Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network traffic to a known StegaBin C2 IP address or specific URI paths used for data exfiltration. This activity is associated with multiple modules of the StegaBin infostealer toolkit.
This rule detects activity related to OpenClaw, Clawdbot, and Moltbot, including their known aliases (clawd, molty, clawhub). Detection is based on several indicators: specific command-line arguments used with common scripting/execution environments (node, npm, bun, pnpm, bash, sh, zsh, launchd, env, curl, pwsh, powershell), presence of specific install or data directories (e.openclaw, .moltbot, .clawdbot, /clawd/, .molty), macOS LaunchAgent persistence mechanisms (ai.openclaw.gateway.plist, bot.molt., com.openclaw.gateway.plist, /Applications/OpenClaw.app), and the use of specific configuration file names (openclaw.json, moltbot.json, clawdbot.json, clawd.json) or aliases (molty, clawhub) within process display names or names.
This rule detects activity related to the EmEditor watering hole attack, specifically looking for PowerShell execution making requests to known malicious lookalike domains and network connections to the associated infrastructure. A match suggests a potential download of malicious code during what appeared to be a legitimate install or update. Investigation should focus on identifying the host, user, source of activity, and legitimacy of the install source, followed by evidence preservation, credential reset, and a search for follow-up malicious activity.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to WebView2 processes interacting with AI webchat domains, potentially indicating covert command and control (C2) proxying or other malicious use. It looks for WebView2 traffic to specific AI domains (Grok, Copilot) originating from unusual parent processes, WebView2 access to Grok with URL parameter-driven prompt execution, and suspicious child process execution (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, calc.exe) where WebView2 is the parent process.
Detects network connections to domains and URLs known to be used by the 'Contagious Interview' campaign for staging malicious batch scripts and PyArmor payloads. This rule specifically looks for connections to hardcoded malicious domains and URL paths identified with the campaign.
This rule detects various indicators associated with a developer-targeting campaign, including Node.js fetching remote JavaScript from untrusted PaaS domains, dynamic loader behavior in next.config.js, repeated beaconing to C2 paths, detached child Node interpreters, directory enumeration and exfiltration behavior, and suspicious access to sensitive files on developer machines.
Detects non-browser processes making outbound connections to specific Google Sheets API endpoints used by the GRIDTIDE backdoor for command and control. This activity is indicative of the malware using legitimate cloud services to disguise its C2 traffic.
This rule detects activity associated with UNC6201 exploiting Dell RecoverPoint VM (CVE-2026-22769), which involves the SLAYSTYLE/BRICKSTORM/GRIMBOLT malware. It identifies attempts to deploy WAR files via Tomcat Manager, suspicious WAR file uploads or modifications in Tomcat directories on Linux appliances, modifications to a persistence script named 'convert_hosts.sh', network communication with a GRIMBOLT C2 endpoint (149.248.11.71), and specific file hashes linked to the threat actor.
Detects a Node.js process making outbound network connections to known malicious infrastructure associated with a developer-targeting campaign. The campaign used Vercel for staging and specific IPs for C2.
This rule detects potential C2 beaconing behavior by identifying devices that make a high number of periodic outbound connections (20 or more within an hour) to a single external IP address on common web and C2-related ports (80, 443, 8080, 8443, 4444, 5555, 8888, 9001). The rule summarizes these connections by device, remote IP, and initiating process, highlighting sustained communication patterns indicative of command and control.
Detects instances where an npm or node process spawns a shell, which in turn executes a command-line networking utility like curl or wget. This behavior is indicative of a malicious pre/post-install script used in supply chain attacks, such as the one seen with the 'ambar-src' package.
This rule identifies various activities associated with the Dohdoor malware campaign, combining multiple detection heuristics into a single result set. It looks for PowerShell executing curl to download batch scripts, copied Windows tools run from shared folders with unusual arguments, suspicious DLL loads from shared folders, and network connections to C2-style domains identified in the campaign.
Detects `msedgewebview2.exe` connecting to Grok/Copilot when the parent is not a browser/Office app, matching the AI-in-the-middle C2 proxy technique.
This rule detects activities associated with the XWorm LATAM campaign. It identifies network indicators such as specific C2 domains (jholycf100.ddns.com.br, voulerlivros.com.br, res.cloudinary.com), a specific IP address (152.249.17.145), and a destination port (7000). It also looks for the abuse of CasPol.exe making outbound connections to the identified C2 infrastructure. Furthermore, the rule detects PowerShell processes spawned by WMI (WmiPrvSE.exe) that attempt to fetch content from Cloudinary and load assemblies in memory, indicating potential in-memory execution. Finally, it includes a specific SHA256 file hash (7befeacf0b3480fb675d0cab7767b5b9697edc9d0e05982025a06ead0054afd5) associated with the campaign.
Detects processes that access Google Sheets API endpoints and parameters described in GRIDTIDE reporting,
where the initiating process is not a common web browser. This may indicate abuse of Sheets as a C2 channel.
where the initiating process is not a common web browser. This may indicate abuse of Sheets as a C2 channel.
Detects LOLBin processes (mshta.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe) making outbound network connections to non-standard ports. This behavior is characteristic of the PeckBirdy framework's C2 communication.
Detects outbound network connections to known command-and-control (C2) and payload delivery infrastructure associated with the Rekoobe campaign. The rule specifically looks for connections to the IP address 154.84.63.184 or domains img.spoolsv.cc, img.spoolsv.net, spoolsv.cc, and spoolsv.net.
This rule detects activity related to the DKnife gateway AitM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) threat, as detailed in Talos Intelligence reporting. It identifies specific binary names (dknife.bin, sslmm.bin, postapi.bin, rules.bin, sshapi.bin, inotify.bin, curlapi.bin) associated with the threat, either as process names or file names. Additionally, it looks for configuration artifacts (rules.conf, sslmm.cfg, url.cfg) used by the proxy/redirect logic, either as file names or within process command lines. Finally, the rule identifies exfiltration or tagging markers (dkimsi=, 460110672021628, PASSWORD) observed in logs or artifacts, which are indicative of DKnife's reporting mechanisms.
This rule detects two related activities that could indicate the use of AI webchat services as a covert C2 proxy via WebView2. The first part identifies network connections to specific AI webchat domains (grok.com, copilot.microsoft.com) via proxy or web logs. The second part identifies the creation of the 'msedgewebview2.exe' process by unusual parent processes, excluding common browsers and Microsoft Office applications. This combination aims to catch scenarios where WebView2, often used by AI webchat applications, is leveraged for malicious command and control.
This rule detects network connections to known cryptocurrency mining pools or processes associated with cryptocurrency mining. It identifies suspicious activity based on remote URLs, process names, and remote ports commonly used by miners.
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