Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,252 detections
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Detects network communication to known Command and Control (C2) IP addresses used by the Medusa ransomware group.
Detects the LegionLoader malware staging its Python-based C2 module named _socket.pyd within non-standard directories in the AppData\Roaming path. This behavior is indicative of a persistence or execution staging mechanism where the malware attempts to hide its components in user-writable directories while avoiding standard Python installation paths.
Detects the execution of Python interpreters from user-writable AppData\Roaming directories initiating external network connections. This behavior is consistent with the execution of LegionLoader malware and its associated _socket.pyd Python C2 module.
Detects potential C2 beaconing activity associated with LegionLoader by monitoring for outbound network connections to 'birdeemusic.com' domains initiated by Python or AppData/Roaming-based processes, following a precursor process launch (msiexec.exe or from AppData/Roaming) on the same host within 10 minutes.
This rule detects outbound network connections from devices to a specific remote IP address (62.102.148.212) on a set of suspicious remote ports (37393, 45839, 38471, 12345, 4444, 5555). This pattern is indicative of potential command and control (C2) communication or data exfiltration to a known malicious endpoint.
This rule monitors network, proxy, and DNS traffic for connections to the domain 'perplexity-ai.online'. It identifies potentially suspicious activity by aggregating requests and distinguishing between general outbound traffic and traffic to specific endpoints, such as search queries that may indicate data exfiltration or reconnaissance.
Detects the execution of specific suspicious binaries (tcc.exe or LuaJit.exe) with command-line arguments indicative of shellcode loading, followed by a network connection to known C2 infrastructure (IP 207.56.8.166 or Port 18848) from the same host within 15 minutes.
Detects network and DNS indicators associated with BeepRAT, including connections to known C2 IP addresses on port 18848, resolution of known C2 domains, and suspicious DNS queries to 'doh.pub' from known loader processes (tcc.exe, HFY.exe).
Detects instances where common script interpreters (node.exe, python.exe, etc.) simultaneously access sensitive local credential files and establish outbound network connections to common web ports (80, 443, 8080, etc.), which is indicative of credential exfiltration behavior.
Detects outbound network connections to remote URLs containing keywords associated with blockchain, cryptocurrency, or Web3 technologies. This behavior may indicate an adversary utilizing blockchain services or decentralised infrastructure for command and control (C2) communication, exfiltration, or proxying.
This rule query identifies likely post‑exploitation activity associated with React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) in which Part 1 identifies web servers spawning unusual child processes (such as command shells or system utilities) combined with suspicious command-line patterns, which may indicate post-exploitation behavior following a compromise. and part 2 detects web servers making outbound network connections to known malicious IPs or hostnames, or to domains associated with tunneling services (e.g., trycloudflare.com), suggesting potential command-and-control activity or data exfiltration.
This rule detects indicators associated with the StegoAd malware family, specifically focusing on suspicious browser extension IDs observed in command-line arguments and network-related process activity (ProcessCreate or NetworkConnect). It monitors for known extension identifiers, StegoAd-specific C2 infrastructure domains, and payload frameworks observed in process command lines.
This rule monitors Cisco SD-WAN environment logs for indicators of unauthorized or suspicious control plane activity, including rogue peering attempts, unexpected NETCONF interactions, certificate mismatches, and unauthorized vBond/vSmart connections. It filters out known local management subnets and utilizes a threat intelligence lookup to identify potentially malicious infrastructure attempting to interface with the SD-WAN fabric.
Detects automated scraping of company location and headquarters pages
Detects network traffic associated with known Cobalt Strike Beacon request URI patterns. This rule utilizes network signature inspection to flag outbound connections containing URI fragments commonly used by Cobalt Strike default profiles.
Detects outbound network connections over port 8883 (MQTT/IoT) indicative of the Grandoreiro banking trojan. The rule identifies suspicious, unsigned, or non-whitelisted processes attempting to initiate multiple connections to external endpoints, masquerading as legitimate IoT telemetry traffic using MQTT client configurations.
This rule detects potentially suspicious network connections originating from processes residing in common Git development directories (e.g., node_modules, temp, workspace) shortly after a Git clone, pull, or fetch operation. The detection logic filters for successful connections to non-private, non-whitelisted remote endpoints, which may indicate an adversary leveraging legitimate developer tools and environments for command-and-control (C2) or payload exfiltration.
This rule detects network connections initiated by common Windows command-line utilities (powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, cmd.exe) to suspicious remote IP addresses or non-standard ports. It specifically flags known Command and Control (C2) IPs and atypical network ports to identify potential adversary activity like staging or communication.
Detects outbound network connections initiated by common AI agent runtime processes (Python, Node.js, OpenClaw) to external destinations that are not identified as known AI service providers, specifically focusing on non-standard ports or the use of WebSocket protocols. This behavior may indicate an AI agent being used for unauthorized data exfiltration, command-and-control communication, or interaction with an unverified external service.
Detects an AI agent performing outbound network connections to the stitch-design.ai domain. This behavior is indicative of a malicious AI agent attempting to fetch dynamically loaded execution instructions at runtime to evade static analysis during security vetting processes.
Detects G2M.exe making external connections shortly after loading a local g2m.dll, providing behavioural confirmation that the trusted binary has been repurposed. This rule specifically looks for network activity from G2M.exe when its process image path is located in suspicious directories like AppData, Temp, Downloads, ProgramData, or Users\Public, indicating potential abuse of a legitimate application.
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