Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a suspicious process or Living-Off-the-Land Binary (LOLBin) being launched by a Microsoft SQL Server process (sqlservr.exe). This behavior is often indicative of post-exploitation activity after a database server has been compromised.
This query groups all files by their originating file—such as a ZIP archive or from a Website—and includes all the files that were extracted from it. Among the benefits of Correlating File Events Using InitiatingProcessUniqueId field we can identify:
- Provides full visibility into all files related to a single action (e.g., ZIP extraction).
- Helps detect hidden or secondary malicious files that may not trigger alerts.
- Traces the origin of files—whether downloaded or extracted from another source.
- Strengthens root cause analysis and incident investigation.
- Enhances detection of multi-stage payloads or complex delivery methods.
- Builds context around suspicious activity for better decision-making.
On the other hand, we can enhance this detection by adding additional checks — for example, identifying when one of the extracted or downloaded files has a high-risk file extension.
| where FileExtension in ("exe","cmd","bat","ps1","js","vbs")
- Provides full visibility into all files related to a single action (e.g., ZIP extraction).
- Helps detect hidden or secondary malicious files that may not trigger alerts.
- Traces the origin of files—whether downloaded or extracted from another source.
- Strengthens root cause analysis and incident investigation.
- Enhances detection of multi-stage payloads or complex delivery methods.
- Builds context around suspicious activity for better decision-making.
On the other hand, we can enhance this detection by adding additional checks — for example, identifying when one of the extracted or downloaded files has a high-risk file extension.
| where FileExtension in ("exe","cmd","bat","ps1","js","vbs")
Detects the creation or modification of specific files identified as indicators of compromise (IOCs) used by UNC4841 in their exploitation of Barracuda ESG appliances. These files are associated with various stages of the attack, including persistence, execution, and defense evasion.
Detects the execution of various infostealers and RATs, such as BeaverTail, OtterCookie, WeaselStore, and AkdoorTea, used by the North Korea-aligned threat actor DeceptiveDevelopment.
Detects execution of python using the "-c" flag. This is could be used as a way to launch a reverse shell or execute live python code.
This rule detects the Linux_Backdoor_PondRAT malware by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its 'connect_proxy', 'send_payload', and 'execute_shell_command' functions. The rule targets ELF executables.
Detects the execution of commands via the Windows Run dialog box by monitoring modifications to the `RunMRU` registry key. This technique is often abused by threat actors to trick users into pasting and executing malicious commands, sometimes disguised as CAPTCHA verification steps. The rule filters out common legitimate entries to reduce false positives.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) to download files from known file-sharing or content delivery network (CDN) domains. It specifically looks for command-line arguments indicative of file download operations, such as '.DownloadString(', '.DownloadFile(', 'Invoke-WebRequest', 'iwr', and 'wget'. The rule aims to identify suspicious activity where PowerShell is leveraged to retrieve potentially malicious payloads from untrusted or commonly abused online services.
This analytic identifies the execution of suspicious processes, such as `cmd.exe`, `powershell.exe`, or `bash.exe`, when they are spawned by web server processes like `w3wp.exe` or `nginx.exe`. This behavior is a strong indicator of WebShell activity, where an adversary exploits a web application vulnerability to gain persistent access and command execution capabilities on the web server. Successful exploitation could lead to arbitrary command execution, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration.
Detects potentially suspicious file downloads from known file-sharing domains using `wget.exe`. This rule looks for `wget.exe` execution where the command line includes common file-sharing or code-hosting domains, an HTTP/HTTPS URL, and flags indicating an output file (e.g., `-O` or `--output-document`). It also specifically looks for downloads of common executable or script file extensions, such as `.exe`, `.dll`, `.ps1`, `.bat`, `.vbs`, `.hta`, and `.msi`.
The following analytic detects the use of the EncodedCommand parameter in PowerShell processes. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify variations of the EncodedCommand parameter, including shortened forms and different command switch types. This activity is significant because adversaries often use encoded commands to obfuscate malicious scripts, making detection harder. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute hidden code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or persistent threats within the environment. Review parallel events to determine legitimacy and tune based on known administrative scripts.
MCP Remote RCE Via Oauth
YARA-L
Detects potential remote code execution via a malicious OAuth URL in the mcp-remote proxy tool, indicative of CVE-2025-6514 exploitation.
Detects processes potentially related to XillenStealer making outbound network connections or DNS queries for telegram.org. This is indicative of command and control or data exfiltration activity.
This detection looks at users attempting to download files from the internet using powershell / cmd commands. It measures the number of commands against a baseline set over the past 14days and if a user has performed an unusual amount of commands (also more than 5) then an alert will be created. This will detect when an attacker has compromised a user and is now attempting to download payloads from the internet or a C2.
Detects the execution of command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe) from the Netlogon or Sysvol shares. This activity is highly suspicious as these shares are typically used for Group Policy and logon scripts, not for direct execution of interactive shells or scripting engines by users or processes. This could indicate an adversary attempting to execute malicious code or scripts from a central, often replicated, location within a Windows domain environment, potentially for lateral movement, persistence, or privilege escalation.
This rule detects various activities associated with the NotDoor malware, including the copying of malicious files to Outlook macro folders, C2 beaconing attempts using nslookup or curl to suspicious domains, registry modifications to disable Outlook macro security or enable macro loading on boot, and the creation of staging files in temporary directories for potential exfiltration. These behaviors are indicative of NotDoor installation, persistence, defense evasion, and data staging.
Detects the ITarian RMM service (RmmService.exe) spawning a child process from various suspicious directories commonly used for malware staging. This behavior is associated with adversaries using ITarian for post-exploitation activities, such as dropping additional malware.
This analytic detects suspicious Python package installations where the package name resembles popular Python libraries but may be typosquatted or slightly altered. Typosquatting is a common technique used by attackers to trick users into installing malicious packages that mimic legitimate ones. This detection leverages Cisco NVM flow telemetry and checks for pip or poetry package managers with the "install" or "add" flags, making outbound connections to package repository such as `pypi.org` with known or suspected typo package names.
Detects various activities associated with the AppSuite PDF Editor backdoor, a trojanized application with extensive backdoor capabilities. This rule looks for specific command-line execution, persistence mechanisms, and network communications.
This analytic identifies the use of Chromium-based browsers (like Microsoft Edge) running in headless mode with the `--dump-dom` argument. This behavior has been observed in attack campaigns such as DUCKTAIL, where browsers are automated to stealthily download content from the internet using direct URLs or suspicious hosting platforms. The detection focuses on identifying connections to known file-sharing domains or direct IPs extracted from command-line arguments and cross-checks those against the destination of the flow. Since it leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module telemetry, the rule triggers only if a network connection is made.
The analytic detects the use of Windows InstallUtil.exe with an HTTP or HTTPS URL in the command line. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to download and execute malicious code, potentially bypassing application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment. Analysts should review the parent process, network connections, file modifications, and related processes for further investigation.
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