Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a suspicious behavior chain characteristic of information stealers like Vidar. The process first modifies the Windows Registry to disable the Windows Error Reporting (WER) UI (an anti-analysis technique to suppress crash dialogs) and shortly thereafter initiates an outbound network connection to a public IP, likely for C2 communication or data exfiltration.
Detects signs of the ClosedQuorum implant by correlating at least two redundant persistence mechanisms (Registry Run keys, Scheduled Tasks, WMI execution) on the same host within a 10-minute window. The rule focuses on artifacts originating from suspicious user-writable paths or unsigned binaries, while excluding known legitimate installation paths.
Detects signs of the ClosedQuorum implant by correlating at least two redundant persistence mechanisms (Registry Run keys, Scheduled Tasks, WMI execution) on the same host within a 10-minute window. The rule focuses on artifacts originating from suspicious user-writable paths or unsigned binaries, while excluding known legitimate installation paths.
Detects signs of the ClosedQuorum implant by correlating at least two redundant persistence mechanisms (Registry Run keys, Scheduled Tasks, WMI execution) on the same host within a 10-minute window. The rule focuses on artifacts originating from suspicious user-writable paths or unsigned binaries, while excluding known legitimate installation paths.
This rule monitors for coordinated persistence efforts by detecting the occurrence of at least two out of three specific persistence techniques (registry run key modification, scheduled task creation, or WMI-based script execution) on the same device within a 30-minute window. It explicitly filters out activities from signed binaries or those occurring in standard system/application directories, focusing on potentially malicious artifacts originating from user-writable locations.
This rule monitors for coordinated persistence efforts by detecting the occurrence of at least two out of three specific persistence techniques (registry run key modification, scheduled task creation, or WMI-based script execution) on the same device within a 30-minute window. It explicitly filters out activities from signed binaries or those occurring in standard system/application directories, focusing on potentially malicious artifacts originating from user-writable locations.
This rule monitors for coordinated persistence efforts by detecting the occurrence of at least two out of three specific persistence techniques (registry run key modification, scheduled task creation, or WMI-based script execution) on the same device within a 30-minute window. It explicitly filters out activities from signed binaries or those occurring in standard system/application directories, focusing on potentially malicious artifacts originating from user-writable locations.
Detects the creation or modification of registry run keys under HKCU or HKEY_USERS that use the value 'WindowsDefender' to point to an executable located within the AppData directory. This is a common technique used by malware to establish persistence while masquerading as a legitimate security component.
Detects potential persistence attempts via registry modifications involving rundll32.exe. The rule monitors for two patterns: registry keys associated with shell commands for specific file types triggering rundll32.exe, and registry 'Run' keys using a 'Locked' value name with a custom URI handler, often indicative of malware or suspicious persistence mechanisms.
Detects potential persistence attempts via registry modifications involving rundll32.exe. The rule monitors for two patterns: registry keys associated with shell commands for specific file types triggering rundll32.exe, and registry 'Run' keys using a 'Locked' value name with a custom URI handler, often indicative of malware or suspicious persistence mechanisms.
Detects the creation or modification of a Windows Registry 'Run' key that triggers a PowerShell script named 'Update.ps1' with hidden execution policies. The rule also captures direct execution of the same PowerShell script via process creation events.
This rule detects a malicious execution chain starting with an MSI file being launched by explorer.exe from user-downloaded folders. The installer spawns chrome.exe, drops a specific loader file (e.g., PavokwiLoader.exe or Loader.exe) into the %LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp\modules\ directory, and establishes persistence via the HKCU 'Load' registry value pointing to that location.
Detects the persistence sequence associated with 'ChainScript', which involves creating a hidden scheduled task using PowerShell or specific scripts, and a fallback mechanism that creates a registry run key entry if the task creation fails. The rule monitors for PowerShell commands, bridge script execution, and registry modifications involving the 'ComponentTask33Agent' or wscript.exe executing an '_agent.vbs' file.
Detects the creation of Windows Registry Run keys with names mimicking known applications (e.g., 'Canon Configuration Reader' or 'Stardock DeElevation Tool'). These naming patterns are highly suspicious and indicative of attempts to achieve persistence or perform defense evasion via registry-based autostart execution.
This rule detects the creation of a file within the SysWOW64 directory followed by an immediate modification or creation of a Windows Run registry key within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a persistence mechanism where a malicious file is dropped to a system directory and registered for execution at system startup or user logon.
This rule detects a malicious execution chain starting with an MSI file being launched by explorer.exe from user-downloaded folders. The installer spawns chrome.exe, drops a specific loader file (e.g., PavokwiLoader.exe or Loader.exe) into the %LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp\modules\ directory, and establishes persistence via the HKCU 'Load' registry value pointing to that location.
Detects a suspicious process pattern where an executable running from a staging directory (Temp or Downloads) spawns a child process of itself, followed by a registry modification performed by that child process. This behavior is indicative of malicious loaders, such as OnyxC2, that sideload components and establish runtime configurations before C2 communication.
Detects the creation or modification of Windows Registry Run/RunOnce keys that reference msbuild.exe without typical build arguments. This is often used by adversaries to maintain persistence by executing malicious XML-based projects or inline C#/VB code via a trusted system utility.
Detects the modification of the registry value 'EnableScriptBlockLogging' to '0' (Disabled) under the PowerShell policy path. This action suppresses the generation of Windows Event ID 4104 (PowerShell Script Block Logging), which is a critical source for monitoring attacker-issued PowerShell commands and detecting post-exploitation activity.
Detects the creation or modification of a Windows service named 'ProcAuditManager' using 'sc.exe' or 'services.exe' command-line utilities, or by direct modification of the associated registry key. This activity may indicate persistence establishment or service manipulation by an adversary.
This rule detects modifications to Windows Registry run keys and startup folder locations that are commonly used for persistence. It specifically flags when entries point to scripts, interpreted binaries, or files located in directories often used by attackers to hide malicious payloads (e.g., AppData, Temp, ProgramData).
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