specifically monitors for unauthorized 'RunOnce' registry entries, the creation of suspicious scheduled tasks, or updates to scheduled tasks involving 'GlobalProtect.exe'. These actions are initiated by either 'msiexec.exe' or 'GlobalProtect.exe', suggesting a possible attempt to masquerade malicious activity as a legitimate VPN update or installation process.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms associated with the GlobalProtect VPN application where the binary is unsigned. It specifically monitors for unauthorized 'RunOnce' registry entries, the creation of suspicious scheduled tasks, or updates to scheduled tasks involving 'GlobalProtect.exe'. These actions are initiated by either 'msiexec.exe' or 'GlobalProtect.exe', suggesting a possible attempt to masquerade malicious activity as a legitimate VPN update or installation process.
Detects a behavioral chain where a process establishes persistence using a 'WindowsUpdate' Registry Run key or a scheduled task, followed within five minutes by an outbound network connection from the same process. The rule specifically excludes cases where a ZIP file was written to disk, identifying potential in-memory staging for exfiltration.
Detects a dual persistence mechanism where an adversary establishes persistence both via a registry Run key and a scheduled task, both named 'WindowsUpdate'. The rule correlates these events occurring on the same device within a 15-minute window.
This rule detects attempts to bypass PowerShell execution policies either through command-line arguments ('-ExecutionPolicy Bypass' or '-ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted') or by modifying PowerShell execution policy registry keys. This behavior is commonly used by adversaries to execute unsigned or malicious scripts, circumventing default system security restrictions.
Detects processes establishing persistence via Windows Registry 'Run' keys followed by frequent outbound network connections over non-standard ports. This behavior is consistent with the SystemBC/Coroxy SOCKS5 proxy backdoor often utilized by ransomware actors like Ryuk, Conti, BlackBasta, Play, and Rhysida.
Detects persistence mechanisms used by The Gentlemen ransomware, specifically the creation of malicious scheduled tasks (UpdateUser, UpdateSystem, or gentlemen_system) and modification of registry Run keys (GupdateS or GupdateU). The rule also monitors for the presence of the operator password string 'G7Vz9eyG' within command line arguments.
Detects the execution of a Control Panel (.cpl) item using control.exe or rundll32.exe. The rule specifically looks for CPL files that were recently written to suspicious directories (Temp, AppData, Downloads) and correlates this execution with subsequent suspicious behaviors, such as spawning Python processes, outbound network connections, or registry modifications consistent with key storage or payload persistence.
Detects the installation or configuration of the NvFsFilter (Alinubx.sys) persistence driver, often associated with malicious behavior that continuously terminates security software processes to allow for persistent unauthorized activity after system reboots.
This rule detects the creation of a file within the SysWOW64 directory followed by an immediate modification or creation of a Windows Run registry key within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a persistence mechanism where a malicious file is dropped to a system directory and registered for execution at system startup or user logon.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious persistence attempts where Windows Package Manager (WinGet) configuration processes (ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe or WindowsPackageManagerServer.exe) write to the Windows 'Run' registry keys in HKLM. This behavior can be abused to execute malicious code automatically at system startup.
Detects modifications to Windows Registry persistence locations (Run, RunOnce, Winlogon Shell/Userinit) where the assigned executable path is located within high-risk directories such as Temp, AppData, or Users Public folders. This is a common technique used by malware for persistence.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms involving the creation of 'Locked' registry keys within Software\Classes and subsequent use of Run registry keys that reference 'Locked://' URIs. It also identifies suspicious execution of rundll32.exe utilizing specific CLSID-based command line arguments associated with the '{CFDC57BA-1705-45AF-BA10-EFC3D592982B}' identifier, often linked to malicious activity patterns.
Detects persistence modification via Registry Run/RunOnce keys or the addition of suspicious files to the Windows Startup folder. The rule specifically monitors for registry values pointing to common volatile directories, script extensions, or suspicious command-line interpreters. It also flags new executables or scripts being written directly into startup directory paths. This rule covers both direct registry manipulation and startup folder placement, often associated with malware or adversary persistence mechanisms.
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