Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Matches known VectraRAT sample SHA-256 hashes and the ClickFix distribution domain (verify-cloud.digital) recovered from pivoting across exposed VectraRAT distribution infrastructure
Matches known VectraRAT sample SHA-256 hashes and the ClickFix distribution domain (verify-cloud.digital) recovered from pivoting across exposed VectraRAT distribution infrastructure
Matches known VectraRAT sample SHA-256 hashes and the ClickFix distribution domain (verify-cloud.digital) recovered from pivoting across exposed VectraRAT distribution infrastructure
Detects periodic outbound network connections (beaconing) from internal hosts to external networks that exhibit patterns consistent with BabylonRAT malware. This rule monitors for a specific threshold of connection attempts over time, which is characteristic of a C2 heartbeat.
Detects network traffic containing specific 'ASISFH' marker strings associated with the CrimsonRAT command-and-control protocol. These markers are utilized by the malware to obfuscate command tokens during C2 communication.
Detects network traffic to known Transparent Tribe (APT36) C2 IP addresses and DNS resolution attempts for their associated command and control domains. This rule monitors for communication with identified malicious infrastructure often used by the group for C2 activity.
This rule monitors network traffic to GitHub API endpoints and categorizes the activity based on APT36's known operational window (weekdays, 04:00-11:00 UTC). Traffic patterns deviating from this schedule are flagged as anomalous, helping to identify potential C2 communication outside of established threat actor activity windows.
Detects network connection events to known domains and subdomains associated with the SilkParasite threat actor. The rule specifically monitors for connections to specific parent domains (natcommunzu.com, kginfocom.com, mfa-uz.com) and subdomains utilizing service-oriented naming patterns (e.g., mail, service, help, storage, support, microsoft, post) commonly used by this actor for command and control infrastructure.
This rule detects network connections or process command lines associated with known malicious domains, IP addresses, or payload URLs. Additionally, it correlates connections to common public file-sharing platforms or APIs (e.g., Gofile, Telegram) if these events occur on the same device within a 60-minute window of a confirmed malicious infrastructure event, reducing false positives from legitimate uses of shared infrastructure.
Detects network connections to known JeetBot infrastructure domains and IP addresses. The rule specifically identifies potential exfiltration of Twitch OAuth tokens via URL parameters or interaction with known token-collection proxy endpoints, which are associated with the JeetBot/Twitch Enhanced Viewer credential harvesting campaign.
Detects network connections to known JeetBot infrastructure domains and IP addresses. The rule specifically identifies potential exfiltration of Twitch OAuth tokens via URL parameters or interaction with known token-collection proxy endpoints, which are associated with the JeetBot/Twitch Enhanced Viewer credential harvesting campaign.
Detects network connections originating from browser processes to known JeetBot command and control (C2) infrastructure. The rule identifies suspicious C2 communication and, specifically, attempts at token exfiltration by monitoring for auth tokens in the URL of requests directed to known JeetBot hosts and Twitch-related infrastructure.
Detects network connections originating from browser processes to known JeetBot command and control (C2) infrastructure. The rule identifies suspicious C2 communication and, specifically, attempts at token exfiltration by monitoring for auth tokens in the URL of requests directed to known JeetBot hosts and Twitch-related infrastructure.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with a specific AutoIT-based malware delivery chain. It tracks the execution and presence of specific malicious file names and SHA256 hashes, as well as network connections to a identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure IP address (158.51.122.136). The detection spans file creation, process execution, image loading, and network communication events to identify the multi-stage attack lifecycle.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with a specific AutoIT-based malware delivery chain. It tracks the execution and presence of specific malicious file names and SHA256 hashes, as well as network connections to a identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure IP address (158.51.122.136). The detection spans file creation, process execution, image loading, and network communication events to identify the multi-stage attack lifecycle.
This rule monitors network connection logs, DNS query logs, and common security logs for known indicators of compromise, specifically IP addresses and domains associated with command and control (C2) infrastructure.
This rule monitors network connections and DNS query responses for activity associated with known suspicious domains: 'getmacouscloud.com', 'ferncore13.com', and 'grove-89.com'. It identifies communication attempts (successes, failures, or DNS lookups) between endpoints and these domains, which is indicative of potential command and control (C2) activity.
This rule monitors network connections and DNS query responses for activity associated with known suspicious domains: 'getmacouscloud.com', 'ferncore13.com', and 'grove-89.com'. It identifies communication attempts (successes, failures, or DNS lookups) between endpoints and these domains, which is indicative of potential command and control (C2) activity.
Detects network communication with domains and IP addresses known to be associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering campaigns (specifically those masquerading as legitimate HBO Max or macOS related updates). The rule applies a strict correlation between observed malicious IP traffic and specific DNS requests to reduce noise from IP address reuse or threat intelligence feed probes, while also excluding known security-related processes.
Detects network communication with domains and IP addresses known to be associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering campaigns (specifically those masquerading as legitimate HBO Max or macOS related updates). The rule applies a strict correlation between observed malicious IP traffic and specific DNS requests to reduce noise from IP address reuse or threat intelligence feed probes, while also excluding known security-related processes.
This rule detects network connections or process command lines associated with known malicious domains, IP addresses, or payload URLs. Additionally, it correlates connections to common public file-sharing platforms or APIs (e.g., Gofile, Telegram) if these events occur on the same device within a 60-minute window of a confirmed malicious infrastructure event, reducing false positives from legitimate uses of shared infrastructure.
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