Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This analytic detects the use of `curl.exe` with insecure flags such as `-k`, `--insecure`, `--proxy-insecure`, or `--doh-insecure` which disable TLS certificate validation. It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module (NVM) flow data and process arguments to identify outbound connections initiated by curl where TLS checks were explicitly disabled. This behavior may indicate an attempt to bypass certificate validation to connect to potentially untrusted or malicious endpoints, a common tactic in red team operations, malware staging, or data exfiltration over HTTPS.
Detects the execution of various infostealers and RATs, such as BeaverTail, OtterCookie, WeaselStore, and AkdoorTea, used by the North Korea-aligned threat actor DeceptiveDevelopment.
Detects potential LINE VIPER tasking activity via Cisco ASA WebVPN authentication requests. This involves looking for specific XML elements (<client-cert> or <client-cert-auth-signature>) containing large Base64-encoded data, which is indicative of embedded shellcode.
This detection rule identifies potential SEO poisoning activity associated with the Operation Rewrite campaign. It looks for a high volume of web requests from a single source IP where the HTTP referrer indicates the traffic originated from a search engine. This pattern can indicate a compromised host being used for malicious purposes or a user interacting with multiple poisoned search results.
Detects network traffic to a known Command and Control (C2) server (136.243.146.46:8898) associated with the YiBackdoor malware.
Detects files containing Command and Control (C2) domains and IP addresses associated with the 'Operation Rewrite' SEO poisoning campaign (CL-UNK-1037). These indicators are often found embedded in BadIIS malware variants or related configuration files.
Detects outbound network connections to the Telegram API, a technique used by XWorm for command and control (C2) and data exfiltration. The rule specifically looks for connections to "api.telegram.org/bot" and "/sendMessage" paths, originating from suspicious processes like WmiPrvSE.exe or Soundman.exe, or from common user-writable locations.
This rule detects the execution of Visual Studio Code's tunnel feature. Attackers can abuse this functionality to establish a command and control (C2) channel, allowing them to remotely control a compromised system. The rule looks for specific command-line arguments associated with the tunnel feature, including '.exe tunnel' and '--accept-server-license-terms'. It also identifies scenarios where 'cmd.exe' is used as a parent process to launch the tunnel, specifically looking for 'code-server.cmd' within the command line.
This rule detects the execution of Visual Studio Code (VS Code) tunnel functionality, particularly when the executable has been renamed. Attackers can abuse this feature to establish a command and control (C2) channel, bypassing typical network restrictions. The rule looks for command-line arguments indicative of VS Code tunnel activation, including specific arguments for accepting license terms or running as a service, and also checks for `cmd.exe` spawning the tunnel process.
Detects the download of suspicious file types (batch, command, PowerShell scripts) from well-known file and paste sharing domains. This rule specifically looks for the creation of Zone.Identifier alternate data streams on these file types, which indicates they were downloaded from the internet.
Detects fake image files (BMP, GIF, JPEG, PNG, TIFF) used by the BeardShell backdoor for command and control communications. These files contain an encrypted payload and a size field that matches the file's total size, a technique used by APT28 in the Phantom Net Voxel campaign.
Detects network connections to known malicious AnyDesk-related URLs and IP addresses, as well as the presence of specific malicious file hashes and filenames associated with AnyDesk-themed phishing or malware. This rule aims to identify potential compromise attempts or active infections involving remote access tools often abused by adversaries.
This rule detects various activities associated with the NotDoor malware, including the copying of malicious files to Outlook macro folders, C2 beaconing attempts using nslookup or curl to suspicious domains, registry modifications to disable Outlook macro security or enable macro loading on boot, and the creation of staging files in temporary directories for potential exfiltration. These behaviors are indicative of NotDoor installation, persistence, defense evasion, and data staging.
Mustang Panda conducted a phishing campaign against Myanmar entities using a compromised embassy email. The lure involved a PDF with an embedded URL that delivered a ZIP archive containing a trojanized executable and malicious DLL. The malware disguised itself as a PDF, sideloaded the DLL, established persistence, and executed further payloads. It performed system reconnaissance, data exfiltration via SFTP, and defense evasion.
Detects various activities associated with the AppSuite PDF Editor backdoor, a trojanized application with extensive backdoor capabilities. This rule looks for specific command-line execution, persistence mechanisms, and network communications.
This rule detects potential C2 communication patterns associated with the NightshadeC2 botnet. It looks for outbound TCP connections from non-browser processes to specific ports used by the malware, or connections to Steam community pages which are used to host C2 addresses. It also identifies initial geo-IP lookups from non-browser processes.
Yara rule that detects PondRAT backdoor.
Looking for several activities that are documented as being part of the initial infection chain for NotDoor (https://lab52.io/blog/analyzing-notdoor-inside-apt28s-expanding-arsenal/).
Nice as a quick historical check for any potentially interesting things to investigate further.
Nice as a quick historical check for any potentially interesting things to investigate further.
Detects Visual Studio Code tunnel execution. Attackers can abuse this functionality to establish a C2 channel
Detects renamed Visual Studio Code tunnel execution. Attackers can abuse this functionality to establish a C2 channel
Detects potential misuse of AI model APIs by correlating process creation, network activity, and non-standard AI service ports.
Covers Ollama, OpenAI, Azure OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, Mistral, Cohere, Copilot, OpenRouter, Together, and Perplexity.
Covers Ollama, OpenAI, Azure OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, Mistral, Cohere, Copilot, OpenRouter, Together, and Perplexity.
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