Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects network connections initiated by 'bun.exe' to specific IP address ranges (94.154.172.0/24 or 91.195.240.0/24) that have been identified as malicious command and control (C2) infrastructure. This indicates potential compromise of a system where 'bun.exe' is being used for malicious communication.
Detects Sliver C2 framework based on default TLS certificate
Detects HTTP C2 communication patterns associated with Remcos RAT loader by monitoring network events for specific URLs and known malicious IP addresses. This rule identifies outbound network connections to hardcoded malicious IPs and specific URL paths often used for command and control by Remcos.
This rule detects patterns associated with the APT29 Wineloader backdoor. It looks for the creation of ActiveX objects for Wscript.Shell and Scripting.FileSystemObject, XMLHttpRequest for HTTP requests, specific `certutil -decode` commands, `tar -xf` commands, the presence of `SqlDumper.exe` in a specific path, and generic URL patterns. These indicators suggest potential execution of malicious scripts, file manipulation, data exfiltration, and command and control communication.
This rule detects the use of TLS protocol on port 443 with a specific content signature, indicating potential Command and Control (C2) activity. It triggers an alert if 20 such connections are observed from the same source within 60 seconds.
This rule detects devices making a high volume of successful network connections to GitHub's API endpoints (api.github.com or api.releases). A count of 5 or more successful connections within an hour from a single device is considered suspicious and could indicate data exfiltration, automated tooling, or unusual development activity.
Detects the initialization of an alternative hidden shell environment via 'WindowsBackstageShell.exe' and its subsequent network connections. This activity is associated with the SilentCanvas operation.
Detects DNS lookups to Pastebin used for dead drop C2 configuration retrieval
Detects the execution of the SPECTRALVIPER binary or script, a core backdoor component in the Miasma toolkit used for persistent remote access and command execution. This rule specifically looks for process creation events where the filename or command line contains 'spectralviper'.
This rule detects anomalous network connections originating from common communication applications (Teams, Slack, Discord, Skype) to non-standard ports (not 80, 443, 8080, 8443) and to IP addresses not typically associated with Microsoft or other major cloud providers (e.g., not starting with 13. or 51.). It specifically looks for a high volume of such connections (10 or more within an hour) from a single process on a device, which could indicate protocol tunneling or the use of these applications for command and control.
This rule detects devices making a high volume of successful network connections to GitHub's API endpoints (api.github.com or api.releases). A count of 5 or more successful connections within an hour from a single device is considered suspicious and could indicate data exfiltration, automated tooling, or unusual development activity.
This rule detects unusual network beaconing activity from processes. It identifies processes that make more than 50 network connections within a 15-minute window to distinct remote IP addresses and ports, excluding common legitimate processes like svchost.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, and explorer.exe. The rule then enriches this information with the last seen time of the process.
This rule detects processes making a high volume of successful network connections to GitHub's raw content (raw.github.com). This behavior can be indicative of an adversary downloading tools, scripts, or other malicious content from GitHub, potentially as part of a command and control (C2) channel or for staging purposes. The rule counts connections per hour per initiating process filename and flags if the count exceeds 5.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity by monitoring network events for specific URL patterns and user agent strings associated with known C2 frameworks like AzureVeil and Adaptix. It identifies beaconing if multiple devices communicate with the same remote IP address using these indicators within a 15-minute window, with more than 5 beacon counts and more than 1 distinct device.
This rule detects the use of TLS protocol on port 443 with a specific content signature, indicating potential Command and Control (C2) activity. It triggers an alert if 20 such connections are observed from the same source within 60 seconds.
This rule detects network connections from devices to a predefined list of known malicious domains. It identifies attempts by internal systems to communicate with command and control servers, phishing sites, or other infrastructure associated with threat actors.
This rule detects suspicious network connections originating from internal IP addresses to common service ports (DNS, SMB, RDP, WinRM) on remote, non-internal IP addresses. It flags instances where a single process on a device makes 10 or more such connections within an hour, which could indicate reconnaissance, lateral movement, or data exfiltration attempts.
Monitors for network connections originating from the VSCode extension host process to GitHub API endpoints immediately following a new extension installation. This may indicate token exfiltration or repository enumeration from a malicious extension.
This rule generates a comprehensive forensic timeline for a specific executable file, analyzing its origin (file creation/drops), execution context (process creation and child processes), network communications (outbound connections), and persistence mechanisms (registry modifications for run keys/startup and scheduled task creation/updates). It correlates events across different data sources based on the executable's file name or SHA256 hash.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communications over non-standard ports. It identifies devices that make a high number of network connections to distinct remote IP addresses on ports other than common ones (80, 443, 53, 22, 21, 25, 110, 143, 993, 995) and not to private IP ranges. The rule aggregates connection counts and distinct remote IPs over 15-minute intervals and flags activity where there are more than 30 connections and more than 2 distinct remote IPs.
This rule detects suspicious network connections originating from internal IP addresses to common service ports (DNS, SMB, RDP, WinRM) on remote, non-internal IP addresses. It flags instances where a single process on a device makes 10 or more such connections within an hour, which could indicate reconnaissance, lateral movement, or data exfiltration attempts.
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