Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors network connections initiated by a process named 'setup.exe' to known malicious or suspicious IP addresses. Legitimate installers should not be initiating network connections to these specific external addresses.
This rule detects network connections where the HTTP request URL or specific HTTP cookies match patterns often associated with command and control infrastructure or specific tracking beacons. It triggers on connections to 'financemachinelearning.com/apparatus/wind/twig/statement.html' or requests containing cookies like 'zd_cs_pm' or 'euconsent-v2'.
Detects network beaconing activity associated with the SPECTRALVIPER C2 framework. This rule identifies outbound HTTP GET requests targeting known C2 infrastructure domains and IP addresses, while correlating the traffic with specific browser user agents and cookie patterns indicative of this actor.
Detects network connection events initiated by the OneDrive sync process (OneDrive.Sync.Services.exe) to known malicious domains or suspicious specific file paths, which may indicate unauthorized use of the OneDrive process for command-and-control communication or malicious file retrieval.
Detects instances of the 'smbd' process executing from non-standard locations or initiating network connections on ports other than the default SMB ports (139, 445), which may indicate a rogue service, masquerading, or network pivoting activity.
This rule detects potentially malicious or masqueraded Samba (smbd) activity on Linux systems. It monitors for three conditions: smbd processes launched from non-standard binary paths, smbd process network activity from non-standard binary paths, and smbd processes spawned by unauthorized or unexpected parent processes. These patterns are often associated with unauthorized SMB service deployment, malware persistence, or masquerading techniques.
Detects the execution of fltMC.exe originating from a temporary folder, which is indicative of potential malicious activity. The rule monitors for suspicious child processes spawned by this binary, outbound network connections, and file system operations (creation, modification, renaming) associated with this execution context.
Detects indicators associated with the JDY botnet targeting SOHO and IoT infrastructure. The rule monitors for suspicious firmware update attempts to non-vendor hosts, identifies high-rate outbound scanning from edge devices, and flags devices that show re-emergence of suspicious behavior after a quiet period.
Detects network connection attempts or successes from critical Windows processes (System, svchost.exe, lsass.exe) targeting the localhost interface (127.0.0.1 or ::1) on non-standard ports (above 1024, excluding SMB ports 445/139). This behavior is often indicative of local process injection, credential dumping activity, or unauthorized inter-process communication used by malware to bypass network security controls.
This rule detects web browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Brave, Electron) making network requests to 'raw.githubusercontent.com' that contain keywords indicative of sensitive data, such as 'credential', 'secret', 'password', 'token', 'api_key', or '.env'. This behavior may indicate an adversary attempting to download configuration files or sensitive credentials hosted on GitHub.
Detects inbound network connections initiated by common Windows Nearby Sharing processes ('NearShare.exe', 'NearbySharing.exe', 'quickshare.exe', 'NearbyConnectionsService.exe') that occur on non-standard ports, potentially indicating unauthorized or malicious use of these utilities.
This rule detects a multi-stage malicious activity pattern where a process performs system reconnaissance (process enumeration followed by network configuration enumeration) followed by an outbound network connection to a non-internal IP address. The rule uses transaction correlation on the ProcessGuid/ParentProcessGuid to link these distinct events into a single chain within a 2-minute time window.
Detects network connections initiated by a non-Microsoft signed rundll32.exe process. The rule identifies processes named rundll32.exe that are not signed by Microsoft and are communicating over common ports associated with malicious activity, specifically focusing on external IP addresses and multiple connection attempts.
Detects outbound network traffic from browser processes to known BadBlocker extension command-and-control infrastructure (api.adblock-for-youtube.com or get.adblock-for-youtube.com), followed by subsequent outbound HTTPS connections to arbitrary external domains. This sequence is indicative of malicious browser extension activity involving the exfiltration of session cookies or authentication tokens from the victim's browser.
Detects outbound network connections from endpoint processes to domains associated with a malicious browser extension. The extension is known to fetch scriptlets that enable main-world JavaScript injection and potential credential theft (e.g., document.cookie).
Detects processes that load .NET runtime assemblies (clr.dll/coreclr.dll) from non-standard paths while concurrently performing named pipe inter-process communication and initiating outbound network connections. This behavior is often indicative of fileless execution, living-off-the-land techniques, or lateral movement where a process is repurposed as a proxy or command-and-control conduit.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity by identifying devices communicating with known suspicious remote IP addresses at regular, repeating intervals. It calculates the time difference between consecutive connections to specific suspicious IPs and identifies devices that establish at least three connections within one-hour bins, adhering to a 1 to 15-minute heartbeat interval.
This rule detects multiple outbound network connections to a specific set of known malicious C2 IP addresses on specific ports within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a multi-payload delivery pattern associated with malware families such as Remcos, Agent Tesla, and RedLine.
This rule detects successful outbound network connections from an endpoint to a known Tor directory authority IP address. Establishing a connection to these authorities is a strong indicator that the system is attempting to join the Tor network or is interacting with Tor infrastructure, which may be unauthorized in enterprise environments.
This rule detects network connections on TCP ports 7000, 7001, 8770, and 5353 (commonly associated with Apple services like AirPlay, AirPrint, and Bonjour) initiated by processes other than standard Apple binaries such as iTunes, AppleMobileDeviceService, Bonjour, or mDNSResponder. This behavior may indicate an attempt to blend into expected network traffic by masquerading as legitimate Apple service communication.
This rule detects network communication to a known command and control (C2) server (23.254.164.123:443) associated with the 'protocal.cjs' backdoor, which is part of the 'easy-day-js' npm supply chain compromise. The detection specifically looks for TLS traffic with a Server Name Indication (SNI) and general IP traffic to this C2 address.
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