Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects DNS query requests to Visual Studio Code tunnel domains. Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.
'Identifies patterns in the time deltas of contacts between internal and external IPs in Fortinet network data that are consistent with beaconing.
Accounts for randomness (jitter) and seasonality such as working hours that may have been introduced into the beacon pattern.
The lookback is set to 1d, the minimum granularity in time deltas is set to 60 seconds and the minimum number of beacons required to emit a detection is set to 4.
Increase the lookback period to capture beacons with larger periodicities.
The jitter tolerance is set to 0.2 - This means we account for an overall 20% deviation from the infered beacon periodicity. Seasonality is dealt with automatically using series_outliers.
Note: In large environments it may be necessary to reduce the lookback period to get fast query times.'
Accounts for randomness (jitter) and seasonality such as working hours that may have been introduced into the beacon pattern.
The lookback is set to 1d, the minimum granularity in time deltas is set to 60 seconds and the minimum number of beacons required to emit a detection is set to 4.
Increase the lookback period to capture beacons with larger periodicities.
The jitter tolerance is set to 0.2 - This means we account for an overall 20% deviation from the infered beacon periodicity. Seasonality is dealt with automatically using series_outliers.
Note: In large environments it may be necessary to reduce the lookback period to get fast query times.'
Detects network connections utilizing specific URL paths associated with Prometei botnet malware distribution and command-and-control (C2) communication.
Detects the execution of the "curl.exe" command, referencing "SOCKS" and ".onion" domains, which could be indicative of Kalambur backdoor activity.
'Malware authors will sometimes hardcode user agent string values when writing the network communication component of their malware. Malformed user agents can be an indication of such malware.'
Detects DNS queries initiated by "QuickAssist.exe" to Microsoft Quick Assist primary endpoint that is used to establish a session.
Detects the execution of a shell (powershell, bash, wsl...) via Visual Studio Code tunnel. Attackers can abuse this functionality to establish a C2 channel and execute arbitrary commands on the system.
Detects the installation of VsCode tunnel (code-tunnel) as a service.
'It is reccomended that these Categories shoud be blocked by policies because they provide harmful/malicious content..'
Detects the execution of the "curl.exe" command, referencing "SOCKS" and ".onion" domains, which could be indicative of Kalambur backdoor activity.
Detects the installation of VsCode tunnel (code-tunnel) as a service.
'Identifies callouts to Discord CDN addresses for risky file extensions. This detection will trigger when a callout for a risky file is made to a discord server that has only been seen once in your environment.
Unique discord servers are identified using the server ID that is included in the request URL (DiscordServerId in query). Discord CDN has been used in multiple campaigns to download additional payloads.
This analytic rule uses [ASIM](https://aka.ms/AboutASIM) and supports any built-in or custom source that supports the ASIM WebSession schema (ASIM WebSession Schema)'
Unique discord servers are identified using the server ID that is included in the request URL (DiscordServerId in query). Discord CDN has been used in multiple campaigns to download additional payloads.
This analytic rule uses [ASIM](https://aka.ms/AboutASIM) and supports any built-in or custom source that supports the ASIM WebSession schema (ASIM WebSession Schema)'
Detects execution of curl.exe with custom useragent options
'Matches domain name IOCs related to Forest Blizzard group activity published July 2019 with CommonSecurityLog, DnsEvents and VMConnection dataTypes.
References: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/07/17/new-cyberthreats-require-new-ways-to-protect-democracy/.'
References: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/07/17/new-cyberthreats-require-new-ways-to-protect-democracy/.'
Detects Visual Studio Code tunnel execution. Attackers can abuse this functionality to establish a C2 channel
'This rule identifies a web request to a URL that holds a file type, including .ps1, .bat, .vbs, and .scr that can be harmful if downloaded. This analytic rule uses [ASIM](https://aka.ms/AboutASIM) and supports any built-in or custom source that supports the ASIM WebSession schema (ASIM WebSession Schema)'
'Identifies a match across various data feeds for domains, hashes and IP IOC related to Mercury
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/25/mercury-leveraging-log4j-2-vulnerabilities-in-unpatched-systems-to-target-israeli-organizations/'
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/25/mercury-leveraging-log4j-2-vulnerabilities-in-unpatched-systems-to-target-israeli-organizations/'
'This detection will identify network requests in HTTP proxy data that contains Base64 encoded IP addresses. After identifying candidates the query joins with DeviceNetworkEvents to idnetify any machine within the network using that IP address. Alerts indicate that the IP address of a machine within your network was seen with it's IP address base64 encoded in an outbound web request. This method of egressing the IP was seen used in POLONIUM's RunningRAT tool, however the detection is generic.'
Detects Visual Studio Code tunnel execution. Attackers can abuse this functionality to establish a C2 channel
The following analytic detects a suspicious process making DNS queries to known, abused text-paste web services, VoIP, instant messaging, and digital distribution platforms. It leverages Sysmon EventID 22 logs to identify queries from processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, and others. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to download malicious files, a common initial access technique. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the target host.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, MailSniper Exchange attack tool.
MailSniper is a tool that targets Microsoft Exchange Server. The core function is to connect to Exchange Server and search through emails. In support of this, it can perform reconnaissance, collection, exfiltration, and credential theft. MailSniper is used both by red teams running penetration tests, and by malicious actors.
Microsoft Defender Security Center may record the following alerts during and after an attack:
1. Global mail search on Exchange using MailSniper
2. Exchange mailbox or mail folder search using MailSniper
3. Enumeration of Active Directory usernames using MailSniper
4. Enumeration of the Exchange GAL using MailSniper
5. Access to Exchange inboxes using MailSniper
6. Password spraying using MailSniper
7. Enumeration of domains and user accounts using MailSniper
The following query detects activity commonly associated with attacks run with MailSniper.
Reference - https://github.com/dafthack/MailSniper
MailSniper is a tool that targets Microsoft Exchange Server. The core function is to connect to Exchange Server and search through emails. In support of this, it can perform reconnaissance, collection, exfiltration, and credential theft. MailSniper is used both by red teams running penetration tests, and by malicious actors.
Microsoft Defender Security Center may record the following alerts during and after an attack:
1. Global mail search on Exchange using MailSniper
2. Exchange mailbox or mail folder search using MailSniper
3. Enumeration of Active Directory usernames using MailSniper
4. Enumeration of the Exchange GAL using MailSniper
5. Access to Exchange inboxes using MailSniper
6. Password spraying using MailSniper
7. Enumeration of domains and user accounts using MailSniper
The following query detects activity commonly associated with attacks run with MailSniper.
Reference - https://github.com/dafthack/MailSniper
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