Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Identify network traffic based on target country
Amazon GuardDuty detects an Amazon EC2 instance or a container attempting to communicate with a black hole IP address.
Amazon GuardDuty detects Command and control activity in Amazon EC2, AWS Lambda or Amazon EKS Runtimes.
Detects a network connection initiated by "wordpad.exe" over uncommon destination ports. This might indicate potential process injection activity from a beacon or similar mechanisms.
Yara rule that detects Voldemort backdoor.
This YARA rule detects the Daolpu infostealer by identifying specific byte patterns related to its core functionalities. These functionalities include network communication, searching for sensitive files on the system, parsing Firefox configuration files, and collecting browser passwords and cookies. The rule requires all these distinct patterns to be present within a file to trigger a detection, aiming to reduce false positives.
Detects the execution of suspicious child processes from macOS installer package parent processes. This includes various scripting interpreters like osascript, JXA, and common network utilities like curl and wget, which can be abused during preinstall or postinstall phases of a package installation.
This rule detects DNS queries to specific malicious domains associated with the GALLIUM threat group, as identified by Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center in December 2019. The rule specifically looks for Event ID 257 in the Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Server/Analytical log, where the queried domain name (QNAME) matches a predefined list of indicators.
This rule identifies execution traces indicative of the XCSSET macOS malware. XCSSET is known to spread via Xcode projects and maliciously modify applications. The rule looks for specific command-line patterns involving 'curl' to suspicious URLs, 'osacompile' and 'plutil' interacting with user and group containers, and 'zip' archiving data from user and group containers. These activities suggest potential command and control communication, persistence mechanisms, and data staging/exfiltration by the malware.
This rule detects the execution of a SILENTTRINITY stager by looking for the string 'st2stager' within the 'Description' field of process creation events. This string is typically found in the PE metadata of the stager executable, indicating its use.
Detects the execution of suspicious child processes from macOS installer package parent process. This includes osascript, JXA, curl and wget amongst other interpreters
Detects SILENTTRINITY stager dll loading activity
Detects SILENTTRINITY stager use via PE metadata
Yara rule that detects ChinaZ trojan.
Yara rule that detects Linodas backdoor.
Yara rule that detects LimeRAT backdoor.
Yara rule that detects Krasue backdoor.
Yara rule that detects Konni backdoor.
This rule detects the Minodo backdoor by identifying a combination of specific byte patterns (YARA signatures) within executable files. These patterns correspond to functions responsible for generating system IDs, encrypting and sending data, gathering system information, copying payloads into memory, and executing payloads from temporary locations. The presence of all these patterns indicates the likely presence of the Minodo backdoor.
This rule detects the GoodWill ransomware by identifying specific bytecode patterns related to file encryption, AES encryption routines, file system enumeration, and remote connection activities. The rule looks for a combination of these patterns within a file, indicating the presence of the ransomware.
Yara rule that detects GoodWill ransomware.
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