Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known IOCs from the trojanized anthropic.claude-code (Open-VSX v2.1.313) SSH backdoor: C2 IP 134.209.82.225, beacon URL, extension.js and tunnel key SHA-256 hashes, and ifconfig.me lookups from VS Code-family/extension-host processes. Results are summarized per device and IOC.
Detects DNS requests to major generative AI and Large Language Model API endpoints (such as OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, Mistral, Groq, DeepSeek, and others) initiated by processes other than standard web browsers (e.g., chrome, msedge, firefox, safari). This behavior may indicate unauthorized data exfiltration, shadow AI usage, or automated tooling/scripts interacting with LLM APIs.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known IOCs from the trojanized anthropic.claude-code (Open-VSX v2.1.313) SSH backdoor: C2 IP 134.209.82.225, beacon URL, extension.js and tunnel key SHA-256 hashes, and ifconfig.me lookups from VS Code-family/extension-host processes. Results are summarized per device and IOC.
The following analytic detects HTTP POST requests containing heavily encoded data in the post body, specifically looking for sequences of hex-encoded bytes or base64-encoded strings.
It leverages Zeek HTTP logs to identify POST requests where the body contains eight or more consecutive hex escape sequences or sixteen or more consecutive base64 character groups.
This activity is significant as adversaries commonly use hex or base64 encoding to obfuscate C2 communication, exfiltrate data, or deliver encoded payloads.
It leverages Zeek HTTP logs to identify POST requests where the body contains eight or more consecutive hex escape sequences or sixteen or more consecutive base64 character groups.
This activity is significant as adversaries commonly use hex or base64 encoding to obfuscate C2 communication, exfiltrate data, or deliver encoded payloads.
Detects multiple distinct source IPs sending forged 'pitboss PPE' authentication failure messages to NetScaler authentication endpoints within a short timeframe, associated with a fetch-based FreeBSD payload download (kw2-freebsd-x64-s11).
Detects outbound network connections from processes targeting a known hard-coded Potassium campaign C2 IP address (134.199.154.64), followed by fallback DNS resolver queries using standard public DNS servers by the same process.
Detects non-browser processes contacting multiple distinct cloud storage APIs within a one-hour timeframe, a pattern indicative of potential multi-service command and control or data exfiltration.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known IOCs from the trojanized anthropic.claude-code (Open-VSX v2.1.313) SSH backdoor: C2 IP 134.209.82.225, beacon URL, extension.js and tunnel key SHA-256 hashes, and ifconfig.me lookups from VS Code-family/extension-host processes. Results are summarized per device and IOC.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known IOCs from the trojanized anthropic.claude-code (Open-VSX v2.1.313) SSH backdoor: C2 IP 134.209.82.225, beacon URL, extension.js and tunnel key SHA-256 hashes, and ifconfig.me lookups from VS Code-family/extension-host processes. Results are summarized per device and IOC.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known IOCs from the trojanized anthropic.claude-code (Open-VSX v2.1.313) SSH backdoor: C2 IP 134.209.82.225, beacon URL, extension.js and tunnel key SHA-256 hashes, and ifconfig.me lookups from VS Code-family/extension-host processes. Results are summarized per device and IOC.
Detects outbound network connections to domains associated with the AdFection / Discover-Tech / Controlium threat infrastructure using a Sentinel watchlist, filtering out known browser activity or allowing custom domain lists.
Detects DNS queries to definitionupdates.microsoft.com or the go.microsoft.com fwlink redirect used for WD update downloads, when the querying process is not a Windows system component. BlueHammer utilizes these definition updates as part of its exploit chain.
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
The following analytic detects outbound connections to commonly abused file sharing and pastebin-style hosting domains.
It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense logs and focuses on allowed connections (action=Allow) where the url field matches a list of known data hosting or temporary storage services.
While many of these platforms serve legitimate purposes, they are frequently leveraged by adversaries for malware delivery, data exfiltration, command and control (C2) beacons, or staging of encoded payloads.
This analytic is valuable for identifying potential abuse of legitimate infrastructure as part of an attacker's kill chain.
It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense logs and focuses on allowed connections (action=Allow) where the url field matches a list of known data hosting or temporary storage services.
While many of these platforms serve legitimate purposes, they are frequently leveraged by adversaries for malware delivery, data exfiltration, command and control (C2) beacons, or staging of encoded payloads.
This analytic is valuable for identifying potential abuse of legitimate infrastructure as part of an attacker's kill chain.
Detects persistent blocked web requests from one internal source. A person stops
after a block; software does not. Sustained retries after blocking indicate
automation attempting to reach a destination it has been configured to use.
Onboarding: SAFESQUID-SWG is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 812).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webfilter where sourcename='SAFESQUID-SWG' and action='URL_BLOCKED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, user, category
| select srcip, user, category, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 25
after a block; software does not. Sustained retries after blocking indicate
automation attempting to reach a destination it has been configured to use.
Onboarding: SAFESQUID-SWG is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 812).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webfilter where sourcename='SAFESQUID-SWG' and action='URL_BLOCKED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, user, category
| select srcip, user, category, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 25
Detects web access through Meraki content filtering. Branch users frequently work
without the endpoint controls applied at headquarters, so the network appliance is
often the only layer observing where they go.
Onboarding: CISCO-MERAKI is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 300).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webfilter where sourcename='CISCO-MERAKI' and action='URL_ACCESSED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, domain, url, useragent, user
without the endpoint controls applied at headquarters, so the network appliance is
often the only layer observing where they go.
Onboarding: CISCO-MERAKI is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 300).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webfilter where sourcename='CISCO-MERAKI' and action='URL_ACCESSED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, domain, url, useragent, user
Detects one internal source repeatedly blocked from reaching URLs. Persistent
attempts after a block indicate automated software rather than a person — a person
gives up, malware retries on a timer.
Onboarding: VERSA-NETWORKS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 806).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webfilter where sourcename='VERSA-NETWORKS' and action='URL_BLOCKED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, user
| select srcip, user, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 20
attempts after a block indicate automated software rather than a person — a person
gives up, malware retries on a timer.
Onboarding: VERSA-NETWORKS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 806).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webfilter where sourcename='VERSA-NETWORKS' and action='URL_BLOCKED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, user
| select srcip, user, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 20
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
Detects the Blinder Tunnel C2 loop. The loader beacons about every 63 seconds to the GitHub Contents API (profile upload, one-time license read). The newer variant can instead go through a Cloudflare Workers relay that mirrors the GitHub API paths. Both platforms are legitimate, so the signal is the client: the implant install directory, a non-System32 RuntimeBroker.exe, or any binary under AppData\Local\Microsoft\, none of which are real GitHub clients. Known implant hosts and the known relay alert on a single hit. The lookalike-path arm needs 10 or more connections per hour (a 63-second loop produces 100+), which suppresses incidental noise. Depends on RemoteUrl being populated for TLS connections.
Suspicious Connection to Custom GPT
Cortex XDR
Detects outbound web traffic to OpenAI ChatGPT Custom GPTs where the URL slug contains keywords potentially indicative of unauthorized or non-standard usage, such as keywords implying premium, professional, or official status, which could be used as a cover for data exfiltration or credential gathering via malicious or typo-squatted GPT instances.
Sweeps DNS, endpoint network and proxy/firewall telemetry for BraZetsu C2, panel and shop domains using exact or subdomain matching. The apex installscenter.com remains active on Cloudflare with wildcard certificates.
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