Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,252 detections
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Detects malicious activities targeting Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN infrastructure, including connections from known malicious IP addresses (UAT-8616), unauthenticated vManage API access attempts indicative of exploitation (CVE-2026-20182), and anomalous control-plane signaling (OMP/DTLS/NETCONF) from unauthorized external sources.
This rule detects suspicious network connections originating from internal IP addresses to common service ports (DNS, SMB, RDP, WinRM) on remote, non-internal IP addresses. It flags instances where a single process on a device makes 10 or more such connections within an hour, which could indicate reconnaissance, lateral movement, or data exfiltration attempts.
This rule detects outgoing TCP traffic that initiates a SOCKS5 handshake (indicated by the byte sequence |05 01 00|) on destination ports other than standard web ports (80, 443, 8080, 8443). This behavior is characteristic of TOR client traffic attempting to establish an anonymous connection to an external TOR relay or node via non-standard network ports.
Detects suspicious behavior originating from Windows Package Manager (winget.exe) and associated DSC/Server processes. This rule identifies two specific patterns: 1) These processes spawning shells or interpreters (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, mshta) which may indicate command-line abuse or malicious script execution. 2) These processes making outbound network connections to non-private/external IP addresses, potentially indicating remote payload delivery or command and control activity.
Detects a multi-stage execution chain associated with the 'Contagious Interview' campaign, where Visual Studio Code (Code.exe) spawns a shell process (cmd, powershell, bash, or sh) that uses network retrieval utilities (curl, wget, or http) to download content from known Lazarus group staging domains within a two-minute window.
This rule detects the execution of the QEMU virtualization engine (qemu-system-x86_64.exe) when associated with specific toolset files (e.g., BloodHound, Metasploit) or suspicious network activity patterns indicative of lateral movement, such as connecting to administrative ports (SMB, RDP, WinRM) on external or sensitive network ranges. The rule calculates a risk score based on the presence of these indicators.
Detects evidence of SearchLeak (CVE-2026-42824), a post-exploitation technique where M365 Copilot prompt injection causes a browser to perform a Bing 'searchbyimage' request. The 'imgurl' parameter points to an attacker-controlled server, with the URL path containing exfiltrated mailbox data (e.g., MFA codes, email content) encoded as underscore-delimited segments. The Bing service performs an SSRF, fetching the image from the attacker's server and thereby delivering the data while bypassing local client-side security controls like CSP.
Detects network connection attempts or successes from critical Windows processes (System, svchost.exe, lsass.exe) targeting the localhost interface (127.0.0.1 or ::1) on non-standard ports (above 1024, excluding SMB ports 445/139). This behavior is often indicative of local process injection, credential dumping activity, or unauthorized inter-process communication used by malware to bypass network security controls.
This query detects multiple TTPs associated with the Storm-2561 campaign that uses SEO poisoning to distribute fake VPN clients for credential theft. It looks for known file hashes, a specific code-signing certificate, malicious DLL side-loading and C2 communication patterns.
Detects network activity over port 1313 containing Socket.IO payloads with keywords 'control' and 'escape', indicative of a command and control or remote access channel often associated with interactive shells or administrative backdoors.
Detects browser processes performing DNS resolution for Bing search endpoints immediately following access to M365 Copilot services within the same process storyline. This pattern is indicative of a SearchLeak exploitation chain where an adversary leverages M365 Copilot search to perform SSRF, using Bing as a proxy for data exfiltration.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity by identifying devices communicating with known suspicious remote IP addresses at regular, repeating intervals. It calculates the time difference between consecutive connections to specific suspicious IPs and identifies devices that establish at least three connections within one-hour bins, adhering to a 1 to 15-minute heartbeat interval.
This rule detects network connections from devices to a predefined list of known malicious domains. It identifies attempts by internal systems to communicate with command and control servers, phishing sites, or other infrastructure associated with threat actors.
Detects a Python loader process spawned by VS Code or Node.js environments that exhibits suspicious network activity indicative of fetching the InvisibleFerret infostealer, correlated with the installation of Python dependencies via 'pip' within a 10-minute window. This behavior is associated with the Lazarus Group 'Contagious Interview' campaign.
This rule monitors for Cobalt Strike Beacon named pipe C2 patterns by analyzing Sysmon event IDs 17 (Pipe Created) and 18 (Pipe Connected). It specifically flags known default Cobalt Strike pipe naming conventions (e.g., 'MSSE-', 'postex_ssh_', 'msagent_') and common randomized short alphanumeric pipe names while excluding legitimate Windows system pipes.
Detects artifacts and activity related to the exploitation of CVE-2026-55200 in libssh2. The rule monitors for the creation or execution of identified libpwn exploit harness files and scripts, as well as suspicious network activity involving TCP port 2222, which is the default port for the PoC rogue SSH server. It also correlates the appearance of these exploit files with subsequent outbound SSH connections.
Detects outbound proxy requests to the Bing Search-by-Image endpoint where the imgurl parameter is used to perform a server-side request forgery (SSRF). Attackers use this to bypass security controls by forcing Microsoft services to fetch an external, malicious URL containing exfiltrated data within the path, as seen in the SearchLeak (CVE-2026-42824) exploit chain.
This rule identifies network activity or DNS queries associated with the known malicious domain 'perplexity-ai.online'. It monitors both endpoint network event logs and DNS logs to alert on any attempts to establish communication with or resolve this specific domain.
Detects instances where scripting engines (Python or Node.js) access known SSH private key files and subsequently initiate a successful network connection to a non-private IP address within a 60-second window. This behavior is indicative of potential credential exfiltration or unauthorized remote access.
Detects the execution of known Command and Control (C2) frameworks such as Sliver, Havoc, SparkRAT, or VShell from common suspicious temporary or staging directories (temp, tmp, appdata, programdata). This rule monitors process creation events to identify the presence of these unauthorized remote access tools.
This query detects multiple TTPs associated with the Storm-2561 campaign that uses SEO poisoning to distribute fake VPN clients for credential theft. It looks for known file hashes, a specific code-signing certificate, malicious DLL side-loading and C2 communication patterns.
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