Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects processes making a high volume of network connections (10 or more within an hour) to URLs containing 'release' or 'download'. This behavior can be indicative of malware downloading additional components, updates, or exfiltrating data, but could also be legitimate software updates or large file transfers.
Detects unusual network traffic over TCP port 886, which is specifically used by Atlas RAT for command and control check-ins and encrypted data exfiltration in recently observed TA4922 campaigns.
Identifies mshta.exe accessing externally hosted HTA content from a user-initiated Explorer session, potentially indicating malicious remote code execution.
Detects non-browser processes making DNS queries to the Telegram Bot API. This activity is indicative of malware using Telegram for Command and Control (C2) communications or data exfiltration, such as Amnesia RAT.
Detects the upload of an ASPX web shell originating from a specific IP address (124.156.129.151) associated with the OP-512 threat group. The detection specifically looks for POST requests to .aspx endpoints with a user agent containing 'python-requests/2.33.0' in IIS logs.
This rule detects a PowerShell Empire C2 beacon pattern over HTTP. Specifically, it looks for HTTP POST requests to '/index.jsp' where the client body contains a base64-like encoded string of at least 200 characters, indicated by the PCRE pattern. This pattern is characteristic of how PowerShell Empire agents communicate with their command and control server.
Detects browser processes making DNS queries or network connections to BNB Smart Chain RPC endpoints (and related EVM-compatible chain RPCs). This technique is a signal for EtherHiding-style attacks where malicious JavaScript injected into compromised websites queries smart contracts for payload retrieval. This generalizes beyond ClearFake to catch UNC5342 (North Korean DPRK) and other EtherHiding adopters documented since October 2025.
This rule detects indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the Red Lamassu (JFMBackdoor) campaign. It identifies malicious file hashes, network communication with known command and control (C2) domains and IP addresses, specific file paths and names used by the malware, and registry modifications for persistence. The rule looks for file events, process creations, network connections, and registry changes that match the defined IOCs.
This rule detects a high volume of successful network connections to common web ports (80, 443, 8080, 8443) where the remote URL contains keywords like 'version' or 'software'. This pattern could indicate an adversary performing reconnaissance to identify installed software and their versions, potentially looking for vulnerabilities or specific applications to target. The threshold of 10 such activities within an hour for a single device is set to flag anomalous behavior.
This rule detects network connections to suspicious domains or IP addresses associated with potentially compromised or malicious VPN infrastructure. Specifically, it looks for connections to 'vpn-fortinet.com', 'ivanti-vpn.org', 'forticlient-vpn.de', or the IP address '194.76.226.93'. These indicators may suggest attempts to establish command and control, exfiltrate data, or engage in other malicious activities via compromised VPN services.
Detects instances where rundll32.exe executes with missing or minimal DLL arguments and subsequently establishes outbound network connections. This behavior is uncommon in legitimate Windows operations and has been observed during ACR Stealer infections, including executions originating from remote SMB shares and memory-loaded payloads.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity by monitoring network events for specific URL patterns and user agent strings associated with known C2 frameworks like AzureVeil and Adaptix. It identifies beaconing if multiple devices communicate with the same remote IP address using these indicators within a 15-minute window, with more than 5 beacon counts and more than 1 distinct device.
Detects indicators associated with the MiniUpdate RAT deployed by the threat group Screening Serpens. This rule identifies network connections to known C2 domains, the creation of a persistence scheduled task named 'WindowsSecurityUpdate', and the dropping of specific RAT module DLLs ('UpdateChecker.dll', 'InitInstall.dll', 'Updater.dll') in common user-writable directories. The file event detection is tuned to require multiple generic DLLs or the presence of 'InitInstall.dll' to reduce false positives.
Detects outbound network traffic to a hardcoded Command and Control (C2) IP address and port associated with a specific build of Lucid Stealer malware. This rule identifies potential C2 communication by monitoring network connections for a known malicious IP and port combination.
Detects DNS resolutions for domains associated with the Kali365 affiliate panel, which is heavily abused in device code phishing campaigns. This rule specifically identifies DNS queries to known malicious domains used by this PhaaS (Phishing-as-a-Service) infrastructure.
Detects network connections to the decoy C2 domain api.anthropic.com originating from development runtimes like Node.js, Python, or Bun. The Miasma/Shai-Hulud malware actively uses this specific domain as a decoy to obscure its data exfiltration and C2 traffic.
XOR Encoded C2 Traffic Pattern
Suricata
This rule detects HTTP client body traffic that appears to be XOR encoded, characterized by a long sequence of non-printable ASCII characters (bytes 0x01-0x1f and 0x7f-0xff) of at least 50 characters. This pattern is often indicative of Command and Control (C2) communication used by malware to evade detection.
This rule detects HTTP C2 beaconing activity characterized by regular interval GET requests. It specifically looks for 20 GET requests within a 60-second window from the same source IP address to any destination. This pattern is indicative of command and control communication, often used by malware to check in with its operators.
This rule set detects various stages of the JFMBackdoor and Showboat malware, including DLL sideloading of FLTLIB.dll by fltMC.exe from non-standard directories, network connections to known C2 and staging infrastructure (namefuture.site or 23.27.201.160), command-line activity referencing a specific Pastebin URL used by Showboat for process-hiding code, and the creation of JFMBackdoor payload artifacts (flt.bin, scr.mui).
Detects network connections from Bun or Node.js processes to GitHub API endpoints
used by the Miasma worm for credential exfiltration. The malware creates repos under
the liuende501 account and uploads encrypted stolen credentials.
used by the Miasma worm for credential exfiltration. The malware creates repos under
the liuende501 account and uploads encrypted stolen credentials.
Detects network traffic over TCP port 886, which is specifically used by Atlas RAT for command and control check-ins, plugin downloads, and encrypted data exfiltration in TA4922 campaigns.
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