Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects instances where 'node.exe' is executed from a temporary directory (e.g., 'temp' or 'tmp') and initiates a network connection to an IP address within the '23.254.164.0/24' subnet. This behavior is indicative of the Mastra NPM supply chain compromise, where malicious node packages drop and execute payloads from temporary locations to establish C2 communication.
This rule detects suspicious activity where a Python process initiates network communication to known command and control (C2) domains, immediately followed by accessing SQLite database files (e.g., 'places.sqlite' or 'Cookies'). This pattern is indicative of malware or adversary activity attempting to exfiltrate browser history or session cookies after establishing C2.
Detects if multiple distinct node.exe processes attempt to connect to known easy-day-js C2 IPs within a short span, indicating potential compromise related to the Mastra NPM supply chain attack.
Links the execution of the initial setup.mjs payload to network traffic bound for audit.checkmarx.cx. This rule detects the execution of 'setup.mjs' via 'bun' followed by network communication to 'audit.checkmarx.cx' within a 10-minute window, indicating potential supply chain compromise activity.
Detects the campaign-specific REDCAP-TOKEN cookie name in available endpoint or network event metadata. GTIG reported that INFINITERED used this HTTP cookie to receive encrypted commands and return system, database, and configuration information. This query depends on the cookie value being retained in AdditionalFields by the available sensor or integrated telemetry source.
This rule detects multiple attempts (10 or more within an hour) from a single IP address to access administrative interfaces on a web server. It specifically looks for URI queries containing keywords like 'admin', 'wp-admin', or 'administrator' in W3CIISLog data. Such activity often indicates a brute-force attack or scanning for administrative login pages.
This rule detects potential Trickbot malware command and control (C2) communication by identifying network connections to specific remote URLs and ports commonly associated with Trickbot activity. It looks for multiple connections within an hour from the same device to these indicators.
Identifies network connections to specific IP addresses known to be part of the SniperDz phishing and subscription fraud ecosystem. These IPs are hosted on Horizon IQ and are associated with hundreds of suspicious domains.
Detects connections to default C2 ports used by Metasploit and common RAT frameworks
This rule identifies potential data exfiltration or unusual data transfer activity by detecting a high volume of large data transfers (over 1MB per transfer) from or to an IIS web server. It aggregates these transfers hourly by client IP and alerts if 10 or more such transfers occur within that hour from a single IP.
Detects an unusually high volume (100 or more within an hour) of API calls (POST, DELETE, PUT methods to URIs containing 'api') originating from a single IP address. This activity could indicate various malicious behaviors such as brute-force attacks, credential stuffing, web application attacks, or a denial-of-service attempt against the API endpoint.
Detects network traffic matching the specific HTTP GET request URI used by the OceanLotus SPECTRALVIPER backdoor for command and control beaconing.
Detects suspicious network connections to 'sfrclak.com' on port 8000 or command-line activity involving 'curl' targeting 'packages.npm.org' on port 8000, potentially indicating malicious activity such as malware download or command and control communication. The rule specifically looks for various command-line patterns including 'cmd.exe' with PowerShell scripts, 'python' scripts, or 'com.apple.act.mond' related commands.
This rule detects high-volume data exfiltration attempts over common HTTPS ports (443 or 8443). It identifies network connections where more than 1MB of data is sent in a single connection, then aggregates these connections over one-hour intervals per device and remote IP. Finally, it flags any device that has sent a total of 50MB or more within that hour to a specific remote IP, indicating potential data exfiltration to a command and control server.
Detects web-based access to log files indicating log tampering attempts
Detects symmetric encryption patterns in C2 communications for encrypted channel detection
Detects download of malware source code from code repositories
Detects connections to domains associated with observed ACR Stealer command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects HTTP requests where the Cookie header contains the specific prefixes 'euconsent-v2=' or 'zd_cs_pm=', which are used by the OceanLotus SPECTRALVIPER backdoor to exfiltrate encrypted host profiling data.
Recent reporting indicates the campaign targeted GitHub repositories by inserting malicious GitHub Actions / CI workflows designed to steal secrets and credentials.
5,561 repositories were affected in roughly six hours
Attackers pushed 5,718 malicious commits.
The objective was credential theft from CI/CD environments, including:
cloud credentials
SSH keys
access tokens
CI/CD secrets
The campaign reportedly used:
fake automation-style commit identities such as build-bot, ci-bot, or similar
malicious .github/workflows changes
workflow triggers that either:
executed automatically on push / pull request, or
remained dormant until manually triggered
Web reporting further states the payload collected environment variables, cloud metadata credentials, and repository runner secrets, then exfiltrated them to 216.126.225.129:8443.
5,561 repositories were affected in roughly six hours
Attackers pushed 5,718 malicious commits.
The objective was credential theft from CI/CD environments, including:
cloud credentials
SSH keys
access tokens
CI/CD secrets
The campaign reportedly used:
fake automation-style commit identities such as build-bot, ci-bot, or similar
malicious .github/workflows changes
workflow triggers that either:
executed automatically on push / pull request, or
remained dormant until manually triggered
Web reporting further states the payload collected environment variables, cloud metadata credentials, and repository runner secrets, then exfiltrated them to 216.126.225.129:8443.
This rule detects suspicious outbound network connections initiated by an IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) to non-standard ports. This behavior can indicate a web shell or other compromise establishing Command and Control (C2) communication, potentially for data exfiltration or further malicious activity. The rule specifically looks for successful connections where the remote port is not commonly used for web traffic (80 or 443).
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